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introduction fo m s $w

m

The role of government* both state and mbional*..la the economic
relations between labor and management has become one of major importance

in recent years. M the main* government regulation of industrial
relations has been accepted as a desirable alternative to the evils of
unrestricted warfare between Gzqployem m g employees* Both the federal

and many of the state governments are pursuing a policy today designed
to promote industrial peace#

1# BAOK0B0UHB OF

BEOJi&mtl

m e role of government bodies in the industrial conflict has not

always been as. Important as it is today#. In the early years of .American
history* industrial conditions did not warrant extensive Intervention in
the affairs of master and servant* Production of goods was carried out
m a highly decentralised basis# Ihe relationship between employer and
-employee was etmmoteriaed by the presence of mutual interest#! the
element of conflict in economic objectives was almost nan-existent. The
majority of workers In this early stage of Industrial development were

self^is^Xoyed* owning their own tools of production# Even those who were
alloyed by other craftsmen* the apprentices* could look forward to the
'*
•£•,
day when they too would become master craftsmen and enjoy the independence

of self-^en^loya^nt•

2

the doctrine of conspiracy
In spite of the relatively harmonious relations between employers
and employees in this early period* government regulation of industrial
relations was not entirely absent# Associations of workers were organised
in this societyj as these groups became more and more militant in their
demands* striking for higher wages* the closed shop*'1'and asserting the
right to organise* the judiciary felt impelled to check this activity#
This was accomplished by the application of the common law doctrine of
conspiracy to the associations* Under the doctrine of criminal conspiracy*
an act which is lawful when performed by an individual* may be unlawful
when done in concert with others* In many of the early labor cases the
doctrine of criminal conspiracy invoked by the courts was successful in
stemming the rising tide of employee organisations*^ Even though this
doctrine was sharply limited in the case of Commonwealth v. Hunt»
♦'criminal prosecution for conspiracy continued to be quite frequent until
about 1890* and thereafter ceased to be of much importance only because
injunctions had become the most usual form of action in labor disputes*'*^
Impact of the Industrial Hevolution on isovemment regulation
the conditions which existed in American Jndustry in the first
1

Peo^Xe T * * * lv in 9 ^ Wheeler 0* 0. (If. I.) 262* <1810).

2 Philadelphia Cordwainers Case, <1806.)•
3 4 Metcalf 111* (Mass** 1842).
^ Commons* 1* H«* and Andrews, J* B.* Principles of Labor
Legislation, New York* Harpers* p# 102#

3

'half of the nineteenth eetgtaugr m m drastically changed when the
Industrial Bevolution reached the United States.# With the advent
of the factory system of production* the worker could no longer mm
the tools 'with which he worked*.

The tools in the factory system

■were the machines* and few men could amass the capital necessary to
purchase them* Thus, two rather distinct glasses arose* On the one
hand was the capitalist and employer who owed and controlled the means
,of production^ and mat therefore able to offer employment* On the other
£-v,\hand was the formerly independent craftsmen* who now were forced to work
for wages* is.,the gulf widened between these’two classes .in the indust*
rial, society* it was' quite natural that conflicts between them sbouM
arise* and as the factory system gained a firmer hold in the United
States* these, conflicts m m intensified*
Ba SaUssMThe prevailing philosophy at that time definitely favored the
employer In this conflict* The last quarter of the nineteenth century
"witnessed, however* the beginnings of strong unionism, in the form of the
American Federation of labori this In spit© of the rather strong antiunion feeling in the country* A few- years before the. turn of the century*,
the labor injunction became the principal, regulatory device of the state
and rational government* and it was freely utilised by the courts to pro
tect the rights of employera. fro® concerted activities by the.unions*
■Organised labor sought relief from, the injunction as well as itm the
Sherman Antitrust Act* which the courts had interpreted as applying to

labor,^ and rollof m & granted by Congress la the passage of the day*
toa Act in 1914# *Sb& -Supreme 0aurt of the baited States, heaver,
interpreted the Act in such a manner that- it m s rendered worthless
insofar as protecting, organised labor m s ;concerned*-^ In-the 2 m $
case, an Arisen© statute which closely adhered to the wording of the
Clayton Act was declared ^constitutional* ©ms, the early attespts of
the. state and 'national legislatures to provide labor with a semblance of
protection were overruled by the judicial branch of government*
Beimlation jn the depression yearp«
In 1932, however, Congress again enacted legislation designed to
encourage and protect the unions* Ttm passage-in that year of the Horris~
laGuardia Act which curbed the use of injunctions in labor disputes, was
more favorably received by the courts than m s the Clayton Act* State
legislatures: also passed similar legislation, known as the "little Horris-*
laCuardia Acts", and these tended to supplement the national law in the
area of Intrastate commerce*
Positive regulation of the- rights of employers in the industrial
.conflict mu achieved with the enactment in 1935 of the Wagner Act, which
'defined certain unfair labor-practices which employers could not lawfully
perform in dealing with employees, scad set up the national labor Halations
Board to handle grievances arising under 'the Act, In '1937, the Bwprmm
5
„

£s* x *

6
^

teal. X* tSS&SE* 203 o. S, 274,. (1908).
. _

_

, oc<

. ,.. .

, 257.0.

S- 312, q921)| M s M * M m r n & ,
m&gss, x« Ssaaaaga S ssl

254 u . s . 443, (i9 2 i)j M te ^

S o., 259 0. 3. 344, (1922).

Court held the Wagner Act to be constitutional in a. series of four
decisions handed' do*** on the ease day*?

tous the role of the- national

government to the regulation of industrial relations was vastly ex
panded*
toe state governments had long been active to enacting frag
mentary legislation designed to regulate industrial relations*

When

the constitutionality of the Wfegner Act m i assured* several of the
states passed their m m labor relations acts*^ toes© were modeled after
the national law for the most part* although those passed from 1939 on
to the present time have tended to place m m

restriction on the rights
t

of labor than did the Wagner Act* Several of these laws* for exaisple*
define certain practices which are unlawful when performed by labor*
to addition to the eiployer unfair labor practices*

HafrJas §m m &m jm&sMm s i MashuM*
'Itetog the years of World. War XX# the Wagner Act remained the law
of the land* Government regulation of industrial relations was consider
ably extended* however*, to meet the need for uninterrupted production of
war goods* the War labor Board was formed to facilitate production*
labor gave up the right to strike to return for maintenance of membership
agreements# and other concessions were granted by both employers and the
unions to achieve the objectives of the war effort* this was m era of
7 MUMS v. Jones and I m m M A w Steel Corp.. 301 U, S. lj <1937)I
Press v, MLRB. 3CE U, S. 103, (1937)| SU£8 v.
Maries ClothlPK Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 615; | M § 1- I^ehauf .Trailer
&$»« Ct. 642.
® Colorado, 1943; Connecticut, 1945; Massachusetts, 1937, Michigan,
1939J Minnesota, 1939; Sew loric, 1937; Pennsylvania, 1937; Shod® Island,
1945; Utah, 1937; Wisconsin, 1937.

&
uncommon cooperation between the two disputants# but the cooperation
was not entirely voluntary since it was enforced by the Board and the
War Labor Disputes Act*
It mm perhaps inevitable that a wave of stride© should follow
the cessation of hostilities* Reconversion was constantly interrupted
by work stoppages* As a result, public syxqmthy with the program of
organized labor waned considerably, and a strong demand for restrictive
regulation of labor unions became apparent* ,This demand was translated
into action by Congress with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in
194?* The salient features of this act are well-knovmj it defines un
fair practice© by labor, outlaw the secondary boycott and the closed,
©hop, and requires periodic reports fro® union organizations* in short,
the Act places many restrictions on the activities of labor which were
allowable under the original Wagner Act of 1935* It is the culmination
of federal regulation of industrial relations to the present time* fkm
Taft-Hartley Act, has been severely criticised by the leaders of organ*
ized labor* As a result of the Democratic victories in November, 1943,
it was felt that this law would be repealed, but present trends in Son**
gress indicate that this is highly unlikely, at least until after 1950*
As shall- be shown subsequently, the states have also followed the trend
toward restrictive labor legislation in the postwar era*
II* THE PBOBXSH

t
-■

*

t*

*

r

The preceding cursory examination of the background of regulatory
V

I

.

#

action by governmental bodies in the United States-in the field of

uncommon cooperation between labor spd management, but the cooperation
was not entirely voluntary since it was enforced by the Board and the
War labor disputes Act,
It was perhaps inevitable that a wave of strikes should follow
the cessation of hostilities*
by work stoppages.

Reconversion was constantly interrupted

As a result, public sympathy with the program of

organised labor waned considerably, and a strong demand for restrictive
regulation of labor unions became apparent*

this demand was translated

into action by Congress with the passage of the Taft^Bariley Act in 1947#
The salient features of this act are weH-knownj it defines unfair
practices by labor, outlaws the secondary boycott, the closed shop and
the jurisdictional strikej it requires periodic reports from labor organic
nations and non^eommunist affidavits from union leaders.

In shorty the

Act places many restrictions on the activities of labor which were aliens
able under the original Wagner Act of 1935*

It is the culmination of

federal regulation of labor relations to the present time*

The Taft#

Hartley Act, has been severely criticised by the leaders of organised
labor*

As a result of the Democratic victories in November, 194B, it

was felt that this law would be repealed, but present trends in Congress
indicate that this is hl#iy unlikely, at least until after 1950*

As

shall be shown subsequently, the states have also followed the trend
toward, restrictive labor legislation in the postwar era*

II* THE PROBLEM
The preceding cursory examination of the background of regulatory
action by governmental bodies in the United States in the field of

?
industrial relations indicates two rather significant facts*

First,

certain trends may he seen in the historical development of goverment
activities in the industrial relations field*

Originally taking the

position that associations of employees were detrimental to the public
interest, state and national governments utilised their pavers to
restrict the rise of unionism, invoking first the doctrine of criminal
conspiracy, and later the injunctive power of the judiciary.

Except

for a reversal of policy in respect to railway employees, this trend
continued until the passage of the Uorris^LaOuardia Act in 1932«* From
this point a new trend m s evident as governments became dedicated to
a policy of not only encouraging the rise of unionism but also to a
program of active regulation of employer rights in industrial relations*
this phase of goverment control continued with little interruption
until 194?*

With the passage of the TafWiartley Act, government policy

has returned to a less liberal policy toward labor in an effort to
equalise employer-*eraployee relationships •
The second implication of the historical background of government
regulation of industrial relations is also pertinent to the present
study#

that is, there has been a tendency for the regulation of the

federal government in industrial relations to overshadow the action of
the state governments in this field*

This has been particularly true

since the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935* A drastic restriction of
the jurisdiction of the states in industrial relations m s imposed by
the Supreme Court in 195? when it held the Act to be constitutional * In

<aie ofi'the four decisions ^holding its Gonstitutlomlity, J&JgBj v»
*fcnes pid laujd&la S|eel Gorp>^ the Court hold that mamfaeturing
m s a part of interstate commerce and subject# to federal jurisdiction,
thus reversing a iong*»standing decision that manufacturing establish**
meni© were solely within the domain of intrastate commerce*^ While
it is granted that federal, regulation has assumed a position of greater
significance' in the conduct of Industrial relations' than is accorded to
state action, the latter must be given a position of iagjori&aee as an
integral part of the total picture of industrial relations regulation ir
the United States# In Spite of the tremendous expansion of the concept
of interstate commerce in recent years, many small business establish*
ments remain within the jurisdiction of the states# The in$>ortance of
state action to regulate the conduct of employer-employee relations in
these intrastate establishments should not be minimised#
Statement of the problem
The field of state regulation of industrial relatione has been
relatively neglected by students of labor law and legislation# Accord**
Itig to Professor .Miller, one reason for this **is the impossibility of
treating cos^rehensively state laws that include such wide variations
from one state to another*

In light of the facts, this statement

seems justifiedj however, it does not exclude the possibility of exam
ining specific area© of regulation to determine the general manner in
9 301 U. S. 1, (1937)*
1° United States v. E. C. Knight Co.. 156 U. S. 1, (1895).
Miller, G. W., American Labor and the Government. Hew Tork,
""

Prentice Hall, 19A&* p# H§4#

’
which the states have met the problem of industrial conflict, and to
point out significant trends in legislation# ’
4>'-v
the purpose of this study, therefore, is to determine the nature
and extent of state regulation of industrial relations as such regale*
tion applies to significant areas of economic conflict between employ
ers and employees* These areas are* (% } the making of uniohsecurity
agreements! (2) picketing! (3) boycotting! (4) striking^ (5) regula
tion of union affairsj and (6) unfair labor practices by employers and
employees* two- secondary problems are considered, namely, the matter of
conflict between state and federal jurisdiction, and the methods of
administering industrial, relations legislation#
limitations of Uie s^djr
-In addition to the subject matter limitations on the extent of
the study outlined above, certain other limitations must fee considered#
The validity and accuracy of the study is limited to a relatively short
period of time due to -the fact that the field of labor law and leglsla*
tion is by nature highly dynamic and subject to change* That which is
law today may not fee law tomorrow* Although the state legislatures
generally convene every two years, the legislation itself is subjectto
constant re-interpretation sand modification by the courts# But while
the details of the study m y be subject to change, it is not probable
that the major provisions of the laws will change significantly for a
few years at least*
The study is further limited fey the fact that many areas properly
included in the field of labor legislation have been omitted*. Wage and

m

hour legislation, child labor legislation, regulation of women ill
industry, regulation of wording conditions, and workers compensation
legislation, to m m but a few. M e m, the flings of industrial
relations reflation, but they do not properly lie within the scope of
a study which is concerned primarily with the regulation of the
industrial conflict's# State Anti^Xojunetion laws, popularly known as
the ^little Morris-laQuardia Acts1*, have also been omitted tram the
present study# While they limit the power of the state courts to issue
r

injunctions in labor disputes, their importance at the present time has
been greatly' reduced by the significance of other legislation with which
this study Is concerned*
xii* m s m x m m of m s

used

In order to clarify the terminology used in this study, technical
tems which are directly 'related to specific chapters are defined within
the text of each chapter* General terms, not related to a 'Specific
chapter,., are defined below* although there are conflicting definitions
of various terms in the 'laws of different states, for the purpose of this
study the most widely accepted definition is used, unless specific recog***
nition is given to the fact that a conflicting definition is being
followed*

Ae used in this study, the term employer means % person who
engages the services "of an employee, and includes any person acting upon

XL
his behalf."*2
Boanloyse
The tern employee includes any person who works for another
person in any capacity other than as a supervisor*, or as a domestic
servant* or for a parent or spouse* or who is subject to the Bailway
labor Act.*3
M>2£ AjffiiM
In this study* the tern labor dispute refers to any Controversy
COLLEGE OF WILLIAM S MARY

concerning the terns* tenure* or conditions of employment.•.regardless
of whether the disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and
employee."*^ The latter part of this definition is of great importance
since It in effect legalises such activities as stranger picketing.
The Colorado law* on the other hand* claims that an employee-employer
relationship must exist before a controversy is deemed a labor dispute,
ibis conflict is considered in the chapter on picketing*
Company union*
The Michigan law defines the tern company union la a manner
followed by most of the states* A company union "includes any employee
association* coimittee* agency* or representation plan*- formed or exist*’
ing for the purpose*..of dealing with employers concerning grievances
S*2 Wisconsin Statutes* chapter ill* section 111.02* (1939).
^ Ibid.. section 111.02 (3).
^ Mass. General laws* chapter 150 A* section 2 (7).

m

terms and conditions of employment" which is wholly or partly

dominated by an employer.^

1M

this study the term labor organisation includes any associa

tion of 'employees formed or existing for the purpose of dealing, with
employers which Is not in' any way controlled or assisted -by the
employer*
x?.

of the study amp materials used

In order -to clarify,and. Integrate the remaining sections of this
study* a 'brief .review of the. plan of organisation is advisable at this
point.
Organisation o£ the study
In the following chapter* the Jurisdiction of the states in the
regulation of industrial relations is discussed* and conflicts between
state and federal. Jurisdiction are outlined* In chapter three* state
regulation of union security agreements is discussed and evaluated*
Chapter four deals with picketing as a device for exerting pressure on
employers and the public* with emphasis upon state action to regulate
this activity* Following the chapter on picketing* attention is
focused on state regulations affecting boycotting* In chapter six* a
review is made of the limitations which states have imposed, upon the
right of employees to strike. The following chapter serves to outline
. .. .

t........

^ Colo. Laws* chapter 131* section 2 (7).
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various unfair labor practices by unions and espleyers which a number
of states have included in their labor legislation'* In chapter eight,
the regulation of labor organisations* ayrelatively new type of state
4

legislation*.,is surveyed*

In chapter nine* attention is focused upon the various methods
of administering state legislation affecting Industrial relations* with
emphasis,upon the powers and procedures of administrative agencies* this
discussion of administrative law precedes the final chapter* in which the
study is summarized and conclusions are foimlated*
Materials used in the sbudv
, Since this study is an objective survey of state regulation of
industrial relations* the primary source material utilised consists
largely of the statutes pertaining to the subject as enacted by the
legislatures of the Various states* Whenever possible* court decisions
relating to the specific topics discussed are reviewed* House and
Senate reports on proposed legislation are also utilised* as are the
Annual Reports of the National labor Relations Board*
Secondary sources used consist mainly of articles, appearing tin
law journals and related ^publications* together with definitive textbook
material*

G nm m
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THE JUBISDICTian OF THE STATE IN IHBOSTRIAI,
HEUTICNS REGULATION
i* xNmoBucTiasi
In order to understand the role of the state governments in
the regulation of Industrial .relations considerable attention must be
given to the problem of the states1"jurisdiction over industrial
relations* Several questions must be considered In this connection*
First, what is the legal basis for state regulation in this field?
Second,, in what areas of industrial relations do the states exercise
exclusive jurisdiction? And third, in what areas does state jurlsdie*
tion conflict with federal jurisdiction, and what attempts have been
made to resolve conducting jurisdictional questions?
With regard to the first two questions, fairly definitive answers
may be given* These will be discussed immediately in order to clear
the way for the more important considerations involved in the third
question*
Legal basis for state regulation
The fundamental basis upon which the states are empowered to
regulate industrial relations- is known as the state police power* This
power, which is possessed by all of the states has- been defined as 11the
power inherent in government to protect itself and all its constituents,
and for this purpose to hold the govemment immune, so far as necessary,

15
from any limitations imposed in the past.”^ The word inherent in this
definition is important* The Federal Constitution makes no mention of
a delegation of general police power to the states* and indeed, such a
delegation, had it been granted, would have been largely superfluous
since the colonial state governments possessed this power prior to the
formation of the federal system of government*
& ■this connection it is noteworthy that the federal government
possesses no inherent police power* Bather, whatever power in thl©
respect which it exercises is derived indirectly! that is, by impliestion from specific grants and delegation of other powers* All of the
basic labor legislation which Congress has enacted in the past has
been an indirect exercise, of its police power through the specifically
delegated power to regulate interstate em m erm *
On the other hand, the states are free to protect the health,
safety, morals, and general well-being of their respective populations
in whatever m y they deem appropriate, providing such legislation does
not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or otherwise subvert the Federal Constitution, the
Supreme Court, in interpreting state regulations of industrial .rela
tions in light of substantive due process, .has been rather free in
nullifying such legislation on the grounds that due process has been
i-q.i:rrr ' 1"V1”;i:'1 n-"inT|.”,:linu.'«[,nwu.JJ:

' * Gerstenberg, 0* H*, American 'Constitutional law* Hew fork,
Prentice Hall, (1937)* P* 264*
^ 14th Amendment to the Comtitution*
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violated*3 xn tbs Thornhill Case*,a state law which outlawed peaceful
picketing was held ^ unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated
the Constitutional guarantee of free speech, ettstr&xy to the fourteenth
Amendment* ,Although these decisions have sharply Halted the police
power of the states, there is some indication at present that the Court
will, be lees restrictive in.the future with regard to- state regulations
of the industrial conflict*^' The conflict between state- police power
and the power of the Court to overrule Its use by the states is by no
means resolved, but as one student of the problem has writtenj
Only if the Court continues to recognise that the primary duty
and responsibility for the regulation and settlement of local
economic and social, controversies rests upon state governments,
and limits its consideration to cases in which the state'has
arbitrarily violated its obligations, can it preserve that
detached and disinterested attitude which is necessary if it is
to maintain its position as the final authority on the interpre-* •
tation of the constitution of the United States, and at the same
time, preserve that local self-*govemaent by states, which is m
essential of the dual sovereignty provided by our Constitution,
and a fundamental of Anglo-Saxon democracy* 5
It may be concluded, therefore, that the legal basis for state
action in the field of industrial, relations is the inherent police
power of the state, Subject to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amend*
ment and other provisions of the Constitution*. In the final analysis,
the scope of state police power*ia, and will continue to be defined by
the Supreme Court, in light 'of the. prevailing philosophy of that body#
- ^ Thornhill y* AlaMma* 101 U* S* 83, (1940)5 ^ruax v* Corrigan,
257 0# .8* 3 iZ i il92l}| etc,
4 See A^oma PljaSSd
ggnggs Co.
tions Board.93 law ed. 541, ( w ) .
5 29 Virginia law Review 16?, (1942).
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the state© possessed a much larger Jurisdictional area than they
presently may claim*

4s mas mentioned previously, the Btjpesms Court

severely limited this area in 1937 *hsn it handed dona its decision
#*
in the Jonea and laughiln ffted case# Previous to this decision,
manufacturing establishments m m
commerce#

not considered a part of Interstate

But the Court, in order to support the constitutionality of

the Wagner Act, in effect was forced to abandon precedent and adept a
much wider view of interstate commerce#

the ramifications of this

decision, in respect to the Jurisdiction of the states, cannot be
overemphasised*
But within the limited sphere of intrastate commerce, that Is,
idier# a business is conducted solely within the boundaries of a state,
and the effect of its operations on interstate commerce is negligible
the state legislatures are free to legislate regulation of industrial
relations.

Bven in this area the jwisdiotton of the state is not

entirely dear#

Attesting to this is the fact that only one state has

limited -the term ^coim erae” to mean commerce within the stated

Consider**

able difficulty arises when m attempt is made to draw a lime of
demarcation between intrastate and interstate commerce#

It is with

this problem that the remaining portion of the chapter £0 concerned*

* Utah Code, section 49-1-10 (6)#
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Under a federal extern of government, such as that of the
lotted' State©* which provides for a separation of power© between the
-state and national governments* conflict© with regard to Jurisdiction
are inevitable* this has bam true in this country* not only in the
field of industrial relation©*,, but also in a number of other areas of
regulation*? Since the ih&ure status of state regulation of -Industrial
relations hinges directly upon the outcome of the jurisdictional eon**
troversy between the states and the Federal government* it is- appropri
ate that an examination be made of the background of the conflict*
together with a review of the present status- of the problem*

Sss.

Ms°Mm messMis.S teg M.
the- problem of jurisdiction .in matter© of labor and industrial

relation© was brought into ©harp focus with the passage of the original,
National labor Relations Act* popularly known a© the Wagner Act* Section
XO-'(a) of the Act. Is directly pertinent to the problem!
The Board ie.eegKmred* as hereinafter provided* to prevent any
person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section
B) affecting, commerce* This power shall be-exclusive* and shall
not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention
that has been or may be established by agreement* code, law* or
otherwise*®

7 See

0* S. 557, (1886),

§k- te.k» gs&

l« l« £a« x*

8 49 Stat. L. 453, 29 U, S. C. (1940) section 160 (a).

^

this provision leaves little doubt but'that'Congress m e
providing the National labor Elation© Board (I'URB) with sole juries
diction over’the administration of the substantive features of the Act*
In the last sentence of the section* other agencies* including those
of the states* are specifically forbidden jurisdiction in the enforce
ment of the law* th e question arising' voider the section, is whether or
not Congress intended to supersede state action 3m the field of indust**
rial ablations* and to pseenpt state prerogatives under cover of the'
commerce clause. An examination of the legislative history of the Act
indicates that it did not* neither the House nor the Senate Committee
reports indicates such an intention* and there is no specific mention in
either concerning the jurisdiction of the states in handling unfair
labor practice#*?

V

It may be argued that since no state labor relations acts-*® were
then in existence,. Congress could not be ejected to specifically grant
or supersede jurisdiction with respect to the states* But it is doubt
ful that Confess would not have forseen the eventual creation of
agencies of the states to enforce their mm "little Wagner Act©1**
particularly in light of the fact that states had imitated previous
Federal legislation, specifically the Horrls-laGuardia Act and the Olayton Act*.
9 See House -Report Bo* 1174, ?4th Congress, 1st session! June 10,
1935, p*23; and Senate Report Ho* 573, 74th Congress, 1st session^ May
1, 1935, P* 15#She term “labor relations acts" refers to .the ten states having
lam similar to the National, labor Relations Act, the- first of which was
passed in 1937*

m

It is fairly certain* therefore* that the intent of section
10 (a) m s merely ttto dispel the confusion resulting from dispersion
of authority and to establish a single paramount administrative or
^uasi-judicial authority in connection with the development of the
Federal American law regarding collective bargaining*n31
Xf any doubts existed as to the intent of Congress not to
preempt the authority of the state to pass its own industrial relations
legislation, they were dispelled in the construction of the Act by the
Supreme Court* .A case in point is that of Consolidated Edison Co* of
Hew fork v*

which came before the Court in 1930* Although

Chief Justice Hughes held that the Ht&B had properly taken jurisdiction
in the case* he did not rule out the possibility that the Hew fork
State Belaiione-Board could have handled the dispute under the state
act* this interpretation of section 10 (a) was re-enforced by the
Court*# decision in the case of
Employment Halations

B o a rd
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question before the Court was

whether or not the State of Wisconsin could Impose restrictions cm
certain union activity, specifically mass picketing* Inholding
the state

had the power to restrict union conductMr*JusticeDouglas

abated*
\

H

that

Senate Report 573* jle- elt.

12

305 V. S. 197, 59 S. fit, 206, J&938).
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315 0, S* 7AO, 62 S* Ct* 820, (19A2).
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We.'agree -w ith the statement of the United States as amicus
curiae that the federal Act was not designed to preclude' a
State from emoting legislation limited to the prohibition or
regulation o f this type of union activity* the Committee Beporta
on the Federal Act plainly indicate -that' it is not %• mere- polled
court measure" and that authority of the several States may fee
exerted to control such conduct*. Furthermore* this Court has
long insisted that an "intention of Congress to exclude States
fro$ exerting their police power must fee clearly manifested"*^
In spite of the fact that the Court clearly construed the Act as alien**
ing concurrent Jurisdiction between the states and the Federal govern*
ment, .certain, definite, limitations were placed upon, the power of the
states* In Hines v* Bauidowttz^5 the Court statedi
fbere is not«— and from the very nature.of the problem there
cannot fee^any rigid feiwXu or rule which can fee used as a
universal pattern, to determine the meaning and purpose of every
act of Congress* ibis Court, in considering the validity of
state laws in the light of treaties or federal laws touching the
same subject, has made use of the following expressionst conflict
ing;; contrary toj occupying, the field; yggnxgn&nce; difference;.
irreconcilability; inconsistency! violation! curtailment! and
interference* .But none of these expressions provides an in-’
fallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yard
stick* In the final, analysis* there can fee no crystal clear
distinctly marked fomaula* -Our primary function is* to determine
whether, under the circumstances of this particular case*
Pennsylvania*a -law stands as an'obstacle to the accomplishmenti
and execution of the full purposes’and objectives of Congress*^®
Sms* although concurrent jurisdiction is recognised by the Court* state
laws must not stand as nm obstacle- to- the accomplishment and execution
of the full pmiposes and ■objectives of Congress*"
^

Ibid.. at 7 4 8 .

15 312 *J. S* 52, 61 S, Cfc. 399*
16 JMd*» at 67,
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Bcder the Wagner Mi* a considerable degree of cooperation
existed between the state labor relatione boards and the NM3*

nThe

suggestion made in the Edison case was the basis for a rapprochement
between the. federal, and state agencies which***was carrled to the point
of negotiated agreements which assigned to the local agencies the
responsibility for handling certain categories of industries*^ this
policy was first stated by the N1BB in its third Annual Beport in 193d«
It said then*
last year the Board also reported that it hoped to make coopera
tive arrangements with the State boards to the end that administra
tive friction and lack of unifomity in the application of principles
would not ensue* this hope has been completely fulfilled and the
Board or its agents has been able' to achieve satisfactory working
arrangements with all of the State boards or their agents* M a
result, cases filed with this Board in which State boards had
jurisdiction were immediately and Informally transferred to the
State boards* or vice versa, with a minimum of misimderstanding and
with no delay****latnraHy* the Board hopes 'that, when the State
legislatures meet again they will give serious consideration to the
question of bringing to workers engaged in intrastate business the
benefits ho*#- enjoyed by workers in Interstate commerce* the Board
has never been jealous of its jurisdiction and is prepared to
cooperate with any mm State boards to the same extent as it has
With the beard© already created*18
It may be Inferred from the Court*s construction of the Wagner Act
and from the positionttsken by the M £& that the jurisdictional problem
was fairly -well settled during; the first ten .years of the. Act*© operation*
Hie Court had acknowledged the legitimacy of state action in the industrial
relations field* and the National Board had made rather extensive agreements
17

Sm ith, H. A ., 46 M ich. U

Rev, 593, a t 6071 ( 1943 ) ,

national labor Relations Board, Annual Report, 1938, p. 3,

nit)} the state agencies designed to prom ote cooperation of policies#
Biit the problem m e by no mean© settled* as m s forcibly illustrated
in the Bethlehem case^ %^±ch m m before the Supreme Court in 1947#
The question before the Court m s whether the,Hew fork State
Labor Relations Board could require the Bethlehem Steel Co** end the
Allegheny Indium Co* to recognise the bargaining rights of supervisory
employees when the policy of the National Labor Relations Board m s
such that supervisory were not accorded bargaining righto#. M tho
language of the Court the sole question was "whether* Congress having
undertaken to deal with the relationship between these companies and
their foremen, the State is prevented from doing eo,n2P In holding
that the State board did not have the power which It had easercised over
supervisory employees, the Court* in effect* reversed Its earlier stand
on the question of jurisdiction taken in the Allen Bradley ease and t|e
Consolidated Edison case#

^

S & m sam

the essence of the majority opinion was as followss (1) the
exclusion of state action may be implied from the nature of federal
legislation and its subject ma|tcr* although expressed declaration of
such an intent is lacking#^ (2) Under the Commerce Clause* Congress

19M p $ g i assaSkSa« z* Ifes Sags

67 S. Ct. 1026, (1947).

20 £bid*» at 1029,

^

1029#

Mss fe M lte ga&Bl*

Can reach local and intrastate activities which may vitally affect
interstate commerce*^ (3) ffae^power of the states.to heal with
matters Xeftto its control by ingress does not include the power
of the states to hinder the accomplishment of^federal objectives.^3
(4) Where federal ad&inlstration .has made eowpgwhetiaiCe .roles to
cover the subject matter of a statute enacted under the Commerce
Clause, state regulation in the field of the statute is invalid* even
that mrticular phase o£ the subject '
matter .hap m i beep eon*

alggasg M lisa M w k

amm*2**

this decision was unfortunate in light of the degree of coopera
tion which had been achieved between the BURS and the state board? In
Jurisdictional matters# But perhaps more Important* the decision made
a rather drastic further restriction on the police power of the state
to deal even with industrial relations in intrastate commerce. Mr.
Justice Bi*aiikfurt^r* in a seperaie Opinion* points this out so forcefully
that his judgement is worthy of quotations
Since m are dealing with aspects of commerce between the States
that are not legally outside State action by virtue of the Cfcmmrm
Clause itself* lew forte has authority to act m long as Cbngress
has not interdicted her action. $hile the State does m sufferance*
in ascertaining 'whether Congress has allowed State-action we are
not to consider the matter m though Congress were conferring a mere
bounty* the extent of which must be viewed with a thrifty eye, When
construing federal legislation that deals with matters that also lie
within the authority* because within the proper Interests* of the
States* we must be mindful that we are part of the delicate process

3* Ibid.. at 1030*

of adjusting the interacting areas of National and State authority
over commerce* tbm inevitable extension of federal authority over
economic enterprise has absorbed the authority that m e previously
left to the States. But .in legislating, Congress is not indulging
Hi doctrinaire, bard*an&*fas:h curtailment of the State power®
reflecting genial State interests* federal legislation of this
character must be construed- with ■due regard --to accommodation between
the assertions of 'mm federal authority and the functions of the
individual States, as reflecting the historic and persistent concern®
of our dual system of government* Bince Congress can, if it chooses,
entirely displace the Stages to the full extent of the far-reaching
Commerce Clause, Congress needs no help from generous judicial implications to achieve the supersession of State authority*. To construe
federal legislation so as not needlessly to forbid preexisting State
authority .is .to respect our federal system, 'Any .indulgence in con*
struction should be li* favor of the States****^5
And in concluding his criticism of the majority opinion,.Justice Frank/

furter touches upon the' effect of the decision on federal-state coopera
tion in the field of industrial relations*
M the submission by the Board before us, we have the most
authoritative 'manifestation by national authority that State
collaboration would be a blessing rather than a bane, and yet
judicial construction would forbid the aid which the agency of
Congress seeks in carrying out its duty.,*.Neither what Congress i
has said in the National Labor Kelations Act, nor the structure
of the Act, nor its policy, nor its actual operation, should be
found to prohibit the Board from exercising its -discretion so as
to enlist the aid of agencies charged with like duties within the
■States in enforcing a common policy..**26

Even a casual study of the jurisdictional problem under the
Wagner Act should indicate the logical superiority of Hr* Justice Frank*
furter1"® opinion over that which was. rendered by the majority of the
Court* His assertion that the future of the federal system of government
in the United States depends upon the judicious and conservative Inteipre2* Ibid., atTcm.
spiwiPiPiiji
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^

26 Ibid., at 1035.

isbien of federal legislation ondm r the Commerce Clause m it is
applied to areas of preexisting state authority la a striding defense
against the. increasing '.infiltration of federal control in m tim m of
local significance* He does pet deny, however* the authority of the
federal gomrmg&t to exercise its poeeta to the fullest extent under
the Commerce Clause* but he does oppose the extanblon of that power fey
the. Court ip the absence of apedfic Confessional .intent* fm m the
documentary evidence that has been presented it is fairly dear that
Congress* in passing m section M (a) of the Acts £id not wish to
prsespt state action to rcgdate industrial conflict in the manner In
which the majority of the Court felt necessary* ^Broader .language was
used In the opinion than was necessary to the decision, and-it is
difficult to believe that the Court would, if put to the test, have held
subsequently that cooperative enforcement by the states of policies
conforming to those of the National Board was no longer possible*1*^?
Boon after the decision in the. Bethlehem case was handed down.
Congress passed the labor Management Halations Act of 194?* commonly
known as the fafWiartley Act#-, this legislation amended the original
National labor Halations Act of 1939#

several- of its provisions are

pertinent to the problem of federal^state jurisdiction over industrial
relations* Although th© Act. did not greatly clarity the problem an
examination of these provisions will provide some Insight into the
present -status of.the controversy*
Judith*.; H# -A-#.*.

Jsl^*# at 610*

2?
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In five of the aeetioiie of the amended national labor Eolations
Act

deal with. tho-’JofiediatiaBi of the-states isr

tetter affecting amplo^rMVployee relations, Congress has been fairer
clear in setting forth its intentions* With the amended section 10 (a),
however, the- intent of the legislators is subject to considerable speeu*
lation* In order to clear the way for a discussion of this section, those
provisions which are mm m less capable of positive interpretation shall
be di^mssed ■first#-; m s B&on ayWjftEg' BrRvlBioti
One of the most important provisions of the amended national labor
Halations Jot with respect 'to jurisdiction of the states is contained la
section 14 (b) of the Act* this section provides that
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorising the execu**
tion or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor
organisation as a condition of
any state or territory
in which such execution or .applicative is prohibited by .State or
Territorial law*
This section was passed by (te n g m m in order to clarify any doubts which
might arise in connection with the Congressional authorisation of the
union shop under certain specified conditions In section 8 (&) (3)*
Congress realised that some of the states had labor legislation which
prohibited even the union shop, and a complicated jurisdictional problem
would naturally arise If it regained silent as to the statue of these
state restrictibhs* ’

30
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histoary.ef the aei*^ Atia dear that

the intention of ’Congress was to allow abate union security prwr% ~
eions to stands providing that the

s ta te

laws were not lesft restrict

hive than the 'Federal provision in section 0* the statesffsaay* if they
wish* p a m union security prohibitions which are m m restrictive in
character'than, the Federal law* even to the extent of prohibiting all
union security provisions* the constitutionality of these state
prohibitions on union security agreements shall be discussed under
section W of J^is'/chapter*
restrictioBag on the r^jhfe

* V *'

strike

Another provision of the tended national Labor Relations Act
which rather clearly defines the jurisdiction of the states is con*
cemad with limitations on strike action. Section 13. of the -Act' states*
Nothing in this .Act* except-as specifically provided for herein*
shall be construed eo&s either to interfere with or impede or
diminish im any way the right to strike* or to affect the AAmita~ •
tions or qualifications on that right* "
. .. .,
The

pertinent -clause of this provision in the sfinal. one* In.effect*. it

:m m & .

that the- states are free to. ir^oae restrictive on the right to

strike* providing that these restrictive are not inconsistent with
controlling decisions of the Supreme Court*2^ The Senate Committee
Report makes it clear that this section nAe not intended to change £tt
iiWMawMM#
Mouse Report 0 ® $ $Oth Cong., '1st sees** p* £0*

.
29 f £ g £ * F ^ t e ^ Mefeallurjrlcal
J » 6 B. 3 . 2 *0 , (1939)}
taerioan SSra Co., In c ., 55 I t S 1302 ( l9 W l tCJffl v , Sands Mfg. Co.,
306 U. S. 322, (1939),
'
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any respect existing law as construed in these administrative and
30

judicial decisions*“

In interpreting this section* on© difficulty is presented* that
is, it is hardly likely that Congress was unaware of the rather extensive
state prohibitions on the right to strike which were existent at the time
of the passage of the Act*- Therefore* did Congress mean that the guide**?
posts offered by judicial decisions in this matter were to serve a© the
maximum limit on state action* or as the point of departure from which
the states would be free to restrict strike activity? No positive answer
to this question is possible until the Supreme Court receives a test case*
but as one student of the problem has pointed out* “the lawyer could
hardly be charged with negligence if he should take the section at it©
face value and conclude that state power to deal with strikes remains
unimpaired•“31
Jurisdiction over supervisory employees
The amended National labor Eolations Act is quite clear on the
question of staie-federal jurisdiction over foreman and other employers
acting in a supervisory capacity* The pertinent provision in this
respect is found in section 14 (a) of the Acts
Nothing herein ©hall prohibit any individual employed a© a
supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organiza*
tion* but no employer subject to this Act shall be compelled to deem
individual© defined herein as supervisors as employees for the
purpose of any state law*, either national'or local* relating to
collective bargaining*.
30 senate Report 105# 30th Cong** 1st session* p* 20*
31 &aith* R* A** o|>* Cft*» p* 601*

30

The position of tbs £&£& under the Wagner Act with respect to
supervisory employees and their bargaining rights under the Act had not
been consistent* But in the Packard Motor Car eas©#32

appar

ently resolved the inconsistencies of the Board*s fluctuating opinions
by declaring that for the purposes of the Act, supervisory workers -were t?
to be considered m esployees. Section 14 (a) of the amended Act clearly
repudiates this doctrine# But more important, the section excludes state
action over supervisory employees engaged in industries affecting inter
state commerce* So concurrent Jurisdiction Is. possible; the position of
supervisory workers in the sphere of collective bargaining is not affected
by tbs lavs of either the states or the KLBA, and such workers have no
legal basis for assarting the right to bargain collectively* This fact*
of course, does not prevent the supervisory employees from engaging in \
collective bargaining, but merely forces them to rely upon their own
power to achieve a bargaining agreement with the employer*
B s s £ $ & m a i8 !&
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Section 8 (d) (4) of the eaended H IM provides for a degree of
concurrent jurisdiction between federal and state agencies in the media*
tion of conflicts arising under collective b a rg a in in g agreements* fhn%
the Act provides in this section that in any dilute arising out of an
attempt to modify a collective bargaining contract, or attendant to the
termination of such a contract, notice must be given to the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service and to "any State or Territorial agency
*

32 iiB§ v-

Hotor Car Cg., 330 IT. 8 » 485, (1947).

established to mediate and conciliate disputes

|\nrthemore,

section 293'(b) of the Act directs the 'Service ”ho avoid attesting to
mediate dilutes which weld have only a minor effect on interstate
commerce if State or other conclaliation services are available to the
parties.”
jHSs&sMaa&f ^fegtg jsaaHs jsbs £Sa £ £ k
ffeat Congress did not Intend-that the Federal. -C&uris should have

exclusive jurisdiction to entertain damage actions -arising under the Act
is shown in section 393 (b), Title XSX of the IKEA* fn addition to the
jurisdiction of the/federal District Courts, radial action may be
..Obtained, in %ny other court living jurisdiction of the parties1* for

violations of section-'303 (a)* 'which prohibits boycotts /and other unlaw*
fuX ccHablnaticme*
Sfeatg .iorlgdictlttn wider aeotlop 10 (a) ag aaepded
the preceding discussion of the provisions of the amended USA has
shown that the intention of Congress has been to provide, forever possible*
for the concurrent jurisdiction of federal, and state agencies in the labor
relations field# These provisions, while placing certain restrictions on
the- jurisdiction of the state#, by no means indicate 'm .intention to
entirely preempt state action, either in. Industrie# affecting interstate
commerce, or in the United sphere of intrastate commerce*
the most important jurisdictional provision of the TafWHartley
.Act,, section 19 (a)* was passed to clarify the situation that gave rise b

to the

in early 1947* At discussed above, justice

Frardsfurtor rendered a strong distent opposing the eaasg>leie super*sedure of state jaritdiotiofe by the TOP, At that tine he stated, ”1
cannot join In the Courtis opinion because I read .it to mem that it is
beyond the power of the national Board to agree with state agencies
enforcing M m like the Vagner Act to divide, with dee regard to local
interests the domain over which Congress had- given the national Board
abstract discretion, but which practically, cannot he covered by It
alone*1*
t

Ihls objection to the Court*s construction of the Wagner Act by
justice Fimkfurter was specifically resolved, in section 10 (a) of the
amended Act as follow#t
the- Board is. ^pcweredjf, as hereinafter provided, .-to prevent any
person, from engaging in any unfair labor practice'{listed in sec*
tion B) affecting commerce* mis power shall not be affected by
any other 'means, of adjustment or prevention that has been or m y
hi established, by agreement, law or otherwise! Piyvlded*.mat the
Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of a^Tsiate or
territory to- cads to such agency jurisdiction, over any cases in
any industry {other than mining, manufacturing, communications,
and transportation except idierejre^Ujmlnat^y local In character)even, though such cases m y involve labor disputes affecting com*
mere#, unless the provision of the state or territorial statute
applicable to the detersiiination of such cases.by such agency Is
inconsistent with the esorrespending; provision of this Act or
has received a construction Inconsistent therewith*
It may 'be observed that Congress has conferred upon the MUB the
power to cede to state agencies jui&adietion over cages.In which It has
original authority 'to. act, with two exceptions! (1) It- m y not cede
jurisdiction in mining, manufacturing, c<OTsunicatlone and trai^sportation

except where these industries are pmdamimntlp local in their operas
hi<ms$ and (2) eases m y not fee ceded to the state agency when -either
the state pfovi&im, which applies or it# Judicial, construction is not
.consistent with the- .amended BtM*
,fhe first o m o fo im . to the Board*s power to cede jurisdiction
was merely a translation of the dicta laid down by the Buprm m Court in M
1941 into statutory fora*34 Oongrese recogniaed the sirtgular;iKportanee0f these major industries to- the well-being Of the entire: economy and saw

fit to Jtoiude them cos^letely, except where they' m m of local importance'
only, from the jurisdiction of state agencies* It is of some significance,
however, that the Board is prohibited from ceding jurisdiction in ^mining,
maimfacburlng, <^msaunications and transportation^ rather than where these
industries are % f t acted%

Because of the expansion of the concept of
%

industries ^affecting*1 eam®ere% the difference in terminology is quite
j^orfeant,**^

Yhe reason why congress imposed Mss second exception to the Boardt
power to cede jurisdiction is obvious. .If state, laws, governing the con*
duct of ecployers and m p toyees were grossly Inconsistent with the -policy
of the National G a m m m n t $ ceding jurisdiction in labor matters to such
states would render the authority of the National Government practically
mmninglese* $hl& exception, however, doss not m m that state laws must
fee consistent in every respect to the N1M as amended, a fact which the
■ & Mart# X *

J&* olt** Ilf

35 l& Illinois L. Hmr, 500, at 501*

the Act makes eXe&r*3& ■to all practical panoses
it merely means that 'state-law- may not be leas stringent in their proscrip**
timm of; unfair ■labor practices than the M&tiohal fev*3T‘‘
In spite of'the apparent clarity of the above observations, it is
possible to eonetrue the important clauses of section 10 (a) In a number
of mysv^ However, since the construction of the section has recently
been subject to the- consideration of the Supreme Court, ©peculation in
tfaisimtter is somewhat superfluous* On the other hand, it is appropriate
that several questions be presented at this point to suiamarise some of the
important jurisdictional problems arising but of the provisions of the
amended ^tloml labor delations Act, and also to serve as an introduce
tion to the subsequent discussion of recent % 3» e Court decisions relate
log to the problem* these* question are* (1) Hay a state agency assert
Jurisdiction over the certification of a collective bargaining representa
tive where the TO® has not exercised its authority? (2 ) May' a state
agency assert Jurisdiction in -cases of concurrent power over commerce
where Congress has not Nearly -supplanted such jurisdiction? (3 ) ’ Boss
a previous certification by the MU® preclude subsequent jurisdiction of
a state agency to' enjoin practices which.are' contrary to--the' laws' of the
state? (4) May a state legislature prohibit union security agreements if';
Senate Bepori j®5# CObh Cong, 1st session,. (1947),

. See Lincoln Ifeds,
00.«t 9$ law* “ "' ~
3$ For a detailed atmmsary of such constructions, see 46 Michigan
1 . Bev* 6Q|* C334B}*
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that prohibition is more stringent than the Federal Act?
It is with these and other questions that the following section
of the chapter is concerned# It is significant to note that'these are
the controlling decisions in matters of state and federal jurisdiction
over industrial relations at the present time# (June, 1949)*

m. m m m supreme court decisions relating to the
JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
The question of the jurisdiction of a state agency to certify a
bargaining representative, in an industry affecting commerce, where the
NLRB had not acted was decided in the Bethlehem case in April, 1947.
Xt has been pointed out that the majority of the Court held that the
state agency, the New Terte State Labor Relations Board, did not have
jurisdiction* This case was decided, however, prior to the enactment
of the TafWiartley Act, which provided, in section 10 (a), that the
NLRB could cede jurisdiction to state agencies under certain conditions#
It was quite natural, therefore, that the question of the Bethlehem case
should again, arise in light of Congressional intent in section 10 (a)#
The LaCrosse Telephone case
On January 17, 1949* the .Supreme Court handed down its decision
LaCrosse Telephone pom* v* Wisconsin Itoloyment Relations Board*39
The facts in the case are briefly these* The Wisconsin Employment

^ 93 Law. ed* Advance Opinions 265, (1949)• (Citations of this
and subsequent opinions discussed refer to Law*, ed* Advance Opinions) *

Relations Board, at the request o f a union in rivalry with a union
with which the appellant corporation had a collective bargaining agree
ment, which was to continue from year to year unless terminated by
notice, held an election in. appellant*© plant to determine which union
was the choice of the majority of workers in the plant* The rival
union won the ©lection, and the old union was ousted* Both the employer
and the ousted union brought suit in the state courts# An order of a
circuit court'setting aside the certification was subsequently reversed
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court*
The pertinent question before the United States Supreme Court
was whether a ©tat© agency had jurisdiction to certify a bargaining agent
in an industry affecting commerce, where the NLHB had not asserted juris**
diction, and where the NLRB had not specifically ceded jurisdiction to
the State Board*
The Wisconsin i&E^loyment Relations Board and the Wisconsin Supreme
Court had contended that the State Board could exercise jurisdiction in
the certification of a bargaining representative until or unless the NXRB
asserted its authority to act in the matter* Sh rejecting this contention,
Mr.* justice Douglas reiterated the position of the Court in the Bethlehem
case* With regard to the 'latter, he stated*
Those considerations control the present cases* This employer is
conceededly in interstate' commerce* and the National Board has
consistently exercised jurisdiction*. The Wisconsin Act provides
that a majority of ejqsloyees in a single craft, division, department
or plant of an asg&oye? may elect to constitute that group a sepa
rate bargaining 'unit*. Section 111*02 (6)* The federal act leaves
:that matter to the discretion of the board. ■When under those cir**
cumstanees the state b o a rd put© its ic^rimatur on a particular

3f

,tgroup m the collusive bargaining agent of the employees* it
freeze© into- a pattern.that which the federal act 1ms left fluid
**»•& certification by a state board under a different or con**
flteting theory of represeatatft& m y therefore he a© readily diefoptdve of the practice under the federal act m if- the order# of
the two board# made a head-on collision* fhsse are the very real
potentials of conflict which lead vm- to allow supremacy to the
federal scheme even though it ha# not yet been applied in any
form! way to this particular s«pi0yer*$*
Hr* Justice pougl&ss conclude# by stating that the ^result we haw reached
is not changed by the labor Hanagement delations Act of (June 23) 1947*

What are- the iiopMoationa of this decision? First* it m m m dear
that the Court will not invoke section 10 (a) of the ai&ended HLE4 in case#
Involving ^presentation proceedings* that section apparently i# appli**
cable only to cases involving .labor disputes* and the Board'*# power to cede
jurisdiction 1# 'limited to such cases* thus*., the £3&$ met exercise
exclusive jurisdiction in the ceHlfication of collective bargaining rep**
resentativesjj and m y not cede* even thou# it m y wish to do so* its
exclusive authority, the second implication of the. Xa.Cro^se l^aoticn#decision is that the Bethlehem case* In which the. Court took the position
that a state agency could not assert, jurlidliition where the tfjUSB had all
ready taken action* ha# been extended to the point where even in the
absence of IffiSB action In a specific case involving representation* the
state agency m y not certify' a bargaining agent* lb the discussion of'
the Bethlehem case it was- noted that the Gourt had placet an extremely
3bM*§ at m *
U Ibid., at 270.

narrow construction on the original section 10 (&}* But instead of
relaxing the stringent interpretation of the piwislon* the Oourt in
the

groase m m has further narrowed tee area of state jurisdiction*

.In light- of the legislative history of tee fafWH&rtley Act* ante an
interpretation violates the spirit of tee provision in order to follow
a,precedent Which m s thoroughly criticised by tee minority of tee Ctemri*
as well as by many students of the juilsdietlon problem*
The Courtis interpretation may be criticised bn m m practical
grounds* Use tremendous work load of te&.jN&BB prohibits effective and
quick disposition of all cases arising under tee Act which it is to
administer* But merely because a state prevision is not. consistent .is
all respects with the national law* Justice Douglas would prevent the
ML8B from making working arrangements with, local agencies whose policies
are in general compatible with those of Congress* it does not seem
unreasonable to ■suggest that the effectuation of the Act should be the
responsibility of the Board working through Congress* rather than that
of tee Court* which has m m fit to determine the working policies of the
■H£8B by judicial.- decree, there is no indication in the case that NLHB
had disputed the assimgation of jurisdiction by the Wisconsin BoaMi
indeed* it had already entered into an agreement with tee Wisconsin Board
to effectuate tee policies of the Act under another provision*
. It may be argued that because tee H&8B did not specifically cede
jurisdiction td tee state agency the latter*# action was not valid under
section 10 (a)♦ But ■that provision does not state that the Board must

-specifically cede jurisdiction case by case* even in mining* manufact**
uring* transportation and communications where these are predominantly
local.in character* ■ the question'n m becomes* who is to determine
under what circumstances the Board‘is to cede jurisdiction* Congress*
working through HLSBj or the Supreme Court? the t& Crosse decision
w

*■

••WPIil*

«wpppiBppil»(PW(P*

seems to indicate that the Court .is taking a large measure of- respon
sibility In this determination* -k position which Justice Frankfurter
so strongly opposed in. the ~Bethlehem case#
&

tee Mneeln federal e^sa
Tet another recent case involving the jurisdiction of the states
to control and regulate the conduct of industrial relations Is that of
X^neoln Federal Labor Uniop v* teitewesbe**n £ H 1 SSd Metal Co.« &
this decision*, the Court combined questions arising under a constitutional
>

amendment of the State of Nebraska and a similar North Carolina statute*
teese two states had provided that no one be denied employment because
of membership or because of non-^nembership in a later organisation* and
outlawed the making of agreements which would be inconsistent with this
policy* Although this case will be discussed in full in the chapter on
union security agreements* it is necessary at this point to indicate the.
Court*s position with regard to the constitutionality of such an exercise
of the state police power. Mr.# Justice Black said in parti
‘fhis Court beginning at least as early as'193% teen the Mebbial
Case was decided* has steadily rejected the due process philosophy
enunciated in the Adair^Coppage line of cases*. In doing so it has:
consciously returned closer and closer to the -earlier constitutional
^*93 law* ed* Advance Opinions 201* (1949)*

principle that states have power to legislate against what are
found to he injurious practices 'in their internal commercial and
business affairs* so long as their laws do not rim afoul of some
specific federal constitutional prohibition^ or setae valid federal
law*#**Ohder this constitutional doctrine the due process clause
is no longer to he so broadly construed that the Congress and
state legislatures are put in a strait Jacket when they attempt
to suppress business and industrial conditions which -they regard
as offensive to the public welfare*^
Hds decision marks a rather bread extension of the state police power in
the industrial relations field since the Court had not previously rendered
an authoritative pinion m the validity of the anbi^closed shop- laws
of the states* Although many of the states have had. these laws, for eerne
time* their constitutionality was subject to sons doubt* particularly
'before the passage of the faft^Hartley Act. Since the Lincoln Federal
decision* however* the states are clearly free to exercise their police
power in this matter* the Court could hardly have decided otherwise .in
light of its construction of the due process clause since, the lebb^s
case*^

Closely related, to the Mncal^ Fsiea^ decision*'the Supreme Court
■on March 7® %9hf» handed, down, its opinion In. the case of X lxm m ffewnili
m

«2- Z * m asom SM S m loym ent Hetotloaa Board.4? the fact* to

this case are briery these1 During the last war*
^ l^dfci at 208ft
44 Habbla y. Swr
45 93 tow. ed. 541,

291 6* S. 502, (1934).
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pressure from the War Labor Board, agreed to the inclusion of ©alnbet**
mm

of membership clause 4a tits collective bargaining contract with a

union duly; certified by the HLHB* this clause was •carried over tram, year
to- year# even after the war had ended*- Noting under a Wisconsin statute
\

ashing it an unfair labor practice for an employer to enter into such an
agreement unless it has been- approved by a. majority of his employees,
the Wisconsin Board ordered the m p layer to- cease and desist from giving
effect to the clause, and to reinstate a discharged es^loyee with back
pay, the employee having been .released for failing to conform to the
agreement* Hie Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the order in the face of
the contention, by both union and employer that the Jurisdiction of the
state, board was ousted by the -authority of the MMB$ and that the state
statute was in conflict with the national labor Relation Act as ammended*
In affirming the .order of the Wisconsin arploycaent Relations Board
and the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court* Mr* Justice Frankfurter
msmM

in part-1
'
|a))' must mean'that bossibi* of ju*4adiot4on $» totake place on3y where state and federal laws have parallel pnovi-* ;
slotss* Where the state and federal laws do not overlap* no cession
is necessary.**.Other provisions of. the T&fWKartley Act make -it;.
even dearer* **thab the states are left free to pursue their own
more restrictive policies*-***^
,
.r

the Court then points to the provisions of section 14 (b) which specific
cally state that nothing in the faft-Hartley Act shall be construed to
mean that union security agreements are authorised in any state which
prohibits suchftgremaents* Here one of the jurisdictional problems of
Ibid., 'at*"549.
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the Taft*4iartley Act is answered# That is, the Court construes sec#*
tion 10 (a) to meantbat states need not wait for a cession of Juris** .
•diction, where- the provisions in point do not overlap with similar
federal.provisions* But this formula may.be applied only to action
in cases of unfair ■labor practices, and not in representation action,
apparently* in light of the Ja grouse decision#
In considereing the union and exaployerfa contention that because
of a previous certification by the HLB8 the Wisconsin .Board had no
authority to enjoin unfair labor practices under the state act, the
Court continued*
Since the enumeration by the Wagner Act and the Taft~Hartley
Act of unfair labor practices over which the National Board has
exclusive Jurisdiction does not prevent the States from enforcing
their own policies in matters not governed by the federal law,
such freedom of action by a State cannot be lost because the
Watlomi Board has once held an election under the Wagner Act#
The character of activities left to State regulation is not changed
by the fact of certification*,*♦Indeed, the express disclaimer in
section B {$ ) of the National labor Relations Act of intention to
interfere with State law and the pemission granted the States by
section, 14 (b) of the Taft-Hartley to carry out policies incon**
sistent with-the Taft-Hariley Act itself,, would be practically
meaningless if so easily avoided#^*
Justice Frankfurter, Joined by the majority of the- Court, concluded that
the Wisconsin prohibition of certain union security agreements was not
in conflict with the enacted policies of Congress*
By this decision, the Supreme Court affirmed what to all appear*
anees was the Intent of Congress— to leave the states wide latitude in
their- Jurisdiction of industrial relations, where the exercise of such
w

Ibid.. at 549*

jurisdiction dee® net conflict with federal law*
Although there have \m m inconsistencies la the G&ovi** construe-*
tion of the faft~Harbley provisions dealing with state jurisdiction, thefe
seems to he a trend in the thinking of the Gourt toward preserving, as
far as possible, the inherent polios power, of the states to .regelate
industrial relations#: Within the personnel of the Court, of course, Br#
justice Frankfurter .has become the most vigorous exponent of this phil**
esophy* With regard to practical as well as theoretical considerations
involved, this philosophy presents, the wisest course of action if the
federal, system of government is to be preserved in the United .States#
?* m m t A s s m n m s m ® m m &
OF JUEIS0XCTOT B3T H1HB
fhe discussion of the federal-state jurisdiction problem in
industrial relations would be incos$>Iete without a survey of recent
83LR8 action in asserting and denying for itself authority to regulate
industrial relations affecting commerce# It cannot be emphasised too
strongly that the interdependence of our present economy has rendered
the concept of "purely intrastate commerce* practically meaningless*
fhe expansion of the conceit of business and industry "affecting commerce*
has left but little latitude for the existence of the former concept#
fhe HtBB has, for example, asserted jurisdiction in the past over a small,
business whose sales were entirely in intrastate commerce and whose
materials were purchased entirely within the state, but whose materials
were originally manufactured in another state*

m

Although the SUB could* If It so desired* assert jurisdiction
ever' many small businesses to the lifted States*, this policy would
entail such a heavy edmtototrative burden, that the important phases of
Its m rk w ould suffer* ..It ha© therefore' been the policy of_the HUB
to restrict its Jurisdiction* not because of a lack of authority, but
because the policies of tbs tot which It must adiatolster would not be
effectuated*
ascent eases to which jurisdiction haa been asserted

i

,

.

»

to# HLHB has recently asserted jurisdiction over a local 'bus
company solely on to# ground that it transported to and t r m w ork
esplojreee who were engaged in interstate businesses.*8 The taw coap&ny
was not licensed by the toiersiate Commerce tommiselon and there was no
exchange of passenger© with any other bus system* to# Board has also
recently taken jurisdiction over a retailer of farm equipment who
purchased all of hto stock within the state and whose sales were less
than five per cent to other states*^

v.

In another im * n c e the H U B asserted Jurisdiction over a new
and used oar.-dealer too also operated, a garage and..gas station*^ a h
of the dealers purchases and ©ales were made witoto the state* Although
the new and m o d .cars war# purchased in the state* the Board asserted
^

KlPaeo-Ssleta Sue Co., Inc., 79 BtKB No. 1£U.

#

Hwfcoth factor Co. fit. al,# 79 MEAB So. 3».

1. Townsend. 81 H1BB No. 122.

m

jurisdiction on the ground that they had been originally shipped fro m
outside the state to a distributor within the state*
SSSSZ& cages

j^ich jurisdiction £gg been S S 3 M

On the other hand, the ffiSB has refused to assert jurisdiction
over a photography shop who received annually #25,000 worth of materials
from out of the state*, the 'Board held that the effect of these trana»
actions on Interstate commerce was inconsequential*^ HLEB has also
refused to assert jurisdiction over a chain of four drug stores in one
city| -where one~third of its purchases were from outside the state, and
most of the remainder was originally transported across state lines.^
B M t m m i M m m Mb $ m m & .

He S M

In the past, few months, considerable disagreement has been evident
in the position taken by the National labor Relations Board and its
General Counsel, Hr* Robert H* Denham, with respect to questions involve
ing assertion of jurisdiction over cases where the business only remotely
affects interstate commerce* Hr* Denham has taken the stand that it is
the Board*s duty to handle every case over which it has been given
jurisdiction by Congress* the

on the other hand has refused to

handle minor cases, leaving these to state enforcement officials* fhe
Chairman of the Board, Mr* Herzog, recently defended this position before
m

M

i

■** fTed Montgomery, d/b/a Pereira Studio, S£ ipj© 87,
Haleston Drugsto.res Inc*, 82 H1B8 Mo* 148*

a Congressional committee on

aralaticms^? It is

apparent that the General Counsel, who would seem to have the final
word In this matter under the provisions of the IUfb~Hartley Act,
feels that he has aia&ndaie from Congress to prosecute all oases
arising under the federal law* no matter hew infinitesimal the effects
of the business upon interstate commerce* Once asked what businesses
he would escsspt from interstate commerce, the
♦

General Counselreplied
r

' ■‘X-.

that he could think of none except % farmer who milked his cows and
sold the milk down the road#«54
Ihis controversy will ultimately be settled in the courts, but
until that time the small business man has no assurance as to the
legality if his relations with employees* It may. be surmised that the
outcome of the conflict will be determined in light of recent Supreme
Court opinions which have definitely been favorable to state Jurisdiction*
From a logical standpoint, the position of the HU1B is clearly superior
to that taken by the General Counsel* If the present federal system of
government is to survive in the United States, the scope of the concept
of business "affecting interstate commerce1* must be .limited far short of
the boundary set by Hr* Denham*

^G^edLin Keeeareh Institute of America, labor Coordinator* p* 151#.
54 Hew forte T im * , V o l. XC VU1, S o . 33,385, June 20, 1949, p. 10.
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agreements

Having examined the background o f modem industrial relations
regulation in the first chapter* and the problem of federal-state
jurisdiction in the second* attention is now directed to some of the
specific areas of industrial conflict in which the states have exercised
control# The purpose of the present chapter is to determine the nature
of state regulation of union security agreements* and to discuss the
constitutionality of such regulation in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions# However* it is first necessary to point out the nature and
significance of union security agreements in industrial relations#
X# THE NATURE AND SXOOTX0AN0B OF
UNION SBpUKOT AGREEMENTS
Union security agreements consist of three closely related types
of arrangements into which labor organizations and employers may enter*
usually in connection with a collective bargaining contract# These
three arrangements consist of the closed shop agreement* the union shop
agreement, and the aaintenance-ef-moabership agreement#^*
l^finitlon of the closed shop agreement
The first of these three types of union security devices* the
closed shop agreement* is by far the most iEportant# It may be defined
u jrn uj.ii,«i-mmiinyiiinii.m

i t " - , irnnir
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* Other types of union security agreements may exist* such as the
preferential shop* but these are of negligible importance in state laws#

m

as an arrangement with an employer whereby union membership is'a eon**
dition of employment* Some writers have made a distinction between a
el<>se<* ei»p with, a closed union and the eloeed shop with an open union,2
but the difference is not noted,it* the provisions of the state laws*
Definition <rf the union shop agreement
The second union security device* the union shop agreement, may
be defined as m arrangement between m employer and a labor organise**
*'
.
tion which provides that persons hired by the employer must become
members of the union within a specified period of time* usually thirty
r

*

days* as a condition of future employment* Thus* under a union she#
agreement* the employer must discharge any employee who has failed to
join the union by the thirtieth day of his employment* This type of
agreement has become especially significant since the passage of the
Taft-Hartley Act* which condones the union shop under specified condi
tions.
Definition of the. mintenance-ofHaembership agreement
The minbenance-ef^n^

type of union security device was

given considerable impetus during World War II by the policies of the
War labor Board* The Board felt bound to aid labor organisations In
keeping their memberships intact during the period in which the latter
had generally given up the right to strike* To achieve this objective*
2 eummlns* B* E.* and BeVyver* ?* ?** She labor Psoblem M the

{halted States# New fork*. J»* fan liostrand Co*, Inc** 194^ p* 2I^T

the Board ordered the Inclusion of imlnteimnce--of-membersIiip clauses
in contacts which did not provide for a dosed or union shop* if such
contracts were in dispute* ■^Sisply the maintenance of membership clause
provides that after a fifteen day period, during which -any member may
resign from the union* a worker then a member of the union must retain
his membership as a condition of ecployment for the duration of the
contract*^
Significance of union security agreements to organized labor
Of all the controversial questions connected with the labor*
management conflict, that which is concerned with union security devices
ha© been the most bitterly debated* Specifically, the focal point of
the argument, ha© been the desirability or undesirability of the closed
shop* Since little difference exist© between the dosed shop and the
union shop* in principle* the two devices have been generally treated
as one*
From the viewpoint of organized labor* the closed shop is the
flesh and blood of the trade union movement* Xh a ©hop where both
union and non-union wurisers are employed the latter receive all the
benefits of the former1© collective bargaining efforts without paying
their share of the cost of achieving those benefits* labor leaders
claim that this undermines the morale of union members and prevents
the organization from gaining new recruits* Also* the fact that the
3 Ibid,, p. 224.

•
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union does not present a solid front makes the employer-less vulner
able to the union*s demands*
But perhaps even more important* organised labor feels that the
closed shop prevents competitive wage bidding by employee©. when jobs
are not plentiful* Whsre the dosed shop exists* no employee can
offer to work for less than the union standard wage and thereby deprive
a union member of employment* Shis applies not only to wages* but also
to hours and other conditions of employment. If the union*© policy of
standardisation is to be effective, therefore, it is held that the
closed shop must be enforced*
Other arguments have been presented by organised labor to back
up its claim that the union movement depends upon the prevalence of the
closed shop* Union leaders claim that only where it exists is it
possible to effectively udisciplineff the rank and file to prevent **wiM~
cat1* and "outlaw® strikes* Here the
closed shop offer© advantages to
f
.

the employer! in some Industries, the building trades particularly,
management itself has offered this argument in support of the closed
shop*4
Arguments against the closed and union ahop
Although it may be granted that the above arguments are at least
partially valid, the closed and union shops have been seventy criticised
by

employers, as well as by a considerable segment of the non-union
4 Haber, W. G*, Industrial Relations in the Building lnd»«fcCT-

Harvard Frees, 1*00, p* 254#
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public* One o f the principal co n te n tio n s , o f those antagonistic to the
closed shop has been that the employers right to hire whom he pleases
is removed* The hiring {and firing) of workers Is essentially taken
over by the union itself, since it alone controls the requirements
for membership, and therefore employment* The argument is of course
invalid in the case of a union shop agreement, since the employer may
employ anyone as long as the worker joins the union within the speci
fied period of time*
The most appealing argument against union security devices a©
far as the public Is concerned is that they interfere with the- **right
to work*1. It is claimed that organised labor, in enforcing the closed
shop, holds monopolistic power in the labor market, and that it is
thereby able to prevent some workers from securing es^loyment* Where
union membership requirement© are unduly restrictive, and where exces
sive initiation fees and dues are emoted, this argument is valid*
S B & a U a B S i £&& controversy
All of the contentions of both those who favor end those who
oppose union security device© certainly contain element© of truth* In
the past, the controversy has been too often waged on an emotional
plane, however, rather than upon the basis of rational analysis* The
claim that the union movement would die out in the absence of the closed
shop is as latently propagandist!© as is the contention that its exist
ence is un-American* If any conclusion Is indicated, therefore,-it-Is that the validity of the argument can-only be proved or disproved through
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a trial and error type of e^ertamtahlon In union m e m p s y legislation
by the etuis#*

It Is therefore dessJrmbX# to mdk&’#n ms&satlan of the

m&imsr in which the states have im t the problem of union s M d ^ t y *
ix*
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An examination of the laws of the forty-eight states at the present
time reveal# the fast that the state# have- b#e» active in regulating
union security agreements* Xhe use of the term ^regulate” as used in
this chapter may seem ambiguous in Ught of the numerous flat prohibitions
of security M g m m m b ti which are found in the laws of lit# states*- 'but
its broad construction to include both partial and unequivocal proscrip
tions of such agreements will allow a cos$&ate survey of state agreement# add
will allow a complete mirveyof stale activity in this area of industrial
relations* fh© t#m tTregualte<,# however* Shall apply to those states
that limit the us# of u n io n security devices but that donoi prohibit them
altogether* Xu contrast to this group of states are those that completely
proscribe the dosed shop* and by inference the union shop and maintemncsof—membership ■sgreeBOBSBts*
M & M * m s tte M m
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twelve states have provisions for the regulation of union security
devices.5

Ban® of these etates prohibit all union security provisions
I,. , .n , .

n...

Alabama, Colorado, Comectieut, Kansas, Kaseachusetts* Michigan*
Minnesota* New fori;* Oregon* Rhode Island* Utah and Wisconsin*

in collective bargaining contracts* but all set up certain require**
■ments which must be fulfilled before the agreement is lawful*
One of the most frequent conditions which must be met is that
a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit must vote for the
inclusion of the security agreement in the contract* Such a provision
is found in the law of Kansas* Minnesota* Michigan* fihode Island*
Massachusetts* Connecticut and Mew fork* A typical provision is that
found in the Michigan labor Relations Act.6 Section 14 of the Act
reads:
Nothing in this act shall be construed to interfere with the
right of an employer to enter into an all-union agreement with
one labor organisation established among his employees and
recognised by him* by consent* as the representative of a
majority of his employees: nor shall anything in this act be
-construed to interfere with the right of the employer to make
an all-union agreement with more than one labor organisation
established among his employees if such organisations are
recognized by him* by consent* as the representatives of a
majority of his enployos*?
In the two states which do not provide for majority rule in
union security agreements, Colorado and Wisconsin* more stringent
requirements must be met* Xh Wisconsin* instead of a mere majority*
two thirds of the employees voting in the election must signify
willingness to accept the agreement*^ In addition* the State labor
*
Board may terminate any security agreement if it finds that an employee
^ 1.'1939» 'Public Act 176.

7 Calif, labor Code, section 921.
£ Colo, Acts, 1943, chapter 131, sections 6 (1) (c), (o),
6 (2 ) <b), 7 (1).
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denied taembership In the union without cause*, the latter provision

is alio found -in the California law in a modified form* tn that state*'
the closed shop with the closed union is banned* but closed ©hops with
■open unions are "legal*? But, thejCelorado law offers the most rigid
regulation of union security agreements*^® .In this' state* such cotw*
tracts may -be exeeuted pnly after three-fourths of the ^aployees vote.
,i' -‘'

for the- agreement in a referendum conducted by the- Industrial. CoBmission*
titering into asyunion security agreement in-■ai^r.other way constitutes
an employer unfair labor practice* Following the Wisconsin procedure,
the Colorado Ccwission may terminate any such agreement if it Is found
that an employee has been refused membership in the union* And further**
more* the Act declares that it is not an unfair labor practice for an
employer to refuse to capitualte to employe# demands for a union security
agreement*
Aside from the requirement of a referendum .of the employees prior
he the execution of a union security agreement* three of the states have
imposed other,regulations on the,making of such agreements* jO&bam^, for
expBple* guarantees the. right of .every person to refrain. Ihm joining a
labor organization, end In the exercise of this freedom* to be free from
OoereisR, fores, or intimidation either against himcelf or bin .fWOjr*^-.
? Calif* labor 'Code* section $33*
^ Colo. Acts* 1943* chapter 131* section 6 (1) (c), (e)* 6 (2) (b)*
? <1>*
1# 1943* Act No*

section B#
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The provisions of the Utah and 'Oregon laws are essentially the same.
At first glance, it would seem that the closed ©hop was banned* On
the contrary, the courts of these states have construed the provision
as' outlawing only unlawful interference wlth .a persons attitude toward
joining a labor organisation through threats, coercion* or force against
the person or hi© family*^
Thus it is apparent that even in these twelve state© which allow
the closed shop and other union security agreements, the making of such
contracts is subject to rather thoroughgoing regulation. Even where
they are allowed to exist in the states, there is the further regulation
of the Federal Government* The Taft-Hartley Act, while allowing union
©hop agreements under certain circumstances, prohibit© closed shop agree
ments in industries and businesses affecting commerce. All but three of
the twelve states, however, provide for elections prior to the execution
of security contracts which are as restrictive or more restrictive than
the Taft-Hartley Act* The essential difference in the state laws and the
national law is that the former do not provide for a thirty day period
between employment and required union membership, a provision which is
essential to a legal union shop in interstate commerce* It is clear,
therefore, that closed shops could not lawfully be executed in busi
nesses affecting interstate commerce, although they are legal in intra
state commerce* .Their legality in these states, where they affect commerce
is clearly unconstitutional! whether or not they will be so held is a
■.nil", "inmm n.rnru-H" ri.mj.lijntir ip ii.-M.jimnrl-rrj iwrilirMriilt-

Hotel and Restaurant Bspjoydeg International Alliance and
Bartenders International league of America v. Arthur Greenwood. 249 Ala.
265, Ala. Sup,Ct.(l947).
!
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matter of Aether or not the I&&B asserts jurisdiction*
Prohibition

t|he.closed shop and pfthar union secu^dtv

the regulation of union security d m ices by the states has not
ended with a mere recital &£ conditions which must he fulfilled prior
to the egseution of an agreement*' legul&iieii* as such* has been cast-aside
by a number of the states in favor of flat prohibitions of the closed
shop* And since there has been no differentiation between the closed
shop# the 'Union shop* and maintenance«ofmembership agreements in
them state laws* they may be. considered to proscribe all union security
devices*
Thirteen states3^ have enacted prohibitions against union security
agreements either by legislation or constitutional, amendment*. The oldest
such- law in force is that of Hevada* which dates bach to 1929. The
height:, of the anti-*eIosed shop drive was reached in 194?* when seven
states took action*. Since then* only one state* Borth Dakota* h m im *
posed a ban on the closed shop* The geographic distribution of these
states indicates that bans .on the -closed shop 'have come from the non*
industrial* predominantly agricultural sections- of the country* This
may be accounted for by the lack of union strength in these areas* It
is not unreasonable to suggest that the closed shop prohibition# in the
Southern states indicate a defense against the organisation drives which
^ Virginia* Texas* Tennessee* South Dakota* Borth Dakota, Berth
Carolina* Nevada* Nebraska* Iowa* Georgia* Florida* Arkansas* and Arizona.
yr~™
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'
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many national unions have recently conducted in that area*
Among these thirteen states that proscribe union security In
all its forms, several interesting variations may be observed* The
Arizona constitutional amendment declares that*
Ho person shall be denied the opportunity to obtain or retain
employment because of non-membership in a labor organization,
nor shall***(anyone) enter into any agreement, written or oral,
which excludes any person from employment or continuation of
employment because of non-membership in a labor organization#*^
Floridafs constitutional amendment provides that the "right of persons
to work shall not be abridgedon account of membership or non-membership
in any labor union, or labor organization*.♦•

Georgia has enacted an

elaborate statute, containing eleven separate sections, all of which
simply proscribe union security in any form whatsoever* The Horth
Carolina statute of 194? not only prohibits the closed shop, but also
gives reasons for the action* It declares that*
The right to live includes the right to work* The exercise of the
right to work must be protected and maintained free from undue
restraints and coercion* It is hereby declared to be the public
policy of Horth Carolina that the right to work shall not be
abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor
organization or association*
The Horth Dakota statute begins with the statement that "Ho person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,1*
and subsequently points out that because the closed shop is such a
Constitutional Amendment, adopted Hov* 5, 1946*
3-5

Constitutional Amendment, adopted Hov* ?, 1944*

16 L. 1947* chapter 328, sedtion 1.

!

deptivabion# all'such contracts are mil and vold*^?
It Is- apparent that in spit© of the variation in temimlegy ai*d
mttesaiimtion m sptc^Bd by these states# ■the statutes ape essentially
similar* there-1© to doubt but that they on© and all prohibit the
making of union security agreements#
Althougha total of tweniy^fiv© eta-tee at present either thoroughly
reptote #r flatly proscribe union security agreements in collective
bargaining.contracts#. at leasttie* states tere taken action recently to
prevent each reflation or prohibition, the legislature of the state of
hhlne* after enacting a dosed -shop h m in-1047# found that a legal
teelmi-aality prevented the hill from becoming h©#

-it•the general eleo*

tion in September# 194&# the hill and a constitutional amendment initiated
fey the people were submitted for a referendum* Both of the .measures mm
defeated at the polls* Wm Hampshire, has also taken steps to remove regu-»
latlona on union security agreements* these regulations# Imposed in 1947#
wore repealed on March 11# 1949*^
Eaiing surveyed both the regulation and the prohibition of union
security devices .by the. states, the task remaining is to -determine the
const1tuttonality of union security regulation fey an e^amlsaatlon of
pertinent Supreme Court decisions*

1* 1947#-chapter 243# section 1# effective July 29# 194t*
10 1 . 1949* ch ap ter 5 7 .
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Iwt* top*# scare of to# states bow prohibited and wgwlsbed
the closed shop and union goimritF agreements of other types for many
$m m $

the consittubiomlity of those statutes had awer bean given

authoritative eojuiidembton until early la 1949* M 1945* Florida1'#
constitutional amendment declaring that the "right to work" shall not
he denied bacsu## of wmtortofp or SKU^embertolp la- a labor organise
tion was upheld by the state warts* but la Ifid this Judgement was
reversed by the United States Supreme Court on the ground that the
florid# court# had jaisccastrued the

.An effort was made to

obtain an authoritative wnstracbion in 1947# but with no success♦
Cn January 3# and parch 7, 1949* however, too Supreme Court
matoitoXXy clarified the state# of state 'union security regulation*
Cpinions by the court to the Itocoln federal case* and toe Algoma ftoiood
s^d Veneer case haw been discussed to connection with the Jurisdiction
problem* lb# third decision* toerican

SS^MSSM-SS^*

of &##!» v* Amsatoati

20 **» merely an extension of the Mneoln FedeiraA

judgement* handed down on the same day* He avoid repetition* toe

#®pha#to to this discussion shall, be placed- upem the no^Jurisdicttoml
aspect# of these opinions upholding toe validity of union security
regulation.

iy m

&* m s m m o. s. sea, e m u .

93 Law, «t» Advance'Opinions 209, (1549).
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la. combining the questions. m in in g under the M m a fk a amsn*§»*
rnent m&, the Berth Carolina statute banning the closed shop In the «.
case of Idneela Federal labor Union v* ISerfchweefcern lion and. Metal Co#,^
the Court m e faced with a masher of issues*, first M g . these m e
whether or not the abates* In prohibiting employment discriadn&tion
either for membership or iwiNeesherehip in. a labor organisation# ’
tod
violated constitutichel grants of freedom of speech# and the right to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, as ,
guaranteed by the first Jtoendment and protected from Invasion by the
states in the fourteenth itendment*
Hr* Justice M&eS%. speaking for m ix of the Justices# felt that
the- state provisions proscribing the dosed shop did not so do*.. .In this
connection he declared*
Under the state policy adopted by these laws# sap!pyers must#
other considerations being equal* give equal opportimlt.is0 for
remunemtive work to union and m z m m lm members without discrlmlnatlon against either*, 'in order to achieve this objective'***# employ**
»rs are forbidden to make contracts which would obligate them to
Mrs or keep m m but union members* Nothing in the language of the
laws indicates a pmpoee to prohibit speech* assembly*.'or petition****
It In difficult to- see how enforcement of this state policy could
infringe the freedom of speech of anyone# or deny to anyone the right
to. assemble or .'to petition, for a redress of grievances**®
fhts opinion was further strengthened by Mr* Justice B3aek*s statement
that there weannot be « m g from a constitutional, right of workers to

^ 93 .law*; ed* Advance Opinions, 201# {19493-*
22 Ibid-■ at 204.

ass^ib3je***a further constitutional right to drive from remunerative
espleymeht ;
all other persons- who will, not or cannot#, participate in
union

' fhe second issue# whether the state -laws violated freedom of
contract m provided for' in Article I'section 10 of the 'Oonstituti'sm#

was prcmptly dismissed as -a contention ^without meritw by-the Court*
cited foas

and .jfcfjgft

V* .^aisdeil* 290 C* S*

394# -and other .exporting cases*
It mi toiler contended that the laws of Horth Carolina and

Bebraska deny union members and- union organisations equal protection
of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth j&aendtani* this assertion
mss refuted' by the Court, because «inideniical language these’state'
lams 'forbid employers to cliscrimiimte against- union and mt&mlm.lumbers* "-Kebras&a and lorth Carolina thus

equal employment oppor

tunities for- both gimps of workers**1^
- The fourth issue was. Aether the"laws deprived the mipn m^ers
and union organisation©# or eaployers# of liberty without due process
of law* ■the specific contention of-the appellants was- that the part of
the- laws -which.prohibited makin.g of discrimimtory contracts was in ; •'
conflict with the Fourteenth

But Mr* Justice Black thought

otherwise! 'if **the states have -constitutional power to '‘
ban such diaerSia*
Inatlcn % law# they also-: have power to- ban contmefee which if perform
at 205.
BtitU. at 206.

'
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w n u M bring about the prohibited

'
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m

*

holding*

« * Court wmdered the precedents of Jggig *» g g & g . Stoteg*26 and
CoooaKe v. toneas.^

null «n& void# if auch action wae even necessary

in light of the Courtis construction of the due process clause since

ilthmigh the Gourt g&rongly upheld the tot!* Oareliha and W tem & fo
prohibitions of discrimination against union or aon^unlon m m herst some
doubt ■aa&eied as to whether they would as vigorously simeiion the Arlsona
amendment^, which provided that only noiGHfflefflhers of labor organim.tions
were protected from ei^layment diserhaimtion* fhis case# ftaeffi&im
-f t , labc^-V*, Ja^erlcaii Sfe&ft and.Boor'Op*#-,was decided

on the

some day as the Mneote federal- case#. Hr* Justice Black again delivering
"the opinion of Hie Court*
3h holding that the -Arisotm amendfaeni prohibiting "the closed shop

did not violate freedom of speech* assembly* or petition the Gourt relied
on the reasoning•of the Mnooln Federal decision*:' the principal- issue*,
however* 'was whether the failure of the- law to provide the seine protection
to union mmfa&tn m that which was provided for non-union .workers denied

the former" equal protection of the lews*-. In refuting the contention that
>lW>^

ilWl>W <)l,1|^i<i« . y i»^i|wm i»Mr(l>|ii'i>UJIHi|i.i<i»ii|llll<|.

26 208 B. S. 161 (1908).
• 27 236 8*. 8 * '1 * (1915) ♦

equal protection had been denied malm jgHlhers*.*|ustif# J8X&& poinisi.
to the State'*0 m % i~ ^ l3 u m dog contract Jaw* ,Fusthe**a&re# he m pv® &*
m&

the view* previously heM by the Gourt* that ^legislative .authority*

everted, within its proper field* need net embrace all ihesvlle ■within
Its reach.02® Therefore, merely because the State of Arizona had not
provided that dieerimta&iion against union aon&sro in

mm

unlawful* dons not render the- protectioh -afforded another gsmg*
undOnstltutional*

.

*

.’*^-

’

'%- those two decisions* the Court ifeusupheld the closed ship.
'

\ '

*

.

*

-*

- ' ' *

prohibitions in the thirteen states that have such lawn* tad in the
decided three months later* the Court upheld the right

m m ^
mi

the states to regulate the making of union security agreements*
«

»

* j.

?

that MprnS,m»- .to effect* establishes the constitutionality of the
proVioioiis in the laws of .twelve other states which require*, prior
to the e&ecuticn of ^.such an agres«aent| a referendum in which a
.mlority or more Of the

authorise the; contract*

t deo^ympj

.

it is'pertmp# too early- to judge the effects of the decisions
discussed above,# there is. .little doUbb* however* that the Cburt*#
opinions will encourage other-state#1
-to- either regulate or prohibit

„

_

^ tism^SamS

SgBsgf So. I ' M m

Boat'd. 93 Z&w. ed. Advance {fcinioaa 541* (1949)
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u n io n

security devices. The fact that the power of the state to

take action in this field of industrial relations has been upheld
without reservation* and without strong dissenting opinions* shears
away many of the. obstacles which in the past have mdm mam states
reluctant to attempt ^gelation*
Perhaps the most significant effect of the decisions is that
they involve a considerable extension of the power of the states*
which in the past has been narrowed considerably by a restrictive
construction of the due process -and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution* tn ether fields of regulation* this construction
began to yield to a more liberal Interpretation a number of years
ago* finally being abandoned in the case of Nebbia v;* Hew York» in
1934* How the Robbia philosophy has been applied with full force
and effect In the -regulation of security agreements in industrial
relations* The precendent has been established* whether it will be
expanded or Halted in the future depends largely upon public opinion
and the composition of the C o u rt*
Ho attempt has been made in this discussion of union security
regulation and prohibition by the severalstates to ^rove” the
desirability or undesirability of such legislation# It m s submitted
afoove^O however* that only through experimentation within the states
could the controversy foe resoXvedU In this cormection* Mr* dusttee
•
'
t
c
‘
■
*'
Frankfurter1s opinion in the. Ameidcan Sash and Hoor case is illuminate,
ings
See page

Even where the social undesirability of a law may be convincingly
urged, invalidation of the law by a court debilitates popular
democratic government* Most laws dealing with economic and social
problems are matters of trial and error* That which before trial
appears to be demonstrably bad may belie prophecy in actual opera-*
tioru It may not prove good, but it may not prove innocuous* But
even if a law is found wanting on trial, it is better that its
defects be demonstrated and removed than that the law should be
aborted by Judicial fiafcv**’

^ M k 1* American Bash and Door Co** op* clt* at 216,
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REGULATION OF PICKETING

i
lb has been shown in the preceding chapter that many states have
regulated or prohibited union security agreements in collective bargain*
ing contracts* This, however, is but one area of industrial relations
in which the states have been active in exercising their Inherent police
power* It is the purpose of this chapter to examine another field of
industrial relations which has been subject to state regulation, that
which embraces the use of picketing as an economic pressure device by
labor organisations* Because of the importance of judicial decisions on
the regulation of picketing by the states, a review of selected Supreme
Court opinions is advisable at this boint* This discussion is followed
by a survey of present state laws affecting picketing, together with
an evaluation of these provisions in light of controlling precedents of
9
the Supreme Court*
I* ATTITUDE OF THE COURT TOWARD
PICKETING PRIOR TO 1940
Picketing as an economic pressure device has had a long and
variable history before the courts of the land* Oily forty years ago
the majority of the judicial fraternity considered all picketing, peace-*
fbl or attended with violence, as a tort* Thus in Pierce v; Stablemen*s
U n i o n the California Supreme Court held that a legitimate boycott was
rendered unlawful merely because the unions demands had been transmuted
1 156 Calif. 70, 103 Pac. 324, (1909).
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to the public by a picket line. That the picketing was carried on in
an orderly and peaceful manner was of no concern to the court5 neither
was the fact that the attendant strike was for union recognition-—not
a purely economic strike. The sole concern of the court was the legality
of the picketing, Justice Henshaw reflected much of' the.early attitude
toward this union device when he declared*
'Me think it plain that the very end to he attained by picketing,*,
i© the injury of the boycotted business through physical molestation
and physical fear caused to the employer, to those whom he may have
employed or who may seek employment from'bin* and to the general
public* The boycott having -employed these means for this unques- ■
'
tioned purpose,- is illegal and a court will not seek by over-niceties
and refinements to legalise the use of this unquestionably illegal
instrument*^
Truax v* Corrigan
The views of the courts on picketing were not wholeheartedly shared
by the state legislatures, however* Soon 'after the Clayton Act was passed
by Congress in 1914# & number of states enacted their own anti-injunction
laws which to all appearances made peaceful picketing by strikers nonenjoinable* The State of Arizona had a statute similar to the provisions
of Section 20 of the Federal law at the time the Trua*? case reached the
courts of that state* Briefly, the facts were that the employees of -a
restaurant in Bisbee, Arizona set up a peaceful picket line in front of
the establishment during -a strike. The placards which the picksters
carried were quite micomplementary to the owner, the quality of his food,
and his practices in dealing with employees, The picketing, while peaceful,
' * Zbia.'
3

!

Truax V. Corrigan. 257 U, S. 312, (1921),

m

was very effective, cutting the business volume of the restaurant down
to twenty-five per cent of nonaal* An injunction application against
this activity m s refused feythe trial Justice, a judgement which m s
affirmed by the highest court of the State*
In 1921, the plaintiff appealed to the United States Supreme
Court on constitutional grounds, contending that the state law deprived
M m of property without due process of law, and denied M m equal pro
tection of the lam* the majority of the Court, following the preced
ents of the frl-Cityk case decided two weeks previously, held that the
picketing had been carried on in an unlawful manner, and that the
Supreme Court of Arizona had misconstrued the statute* Thus, it is
apparent that the Court felt that .even peaceful picketing, carried on
by strikers who carried signs which did more than advertise the exist
ence of a dispute, m s unlawful. 3h the -Tri-Cities case, Chief Justice
Taft had laid down seme .rather stringent regulations on picketing,
limiting pickets to *one lone missionary* at each point of Ingress and
-egress of the struck, plant, but Truax v* Corrigan marks the heighth of
restriction on this union pressure device*
The Senn case
The.most important develcpaent in labor relations, as far as
picketing is concerned, between 1921 and 1937 was the enactment of the
Norria~LaGuardia Act in 1932* Section 4 (e) of the statute provides

4 j&ssisgs

257 u. S. 184,

Ipafiaass s* J&-£&ias; central JteSsa fe s ro a *
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that no court shall, have jurisdiction to issue an injunction or tem
porary •restraining order ■against "(living publicity to the existence
of, or-the' tacts involved in, -any labor dispute* whether by advertising,
speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or
violence*1* One of the principal effects of the law was to en&our&ge
the adoption- of the so-called "little Korris-la<kiardia Acts" by several
of the states* the case of Sena v» filelayers Protective Union*5
m s a landmark picketing case prior to 1940, m s essentially a judgement
by the Supreme Court of the validity of these state anti-injunction acts,
and as Professors Gregory and Kats have pointed out, it is difficult "not
to 'regard the Senn case as the first assurance from the United States
Supreme Court that the Rorris-baGuardia Act was constitutional*
fhe ^enp. case presented the question, of whether the Wisconsin anti
injunction provision, which declared peaceful picketing, 'patrolling, and
related activity by strikers immune from injunctive action, violated due
process or equal protection of the laws* According to the facts in the
case, Senn, a small tile-laying contractor, was-picketed for failure to
conduct his business on a closed shop basis* Previously, he had agreed
to the union*s demands if he were allowed to- work at the trade along
with his employees* But because the union wished to retain the work for
its own members, it refused to grant this concession* Setm requested an
an injunction against the picketing, but it was refused, a judgement
5 301 U. s*

466,

(1937)*

6
* Gregory, 0* 0*, and Kats, H* A*, labor law* Mchie Casebook
Corp., Charlottsville, fa*, 1940, P* 2?1*
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subsequently affirmed by the Supremo Court of Wisconsin#
Mr* Rustic© Brandeis, who had dissented in Truax v*
held for the Court that the 1921 case did not apply to the present con
siderations* He then proceeded to deny plaintiff1© appeal that he had
been denied liberty and property {the right to use his hands at his
own trade) without due process of law* and that the state statute
authorising peaceful picketing had been a means by which that right
had been denied* Peaceful picketing, he further declared, is not pro
hibited by the Fourteenth Amendmentj indeed, apmfeere of a union may make
known the facta of a labor dispute without specific authorisation from
the state, since that right has been granted by the First Amendment to
the Constitution*
Although the Senr, decision did not completely overrule Truax v#
Corrigan and American Steel Foundries

V#

Tri-City Central Trades Council*

it was dear that the Court would no longer hold picketing, not attendant
with violence, coercion, intimidation or libel,' .a© unlawful* Furthermore,
the Court now considered the making known of facts in a labor dispute as
a Constitutionally guaranteed right# It should be noted however, that
Justice Brandeis merely stated that members of a union might ’‘make known
the facts in a labor dispute, for freedom of speech Is guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution11, a statement which has been erroneously interpreted
as meaning that picketing itself is.free speech guaranteed by the Consti
tution*? Biers is a significant difference between what Justice Brandeis
. ? Gregory, C. 0*, labor and the law* W* W* Horton and Co*, Hew fork,
1949# p# 340*
•*
' > •

said and what a lumber of studentsof labor law have inferred front
hie opinion# However, three years later the Court itselfadopted the
view *|hat picketing which is carried on

in

a peaceful manner isaform

.of speech which may not 'be abridged, thus rendering the argument purely
academic.
II* flCKEfUSG AS SHSECH FB0M194G fO 1949
While the Bern decision ejcpounded the principle that peaceful
picketing could not. be, enjoined by, the courts, and that, the states were
within their Constitutional -rights" in passing, legislation making this.
union device non-enjoinable, the,basis upon which picketing was held
to be legal was considerably altered in
The Doctrine of Thornhill

1940*

Alabama

In that year, the Supreme Court enunciated its now-famous doc
trine that peaceful picketing was a form of speech, and thus Constitu
tionally protected from abridgement by the First and Fourteenth Amendments# This case, Thornhill y* Alabama* marked the end of the concept
of peaceful picketing as *a contradiction in terms

as held by Chief

justice Taft in the Tri-City case. The question before the Court was
whether a state statute which was.so broadly drawn, as to proscribe
picketing in any for® was a violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment which protects freedom of speech from abridgement
by the ‘states*: In holding the Alabama law prohibiting picketing
'"

*« Alabama. 310 II* S*. 88, (1940).

?2

unconstitutional# Hr. Justice Murphy saids
The existence of such a statute* which readily lends -itself to
harsh and diserin&h&iory .enforcement by local, prosecuting officials
*♦•results la a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom
of discussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its punView*^
This new doctrine of the Court* wherein picketing is regarded on
the same inalienable plane as other forms of speech* was indeed a far
cry from that enunciated in

v* Stablemen^s Union little more

than thirty years before* .Sn Carlson y* California,^ a case decided
soon after the Thornhill decision* the Court reaffirmed the freedom of
©peech— peaceful pirating incept* and in A m tim x t Federation of labor
y* Swing^ the doctrine slashed its broadest development* In this case*
stranger picketing* that is* picketing by persons other than employees*
was held to be Just as much a to rn of speech as that which obtained when
the picketing worker© were en^loyees* The Court upheld stranger picket
ing in this case in spite of the fact that neither the employer nor his
employees desired unionism#
Limitations on tfaft Thornhill doctrine
In spite of it© Immediate benefits to organised labor* the Thorn
hill doctrine has not given such organisations unrestricted freedom in
picketing# It soon became apparent that picketing as free speech would
9 Ibid.
10 310 U. S.-IPS', (3.940).
• U 312;U,.'.S. 321, (1 9 a ).

n

be held subject to- the earn© restrictions which attend other fonns of
speech protected from abridgement by the Constitution. there seemed
to be no question bat that the C o u rt would- not protect violent picket-*
log as an -inalienable right to free speech* and -indeed it did not#- In
M ilk m m n

Drivers Onion local. 753 v* Meadowmoor Dairies

the

Court refused to consider picketing ^enmeshed with contemporaneously
violent conduct11 in the m m light as peaceful picketing# A1so* a state
statute which regulated picketing by allowing the State Employment tela*
tions Board to issue a cease and disist order to prevent mass picketing*
threatening of employees, obstruction of factory entrances and streets*
and the picketing of workers homes, was upheld by the Court even though
such activity proacrlbed by the State *ae carried on in a peaceful manner,23
Another limitation on picketing as free speech was made in Carpenters
agg Joinera Union of flmerlca v. Bitters Cafe.22* it was here determined

with clarity that the states could restrict the communication of ideas by
means of the picket line to an area in which the labor dispute actually
existed. In keeping with this limitation* the states are free to enjoin
or prohibit by statute picketing of m establishment with which the pickets
have no dispute* even though.they may have a grievance with the owner in
connection with M s dealings with them in some other transaction# But this
does not prohibit peaceful picketing where no labor dispute exists as
12 312 U. S. sm » (1941).
23 315 0 . S. 74Q» (1942),

U

315

«, s. 722, (1942).

n

defined by .state law#,^ only that which has ‘
been, called:-' secondary pitted ‘
eting*
. . From 1943 through If&t# the Supreme Court was not called upon to
extend# limit# or clarify the themhill doctrine* However# on iprtl 4#
If49* the Court handed down m . opinion which not only restricted# but
further clarified the- doctrine of picketing m free speech* In Glboney
y> Empire Storage.and Ice Cfo*

the Court was faced with determining

whether peaceful picketing could be enjoined where such picketing Is
^carried -on^asj^s^prable and essential part of a course of conduct" ox
as^inpep^rable and essential part .of a 'Course of conduct which is in ,
violation of the state law*^

fhe ice peddlers union in Kansas City#

Missouri sought to induce all non-eieEiber peddlers to Join the organisation#
most of whom refused* M order to put pressure m the recalcitrant ped*
dlers* the union sought to enter into agrements with wholesale distribut
ors whereby the latter would only sell Ice to the union members. Only ;
one distributor refused#, the appellee# and he m s promptly picketed by
the union* 4 Missouri statute makes such an agreement an unlawful resr
traint of trade# punishable by heavy fines and i^ris^mient* .fhe appellee
petitioned for injunctive relief and It was granted by the trial court#
and subsequently affirmed by the highest court of the State*
* f MfMSZJSM iMS&SZ MSS£2§. 323 M fiS S t

U. S* 769, (1942).
^

93 X*«r ed. Advance Opinions 650, (1949)»
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Ibid,, at 651*

SSS. X* M & * 3*5
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fh holding that the injunction m e properly obtained* and that
the picketing m s unlawful, though peaceful* the Court saich
It iias rarely been suggested that the constitutional freedom
„..for speech and press extends, its. immunity to speech cr^wriilng
used as m integral part ait conduct in violation of a valid
criminal statute#
reject the intention now.
Neither fhorafalll if* Alabama»:#*mr garXson v. California**#
supports the contention that conduct otherwise unlawful is
always immune iwm state reflation because an integral part
of 'that ‘
■induct M carried bn by display of placards by peaceful
pteketers**■
Thus* the Court has placed two rather broad limitations oh the
HmrnhiH doctrine since 1940# In the first piece* picketing* to be
1

'

■

•• .

*

*

protected tm m abtddgemenb by the abates* must be conducted in'a law*
ful manner# Violence* intimidation* threats* and coercion remove
picketing carried on in this maimer from the area of constitutionally:/
protected free speech*' In the second place*, the picketing must be
exercised for ends which are- not in themselves unlawful* Picketing*
for an aaBeaspla* to force an employer to grant a closed shop lit a stats
which prohibited union security agreements would clearly be enjoinable
in light of the jfeoige Storage decision just reviewed* However, where
the picketing la peaceful* and tbs ends sought art- not unlawful* the
-Supreme Court .has Indicated its intention to strike dam stats regular
tion© -that impose greater restriction© on the right to picket* fhis
widely utilised device to exert economic pressure on amployers and the
public has become ftoaly entrenched as a form of speech* and there is
little likelihood that the Court will not continue to regard it as such.
Ibid**
W- at 654#
*r

*

.

IH* PROVISIONS OP STATE LAWS
WHICH REGULATE PICKETING
The landmark cases concerning picketing and its regulation by
the states having been reviewed, the remaining sections of this
chapter deal with the provisions of state laws which are designed to
regulate this form of concerted activity by labor organizations* In
■a general manner* two questions arise with respect to those picketing:
regulations# First* what is the general state policy toward picketing
as a union pressure- device? And second* what is- the constitutional
status of these laws in light of controlling decisions of the Supreme
Court* particularly those that have been rendered since 1937?
Constitutional, regulation of picketing
In one fora or another* picketing has been regulated by thirty*
six of the forty-eight states* In a few states* regulation has been
imposed by the judiciary in the absence of specific legislation* In
\

several others* picketing has been indirectly regulated through the
"little Norris-LaGuardia** acts*. But in the majority of the states,
specific regulatory legislation has been passed that limits in some
manner the right of unions to picket* In a surprising number of state
laws dealing with this phase of union activity elements of unconstitu
tional restriction of free speech are to be found* On the other hand,
many states have exercised considerable restraint in the regulation of
picketing*, and have closely conformed to the limitations which the
Supreme Court has defined* (My those regulations that are clearly

constitutional am discussed at this pointf the examination of laws
which are in. conflict with the announced policies of the Court are
left for a subsequent section*
One of the most frequent regulations of the right to picket
found in state laws is that which outlaws picketing which is directly
or indirectly attended with -violence* intimidation* and undue coercion#
Fifteen states*^ have enacted specific measures which outlaw- picketing
carried on in this tenner# It is not unlikely that the court©, of any
state in the union would hold such picketing unlawful* even in the
absence of specific statutory authorisation* It ha© been pointed out
that the Thornhill doctrine was not intended to embrace violent picket
ing in the realm of constitutionally protected freedom of speech. In
the Headovsaoor Dairies case*, decided a year after Thornhill y> Alabama*
this limitation on picketing was specifically made by the Court to dispel
any doubt or ambiguity concerning the status of violent picketing.
A typical provision outlawing the use of violence in picketing
is found in the Virginia statute*
It shall be unlawful for any person singly or in
others to interfere#**with another in the exercise
to work*.•by the use of force, threats of violence
or by the use of insulting or threatening language
such person* to induce or attempt to induce him to
ment or refrain from seeking oEployment.20

concert with
of his right
or intimidation,
directed toward
quit his employ

Alabama* Colorado, Delaware* Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland,
Hew Jersey, Texas, Idaho, Nebraska, Hew York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Virginia*
^ Va. 1*. 1946, chapter 229*

Th© statute also declares picketing unlawful where violence is used to
obstruct free passageway to and from a place of business, or to obstruct
the public streets* It should, 'be noted that the violence does not have
to be 'manifested in physical force, since even threatening speech renders
the picketing unlawful* On the other hand, the prohibition of picketing
which obstructs free ingress and egress from the establishment being
picketed, and the obstruction of public streets should not b© interpreted
too broadly* Almost any tyse of picketing, even by a single person
carrying a sandwich board, might otherwise be- held to constitute an
obstruction to free- passage way*
In light of the inherent power of the state to protect the public
safety, specific provisions of state laws outlawing violent picketing
may appear to be superfluous* However, since much industrial conflict
has had its origins in the presence of a belligerent picket line, the
states cannot be'criticised for specifically outlawing this activity* ■
Certainly the Supreme Court has given the states a free hand in pro
hibiting violent picketing.
In eleven states2^ provisions may be found which prohibit mass
picketing. Ordinarily, no indication of what constitutes mass picket
ing is given, but in one state, Texas, the term is rigidly defined*
In that state mass picketing includes any picketing in which there are
more than two pickets at any one time within- fifty feet of any other
picketer or pickets, or where there are more than two pickets within
Colorado, Georgia, Michigan, Hew Jersey, Ohio, Texas, Utah,
Wisconsin, Delaware, Pennsylvania, South Dakota*
^

fifty feet of any entrance to the establishment, or where picketing
constitutes an obstacle 'to free passageway.2^ Other states seem content
to rely upon the judgement of the courts to determine when mass.picketing
exists#.
The constitutionality of prohibitions of mass picketing by the
states has been inferred from Supreme Court decisions* There has been
no- clear cut declaim in this matter since Chief Justice Taft declared
mass picketing to be unlawful in the Tri-City case in 1921. However,
Justice Roberts, in his dissent in the Ritters Cafe decision, stated
that there was no doubt but- that the states could, limit participant©' in
picketing to "reasonable numbers”.23 But what actually constitutes a
reasonable number of' pickets is apparently -left to the .judgement of the
state court©*
A number of other regulations have been placed on picketing by
i

the states, -all of which are plainly constitutional* Picketing to

*

achieve an illegal end has been proscribed by Massachusetts and Oregon,
a right which the state© may exercise in light of Giboney y* Empire
Storage and Ice Co* Texas has declared that the misrepresentation of
facts by pickets is unlawful, and the courts of a number of other states
have condemned untruthful picketing* Florida .and Kansas have also *
limited the area in which pickets may operate to a place of business
where the dispute exists* Such laws were held constitutional in the
22 House Bill No. 41* effective 9/4/47.
23 Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritters Cafe, og. clt., (1942).
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Bitters Cfofef. decision* ten. states2** have specifically proscribed the
picketing of a worker*a home, this regulation having been affirmed in
the Allen Bradley case*
Provisions of doubtful constitutionality
In spite of the doctrine of fhornhill v* Alabama, and its later
extension in the Swtn^ case, a number of states have enacted laws which
are clearly in conflict with the concept of peaceful picketing as free
speech* One of the most flagrant examples of state legislation which
violates this principle is that of Nebraska*23 Any person who ^persists
in talking to or communicating in any way with (a) person or members
of his immediate family against his or their will**2^ is picketing in an
unlawful .manner* Also* a picket who is loitering about, picketing or
patrolling the place of work of any person against his will^7 is guilty
of an unlawful practice* It should be noted that the picketing proscribed
is not violent or coercive, in which case the law would not be subject
to question* But the mere showing of persistence in communicating with
a person, even against his will, is deemed peaceful picketing by the
Supreme Court and the .states may not prohibit it.2^
^ Connecticut, Florida, Ohio, Kansas, Michigan, Wisconsin, Bela*
ware, Utah, Nebraska* Arizona, an the other hand, specifically legalizes,
home-picketing*
25 Neb. Kev. Stat* 1943, section 20*012*
26 Ibid.
27

,$enn v* file layers Protective Union* 301 U« S* 460, (1937) *

ax

A number of other state laws have proscribed stranger picketing,
in violation of the awing decision* Hi© provisions relating to stranger
picketing in Missouri, South Dakota, Delaware, Virginia, Pennsylvania,
Minnesota and Morth Dakota clearly conflict with the Supreme Court*s
decision* Hi© Pennsylvania statute, however, has been declared uncon
stitutional. Delaware court© have interpreted the ©tat© statute as
meaning that no picketing is lawful where a legitimate 'strike does not
exist,2? Worth Dakota, similarly, declares that only an employee of
the employer may lawfully picket,3® Virginia’s law is also unconatitutional in the light of AKA y* Swing* It reads as followsi
It shall be unlawful for any person who is not, or immediately
prior to the time of the commencement of any strike was not, a
bona fid© employee of the business or industry being picketed to
participate in any picketing activity with respect-to such a
strike or such business or industry*^
It is apparent that the states are openly flouting the Supreme
Court holding that a person need not be an employee of the establishment
as a prerequisite of lawful picketing* In so far as these states continue
to restrict free speech by limitations on stranger picketing, they are
abridging the constitutional protection of the first Amendment* Hiere
is little doubt that the'Supreme Court will declare such provisions
unconstitutional whenever they are subject to its purview.
29 Motion. Picture Machine Proiectionists Protection Union v.
Malta' t
b
a
a
t
.......
1* 1947# section'12, chapter 242*
^ 1* 1946# chapter 2291

82

A few of the states have limited picketing- to situations in. viiich
a labor dispute exists*32 The Newark statute was struck down by the
Court in. Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl»33 where it was held that ;
picketing by a union could not be enjoined merely' because a labor dispute
did not exist*. These statutes -are unconstitutional^, not only because
they violate the Wohl decision* but because they also preclude stranger
picketing*
Evaluation of state picketing regulation
As has been pointed out in the preceding discussion* not all of
the present regulation of picketing imposed on unions by the states is
a valid exercise of state authority* However* the Court has left the _
states free to restrict picketing in certain situations* The Thornhill
doctrine has not been so broadly construed as to prevent the states from
prohibiting violent picketing*, the picketing of workerrs 'homes* mass
picketing* and picketing to achieve unlawful ends* On the other hand,
in spite of-the action some of the states have recently taken* they are
prevented from enjoining' peaceful picketing for legitimate objectives,
stranger picketing, and picketing in the absence of a labor dispute*
In light of the numerous state provisions which attempt to regulate
picketing in areas in which the Supreme Court has .held that they live no
authority, it is likely that the Thornhill doctrine will be subject to
*

t

"

much attack in the future* The concept of peaceful picketing, however,
32 South Dakota, Texas, New fork*
33 315 u. S. 769.
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as constitutionally protected spaaed has become ftmly entrenched in
V
the thinking of the Court, and it is unlikely that there will be a
significant retreat from this position# .

CHAPTER FIVE

STATS REGULATION OF THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT
It has been shown in the twe preceding chapters that the states
have exercised a significant degree of regulation in the economic con
flict between employers and employees, specifically in the restriction
of union security agreements and picketing# It is also significant to
note that the legislatures and courts of the states have taken definite
action in yet another sphere of industrial relations, that which embraces
the use of the boycott by organized labor as an integral component of
its economic policy* As in the case of union security agreements and
picketings the preponderance of state action with respect to the boycott
has been restrictive in nature* The purpose of the present chapter is
to survey the extent of restrictive legislation of the states designed
to regulate boycotting, and to determine the fom which such legislation
has generally taken* In order to provide a foundation for this study,
an examination of the historical status of the boycott as determined by
the courts and the legislatures must first be made*
1* HISTORICAL STATUS OF THE BOYCOTT
Since there are a number of t^pes of boycotts, it is desirable ito
make a working definition of the form of boycott which has been regulated
by the states* Since the primary boycott has generally been upheld as an
unquestionably legal labor weapon, it has not been subject to restriction.
It is the ,secondary boycott that has been subject to censure by the courts

as

and the legislatures! -therefore, where the tern "boycott11 is used in
this study it means the secondary form exclusively* One writer has
declared that the boycott is a term of "vague signification of which
no accurate and exhaustive definition has ever been given*

This

opinion notwithstanding, the secondary boycott, as defined by most
states, involves the concerted refusal to patronize an establishment
or to handle goods which have been made by -non-union labor, and to
Induce others not to patronize or handle such goods* Hie element of
coercion is almost invariably present in a secondary boycott* There is
a close relationship, furthermore, between the boycott and the strike.^
Hie Danbury Hatters* case
Although the boycott was declared illegal by some state courts
3

as early as 1886, and one state, Alabama, proscribed its use in 1903,
the Supreme Court of the United States was not called upon to judge its
merits until 1908, when the famous Danbury Hatters* case^ came within
its purview. The Hatters * union, in an attempt to unionize the Loews
Co. of Danbury, Connecticut, instituted a nationwide boycott of Loewe
hats, not only by refusing to patronize dealers handling the products of
the company, but also by bringing pressure to bear upon the dealers
throughout the country to discourage them from handling the boycotted
^ Oakes, £. S., Organized Labor and Industrial Conflicts. Lawyers
Cooperative Publishing Co., Rochester, 1927, p* 601.
^ See Taylor, A* G., Labor Problems and Labor Law, Prentice Hall
Inc., 1939, New York, p. 490~

3 People v. Wilzig. 4 H* Y* Crim. 403, (1886)*
**

2 * Lawlpr. 208 U. S. 274, (1908).

products The question before the Court was* granting that the boycott
had interfered with interstate commerce* whether the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act applied to labor organisations and their coercive activities* The
majority of the Court held that the Act was to be construed as applicable
to interferences with commerce by labor organisations as well a© business
combinations in restraint of trade* The Hatters1 were fined some $252*000
under the treble damages provision of the Sheman Act*
The Bucks Stove case
In 1911* the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Loewe v*
Lawlor* It held* in Compere v. Bucks Stove and Bange Co#*'* that an injunc
tion against the circulation of “unfair1* and “we don*t patronise** lists
had been properly served since the use of these terms is “as much subject
to injunction as the use of any other force whereby property is unlawfully
damaged#**^ This adverse decision* coupled with that of Loewe v. Lawlor*
considerably lessened the use of the boycott until after the pugsage of
the Clayton .Act in 1914* which was hailed by Samuel Compere as the “Magna
Charts of Labor#** It was soon apparent however* that the eructations
of labor with respect to the boycott provisions of the Act far exceeded
what little Immunity it provided in actual practice# A review of the
Supreme Court1© interpretation of the act will demonstrate this fact*
r
v

t

5 221 U* S, as, (1911).

"SB &**>lex Printing case
The landmark ease Involving the legality of a secondary boycott
under the Clayton Act was that of Duplex Printing Press Co# y* Peering#?
The Duplex Co# conducted an open shop in Michigan* where it manufactured
printing presses for delivery in other states. Mew York City providing
a market for a large share of the firm1s product# In 1913 the Machinists1
union called a strike at the plant at which time only fourteen union
members walked out# The strike itself was ineffective, but the ^concurrent
institution of a secondary boycott against the plaintiff1© product in Mew
York City was successful* Members of the union in Mew York refused to
install the Duplex presses3 customers of the company were threatened if
they purchased the Duplex product; trucking companies were, threatened with
trouble if they delivered the presses; and repair' shops were- coerced into
refusing to work on previously purchased machines.
In 1921, the Court held that even under the Clayton Act, a secondary
boycott could be enjoined# The principal reliance of the Court was on
section 20' of the Act, which it construed to prohibit injunctions only
where the legitimate purposes of labor were lawfully being carried out
by employees of an employer* The Court considered the restraint of trade
to be an unlawful objective* Furthermore, the union members who instituted
the boycott did not stand In a proximate relationship of-employees of the
Duplex Co* These two 'facts rendered the boycott an illegal, interference
with commerce, and folly demonstrated the ^inherent weaknesses of the Clayton
Act* The Duplex decision was reiterated in 192? in Bedford Cut Stone Co*
7 254 0. S. 443# (1921).

m
%•

Journeymen .atone Gutters Association*^

The Boycott wider the Horris-laGuardia Act
Mi&tever organised labor failed to achieve from the Clayton Act,
it gained under the 1933 Korris-laCKxardia Act* this pre-Hew Beal legislation remedied the faults' of the Clayton Act* declaring that no injunc
tion could be issued in a labor dispute regardless of Aether or not a
$

proximate relationship between employee and. employer existed* Under the
construction of the Act by the Court the landmark case with respect to
boycotts was United States v. Hutcheson,^ decided in 1941* The facts of ♦,
the case involve a jurisdictional dispute between two unions over which
organisation should perform certain work in the Anheuser-Busch plant in
St* Louis* After lengthy arbitration, the work was given to One of the
unions engaged in the dispute* ibis action was followed by a strike by
the members of the union which had been deprived of the disputed work in
the plant, coupled with a concerted campaign to induce other union members
to refuse to patronize the products of Anheuser-Busch, specifically to
refuse to drink Budwelser beer* By use of banners and parades the union
advertised the boycott, and by distribution of leaflets and circulars to
the effect that Anheuser-Busch was on the union1© ^unfair1* list*
Mr* Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court held that the
secondary boycott could not be enjoined under the Morris-LaOuardia Act*
In this connection he stated*
3 274 U. S. 34, (1927).
9 312 V, S. 219, (1941).
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Hie underlying aim of the Harris-laQoardia Act was to restore the
broad purpose which Congress thought it had formulated in the Clayton
Act but which was frustrated* so Congress believed* by unduly restrict
tive Judicial construction****The Horris-IaCkiardla Act was a disap
proval of Duplex Printing Press Co* v* Peering* Supra* and Bedford Cut
Stone Co* v* Journeymen Stone Cutters* Assn***,*l°
In holding the secondary boycott legal* it was necessary for Justice
Frankfurter to reverse the Court*® holding in the Buniex and Bedford Cut
Stone cases* Thus* United States y> Hutcheson stands as the controlling
case in matter© involving the secondary boycott as far as the Supreme Court
is concerned* Recent federal legislation* however* has overruled the
Court*
Secondary boycotts under the Taft-Harbley Act
In 1947* secondary boycotts were proscribed by Congress a© unfair
labor practices by unions under section 8 (b) of the amended national
Eolations Act* and weremade subject to damage actions by section. 303 of
the labor Management Relations Act* The two provisions are identical in
scope* the former calling for intervention by the HLRB* the latter giving
■approval to the entertainment of suits by injured parties* Section 8 -(b)
read© =in part* It shall be an unfair labor practice for a- labor organisa
tion or its agents*
1

t

to engage in* orto induce or encourage the employees of any
employer to engage in* a strike or concerted refusal in the course
-of employment to use* manufacture* process* transport* or otherwise
handle or work on any goodsl #*or to perform any services* where an
object thereof iss♦••forcing or requiring any employer or selfemployed person to Join any labor or employer organisation or any
10 Ibid*, at 236.
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employer or other person to cease usings selling, handling, trarm~
porting, or otherwise dealing In the products of any producer..*or
to -cease dealing with any other person****
In addition it is an unfair labor practice.for a onion to .institute a
boycott to force an employer to assign work to- a particular labor organic
ssatlon* thereby rendering the Hutcheson decision impotent as far as the
present is concerned* Hie policy of the federal government at the
present time, therefore* is to- prohibit the us© of the secondary boycott
.in the industrial conflict* Hie course of state action has followed a
similar trend* as shall be brought to light in the remaining Sections of
this chapter*
u* m m s a x m of state iams m m
BBSPBCT TO THE SBGCIIMHX BOfCOTT
The use of picketing* the strike* and the secondary boycott are
so interwoven aa to make a complete differentiation between them* as
far as state statutory regulation is concerned* almost iixpossible*
Twenty of the states^however, have enacted laws dealing with the
secondary boycott which are so. clearly intended to proscribe or limit
its use that there is no question as to their application* In two- of
the states* Alabama^ and California,^ the prohibition of the secondary
' 11 j&abaw&j California, Colorado*. Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa*. Kansas* hassachusetts# Hinnes.ota, Mxesotiri, South Dakota, Oregon, ..
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, ferns, Utah and Wisconsin*
^ Invalidated in API y# McAdory* 246 Ala* 1, (1944)•
33 Invalidated in Ex Partp ELaney, 184 P* 2nd 892 (Cal. 1947)*

boycott has been held unconstitutional; and the proscription of agricul
tural boycotts have been struck down by the courts in Idaho,^4 South
Dakota, and Oregon**^ Other provisions of the latter three laws were
unaffected, however, making' a total of eighteen states having valid laws
prohibiting the secondary boycott at the present time*
Unconstitutional prohibition of boycotts
It is worthy of note that both the Alabama and the California
courts have rendered the anti-$econdary boycott statutes unconstitutional
in those states* Doth of' these laws contained whot cargo** provisions,
which made the refusal to handle non-union made goods, or goods made by
a rival union, unlawful* The Alabama Supreme Court reasoned that workers
have a constitutional right to refuse to handle non-union material*
Hie invalidation of the California Hhot cargo” and secondary boycott
provision was made on three separate findings of the state court* First,
it held that the prohibition was an unreasonable exercise of the State*s
police power on the freedom of speech, press and assembly* Secondly,
the statute was so vaguely drawn that it was impossible to determine what
conduct was unlawful* An third, the statute did not differentiate between
conduct which the state might regulate and other conduct which enjoyed
constitutional immunity*-^ One or more of the above charges could apply
^ Held unconstitutional in AF1 v* Lanalev. 66 Idaho 763, (1946)*
15 Invalidated in AFX. v. Bain. 165 Ore. 1B3, 106 P. 2nd 544, (1940).
16 M k 2* HcAdogr. og. cit., note 12.

W Ex Parte KLaney, og,. cit.. note 13.
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to many of the other state laws which prohibit the secondary boycott,
but where test cases have been presented the statutes have been held a
valid exercise of the state police power#
The boycott as a nnfpt* unfair labor practice
In eight of the states*** where the constitutionality of ,fhot
cargo” and secondary boycott statutes has either been upheld or no
ruling has been made, this type of union activity has been declared a
union unfair labor practice# the Delaware provision is typical# The
law declares that It shall be an employee unfair labor practice!
To engage in a secondary boycott or to hinder or prevent, by
threats, intimidation, force, coercion or sabotage, the obtaining,
use or disposition of materials, equipment or services, or to
combine or conspire to hinder or prevent, by any means whatsoever,
the obtaining, use or disposition of materials, equipment or *
services*^
This provision is exactly duplicated in the Colorado Labor
Relations. Act,*®

a

district court in that state has held that where a

labor organisation attempted to organise non-union dairies by inducing
truck lines to discontinue deliveries to non-union establishments, and
by inducing union workers to cease construction of non-union dairy
buildings, such ■conduct is not unlawful where it is carried on in a
/
peaceful manner*^ To all appearances then, the intent of the Colorado
statute had been subverted by the court, although the law was not held
rmi.- r - n r : j g ^
vania, Utah, and Wisconsin#

Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Pennsyl
.•

^ L, 1947# chapter 194, section 2 (g),
L, 1943# section B (2) (g)* *
^ Hennl/>h v, .International.Brotherhood of Teamsters* (Colo# 1946),
District Ct,, Denver County, 11 Labor" {S^s’43,094, Feb# 27, 1946#

unconstitutional# The Kansas provision, on the other hand, has been
held to be an unconstitutional violation of freedom of speech*^
Of the eight states that hold the secondary boycott to be an
unfair union labor practice, Minnesota^ has proscribed its use in the
most elaborate terns* With respect to the boycott, a declaration states
that5
It is recognised that whatever may be the rights of disputants
with respect to each other in any controversy, they should not be
•permitted***to intrude directly into the primary rights of third
parties**#legislature, therefore, declares that, in its
considered Judgement, the public good and the general welfare of
the citizens of this state will be promoted by prohibiting secondary
boycotts and other coercive practices in this state*2^
In keeping with this declaration of policy, the Minnesota statute not
only declares the use of the secondary boycott to be an unfair labor
practice by unions, but also prohibits it as "an illegal combination in
restraint of trade and in violation of the public policy of this state
Worth Dakota also has provided that the secondary boycott is in conflict
with the public policy of the state
The boycott as a conspiracy in restraint of trade
In addition to the Minnesota provision above, three other states2^
declare secondary boycotts to be an illegal conspiracy in restraint of
trade* South Carolina law, for example, provides that any agreement by
Stapleton v, Mitchell, 9 labor Gases 62,574.

^ tm 1947, chapter 436#
Ibid*, section 179*40*

Z* Ibid., section 179*43*
^ L# 1947, chapter 242, section 13*
Missouri, Illinois, and South Carolina*
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two or more persons "to refuse to buy from, or sell to, a person because
such person Is not a member of an association, or to threaten to boycott
such person is a conspiracy in restraint of trade.f,28 the vagueness of
this provision, and its all inclusive scope, would tend to make its
constitutionality subject to question* A Missouri statute,29 however,
which is similar to the South Carolina law, has been upheld* The Missouri
Supreme Court held that the Constitution of the United States does not
guarantee labor unions the right to boycott, and under the State1s AntiTrust Act such conduct may be enjoined as an illegal restraint of trade.20
Certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court, thereby strengthing, in a negative way, the constitutionalityof these provisions*

Illi

nois has similarly declared the boycott to bean illegal conspiracy in
restraint of trade, and also proscribes the posting of notices, or dis
tribution of circulars to the effect that a boycott is in progress "with
the fraudulent or malicious intent wrongfully and wickedly to injure the
business or property of another**##"^

An Illinois court has held that

the publication of libeous statements by a number of employees against
managerial personnel cannot be enjoined as a conspiracy where such state
ments would not be subject to an injunction if made by an individual.^2
South Carolina Code, 1942, section 6628*
29 3* B* 79, L*. 1947# section 8.

2° Rogers v* Potect* Sup* Ct*, 355 Mo*986, 13 Labor Cases 64,180,
(1946)* Certiorari denied, dune 16, 1947*
*

2^ 111* Laws, chapter 38, section 139*
22 Montgomery Ward and Co* v. United Retail, Wholesale, and Depart
ment Store Employees, Sup* Ct*, (111* 1948) 14 labor Cases 64,398.
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Other State provisions making the boycott unlawful
& number of the states33 have merely declared the secondary
boycott to be unlawful* without characterising it as an unfair labor
practice* an illegal restraint of trade* or as contrary to public policy*
Iowa34 for example* declares that the -secondary boycott and “hot cargo11
agreements are unlawful* and provides penalties of fine or imprisonment
for violation* Injunctive relief may also be severed from illegal
coercion# Georgia^-* declares the use of a secondary boycott to be a
misdemeanor and subject to penalty* as does the Missouri statute*3&
the Texas boycott statute declares that:
It shall be unlawful for any person* **to establish* call* parti~
cipate in* aid or abet***a secondary boycott****37
The Texas Courts have construed this provision to mean that violations
may be prosecuted under the anti-trust laws of the state*3&
Evaluation of anti-boycott statutes
It may be observed from the .preceding discussion that a signifi
cant phase of state regulation of industrial relations has been the
prohibition of the secondary boycott* Mot only have twenty states
specifically outlawed this fern of concerted activity* but also .in- the
33 Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Missouri and Texas*
34 l*

1947, chapter 297, effective May1, 1947#

35 &4 1947, Act Mo* 141, sections
36 1,

5, 6*

194?, S. B, 79, section 8.

3? Texas K; C. S. 5154 f. section

1.'

f4mer v. Zanea. (Texas, 1947) Ct. of Civil App., 14 labor Cases
64,310, 206 S. W. 2nd, 144.
•

courts of two other states it has been condemned as an illegal, practice.39
It is worthy of note that none of the states have 11regulated1* the use of
the boycott by prescribing situations under which it would be legal%
rather, the states have outlawed it without reservation* This policy is,
of course, in harmony with that of Congress at the present time*
The question of the relationship between the secondary boycott
and the free speech doctrine which the Supreme Court has applied to
peaceful ^picketing is one charged with potential controversy. Whether
the Court will, or should, confer constitutional imaunlty on peaceful
secondary boycotting through an extension of the Thornhill doctrine la
a matter for conjecture. The courts of three

s

t

a

t

e

have declared

secondary boycott and whot cargo” prohibitions invalid as an unconstitu
tional exercise of state police power* In these cases, however, the
basis for invalidation was the vagueness of the provisions, rather than
the illegality of the secondary boycott nor se»
Arguments may be presented in support of the view that peaceful
secondary boycotting is as much an exercise of speech as is picketing*
Chief among these Is that the two forms of union activity are substan
tially interrelated* A boycott is almost invariably accompanied by
picketing, and picketing may be thought of as a form of the secondary
boycott, in that it is an attempt to persuade third parties not to deal
*.

*

with the employer* If this point is conceded, is it possible that the
nrrrr-n iruWriir—i ' m * r r r r . m u hit :.-|'T.h .

“ rrr;»l

Mew York and Ohio*

^ Alabama, California, and Kansas*
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Supreme Court could reasonably confer constitutional immunity on peace
ful picketing,, and at the same time hold anti-boycott statutes to be a
reasonable exercise of state police power? It is submitted, however,
that the parados is only theoretically existent, and that in actual
practice, the imposition of a secondary boycott by a labor organisation
is significantly different from the use of a picket line* In the first
place, the effect on third parties is not identical* A picket line
where peaceful, is a means by which ideas are communicated to the public
by passive means* The public, as the third party in the dispute, may
accept or reject the communication without realising harm if either
course is taken* In the case- of the secondary boycott,,on;the other
hand, demands made to third parties usually result in retaliatory action
if not accepted, and there is typically no free choice possible. It is
difficult to ■visualize a successful boycott which could’be carried on in
a peaceful manner, as that term has been defined by the courts with
regard to picketing. If a labor organization only requested cooperation
from third parties, without threats or intimidation, it is unlikely that
the request would be accepted in many instances*
Chief Justice Taft, in 1931, stated that peaceful picketing was
a 11contradiction in terns

His contention was subsequently overruled

by a later Court where it was held that peaceful picketing was speech
and therefore protected from abridgement by the states* Whether peaceful
secondary boycotting is a ^contradiction in terns** or whether the Court
will eventually confer it with the immunity of free speech will undoubtedly
41 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council. 257
0. S. 184 (192l) .r

be determined in the near future* the large number of state antisecondary boycott statutes makes the clarification of this matter
extremely urgent* From the available evidence* furnished by the re
strictions which the Court has placed upon picketing as free speech*
together with numerous recent decisions upholding state police power
in the matter of union security agreements* it is reasonable to suspect
that the Court will not strike down state secondary boycott prohibitions*

CHAPTER SIX
STATE LIMITATIONS ON THE EIGHT TO STEIKE
In the preceding chapters* attention has be focused upon the
manner in which the state legislatures have regulated some .Of the
inportant economic weapons which have been utilised by organised
labor in the industrial conflict* It has been shown that the state
governments have been active in prohibiting or limiting the right
of employees to make union security agreements* to picket* and to
employ the secondary boycott* These devices* however* are usually
considered to be of secondary importance to the principal economic
weapon used by labor to achieve its objectives* the strike* The
overshadowing importance of the strike is not difficult to understand*
for it is the most effective way in which pressure may be exerted on
employers to induce them to cosily with the demands of organized
employees* It is the basis upon which all the coercive tactics of
labor unions are grounded; indeed* the picket line and the secondary
boycott depend upon the existence or threat of a strike to render
them effective in many instances*
Although it has been clear that the states cannot absolutely
proscribe all strike *activity since the Supreme Court so held In 1923*^
they have enacted a significant amount of regulatory legislation designed
to limit in various ways the right to strike* The purpose of this chapter
1 Wolff Packing Cto. v , Kansas. 262 U* S. 522, (1923).
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is to surrey the important areas of strike regulation to determine the
extent of such regulation and the principal forms which it has taken*
A recent trend toward differentiation between strike regulation in
private industry and similar regulation in industries "affected with
the public interest" necessitates their discussion under separate see**
tions of this chapter*
X#

STRIKE REGULATION XM PRIVATE INDUSTRY

The concept of "private: industry** in relation to state regulation
of the right to strike Is somewhat ambiguous* Private industry has been
subject to increasingly frequent inroads of state regulation under the
inherent police power* and since 1934* the Supreme Court has been
*
inclined to look with favor upon the encroachment* It may be argued
that there are no industries which do not affect the public* But as far
as strike regulation is concerned the states have generally reserved to
private industry all businesses which are not absolutely essential to
the public safety, health and general welfare. Communications, trans
portation, water works, sewage disposal plants, and electric light and
power plants have generally been-excluded from the private industry
category*
Procedural regulation of the right to strike
One of the most effective means by which a large number of the
states have regulated the right of employees to strike has been the
2 Nebbla v. New York, 291 U, S. 502 (1934).
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formulation of procedural requirements which must be met before a strike
is Instituted against an employer# Procedural regualtions have taken
two general forms, .the requirement of a strike election, and the require
ment providing for a ^cooling off” period prior to a proposed strike.
The strike election requirement. Thirteen states^ have enacted
statutes requiring that an election be held prior to a strike to determine
whether or not a majority of the employees are in favor of taking such
action* In Colorado,^ for e:x&mple, it is an unfair union labor practices
to cooperate in engaging in, promoting or inducing picketing,
boycotting or any other concomitant of a strike unless a majority
in a collective bargaining unit of the employees of an employer
against whom such acts are primarily directed have voted by secret
ballot to call a strike#
In Florida, a state which does not define unfair labor practices, the
legislature' has declared it unlawful to ^participate in any strike with
out the majority secret ballot vote authorising the strike#!*^ Missouri

Imfi requires that the election
•**shall be held.and conducted at such place or places and under
such rules and regulations as the Industrial Commission may pre
scribe in order to assure a secret, fair,and impartial election
and a fair count of the ballots##*#
In addition,- this statute declares that m election, to be valid, must *
be preceded by notices to all employees that the vote is to be held#?
*

3 Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, louisiana, Minnesota,
Missouri, Morth Dakota, Oregon, Utah, Wisconsin and Michigan#
& L* 1943, section 6 (2) (e)#
^ 1945 Supp,, section 481*09 (3)*
6 3* B. 79, U 1947, section 3*
? Ibid*# section 4*
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three of the state laws which require m election of employees
prior to a strike have been invalidated by the courts* These states
are Alabama,^ Kansas,^ and Oregon*-*® The Alabama Supreme Court held the
requirement unconstitutional

o il

the ground that it tended to curb lawful

as well as unlawful strike#* A district court held the Kansas statute
unconstitutional in 1945* It declared that the right to strike, like
the right to freedom of speech, is a fundamental liberty which the state
.may not. abridge in the absence of clear 'and present danger to the. com-*.
©unity* Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court in
the Alabama decision but was dismissed for lack of substantial question*^
The Court did not consider the constitutionality of that part of the
statute dealing with procedural requirements*
The rteoolin& off0 period requirement* Eight states, Colorado,
Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, North Dakota, Michigan, Minnesota, and
Wisconsin, require that a specified period of time must elapse between
the calling of a strike and its actual inception* Of these provisions,
that which is found in the Georgia law is most stringent* No labor
organisation and no local shall call or cause any strike, slow-down or
stoppage of work until after a thirty days1 written notice is given to
the esployer, stating the intention to take such action and giving the
^ Alabama State Federation of labor v* McAdory. 244 Ala* .1, (1944)*
^ Stapleton vl Mitchell* 9 labor Cases 62,574, (Kan.,1945)*.
10 M k X* Bain. 165 Oreg. 133,106 P. 2nd 544, (1940).

11 235 U. S. 540, (1945).
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reasons therefor*-^ Colorado requires that twenty days* notice must
be given prior to the inception of a strike in non-agricultural
Industries, and an additional ten-days in agricultural industries*
Delaware and North Dakota only require that notice be given*
The cooling off period requirement is designed to aid in
effecting a settlement of the labor dispute* The element of surprise,
which is a vital factor in many strikes, is significantly lessened,
however, by this procedural requirement, and organized labor Is thus
deprived of the right to take immediate, effective action* One writer
is of the opinion that the cooling off period is in reality a heating
up period, and is actually designed to prevent the advantage which
organized labor might gain from surprise action*^ Whatever is the
truth in this matter, it is doubtful that the requirement is as effec
tive in promoting industrial peace as that which requires an election
among the employees affected prior to the strike* The latter reduces
the number of “wildcat” and “outlaw” strikes in industry, and protects
the majority of ecployees from irresponsible action by a dissatisfied
minority*
Peculation of strikes in violation of collective bargaining aisreements
In addition to procedural requirements, the states have limited
the right to strike by prohibiting strikes in violation of a collective
rrrito^rrTi^W-nvrv,
1* 1941, Act No* 293, section 3*
^ 15 University of Chicago law Heview 282, (1948), *
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bargaining agreement* Eleven states1*' have acted in this respect,
excluding a 1949 Michigan statute1^ which prohibits any. strike to upset
>
a valid certification by the State■labor Eolations Board*
Pemsylvania has made a specific exemption in its Anti-Injunction
Act of strikes which are called in violation of an employer-employee
agreement* The law declares that the act shall not apply in any case
involving!
*«*a labor dispute, as defined’herein, which is in disregard, _,
breach or violation of***& valid, subsisting labor agreement****1®
Both injunctive relief and damages may be sought in Colorado,
Delaware, Missouri, South Dakota, Texas, Worth Dakota, Louisiana and
California, if a strike is called in violation of a collective bargaining
agreement* A strike for this purpose has also been included as an unfair
labor practice by laws in Colorado, Minnesota, and Wisconsin* The
Minnesota provision is typical!

It is an unfair employee labor practice

for
any employee or labor organisation to Institute a strike if such
strike is in violation of any valid collective agreement** *and the
employer is, at the time, in. good faith complying with the pro
visions of the agreement**#*1'
State prohibitions of jurisdictional .strikes
The existence of jurisdictional, strikes in industrial, relations.
^ Pennsylvania, Colorado, Delaware, Missouri, South Dakota, Texa^
Horth Dakota, Louisiana, California, Minnesota and Wisconsin*
*5 Public Act No. 230, Acte 1949, effective May 31, 1949.
1^ Title 43, section 206d, Purdon's Stets. Anno, '
1? 1. 1939, section 179.11 <1).
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has prompted a number-of states to enact specific, proscriptions of this
type' of union activity* The jurisdictional ©trike involves a work '
stoppage as a result of a conflict between two- or more labor organisa
tion© over the right to represent a group of employees, or the right to
perform certain type© of job© for an employer* fhe former type of
jurisdictional strike, is a direct result of dual unionism and the exist
ence of rival labor organisation©| the latter form is at least partially
due to unavoidable technological progress* The prevalance of jurisdic
tional strikes in recent years has not been taken lightly by the public,
to whom the' jurisdictional ©trike represents a gross mate of productive
power and efficiency, nor by the employer© vfoo find that their plants
are strikebound even though they have no dispute with either union*
►v

Consequently, much pressure has been brought to bear on the state
legislatures to curb such ©trike©*
At the present time, eleven states1^ either prohibit or strictly
regulate jurisdictional ©trikes* Bepresentative of the group of state©
that merely prohibit such strikes is the provision of the Florida statute
which declares ■that it is unlawful for any person !}to interfere with work:
by reason of any jurisdictional dispute, grievance or disagreement
between or within a labor organisation,thus condemning both types
of jurisdictional strikes*
Califondl, Florida, Kansas (invalid), Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, Oregon (invalid), Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, lorn, and Minnesota*
19 1945 Supp. section 481,09 (3).
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Other states* such as Michigan^ and Minnesota* have set up
rather elaborate machinery for the settlement of Jurisdictional dis
putes* in addition to prohibiting strikes growing out of these con
troversies# ■The constructive- approach to the problem, taken by Minnesota
Is worthy of comment* In this state* whenever a Jurisdictional dispute
arises* the employer may request that the .labor Concialiator notify the
Governor of the State that a Jurisdictional dispute exists# The latter
then may appoint a referee to hear the conflicting claims of the disputant
labor organisations# The referee nsliaH make such decision as, in con
sideration of the past history of the organizations, harmonious operation
of the industry, and most effective representation for collective bargain
ing, will best promote industrial

p e a c e *1

1

Following the appointment of

the referee, it is declared to be unlawful to strike against the employer*
While the prohibition of Jurisdictional strikes by the states
prevents their occurrence, it is necessary to point out that the problem
of Jurisdictional disputes cannot be solved by legislation* is long as
dual unionism exists in the United States, and, as long as technological
progress continues to change the manner in which certain tasks are per*
formed, these conflicts will continue to plague industrial relations*
Methods of settlement, such as those which’the Minnesota law provides,
constitute a more enlightened solution to the problem, of course, than
the mere proscription of Jurisdictional strikes*
The sit-down strike
Another form .of work stoppage which the states have prohibited by
nurnI#ii m-ic

1941,

s e c t io n

1 7 9 *0 0 3 •

legislation is the sit-down strike#. During the latter half' of the
1930*s, this device was used on a wide scale by the rubber worker’s,

-the auto -worker’s and a number of other major unions* From its incep
tion there' was little doubt but that it was an illegal method of exert
ing' economic pressure# the question was convincingly decided in 1939
in the case of MUffl y> Fansteel Metallurgies Corporation*^ in which
Chief Justice Hughes characterised it as Ma high-handed proceeding
without shadow of legal right**1'
Fourteen states^ have specifically prohibited its use by employ
ees# Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota*
Pennsylvania* Utah and Wisconsin- declare such a strike to be an employee
/
unfair labor practice# the Wisconsin statute is typical# It provides
that it shall be an unfair labor practice for any employee or labor
organisation to Mtake unauthorised possession of property of the employer
or to engage in -any concerted effort to .interfere with production except
by leaving the premises in m orderly manner for the purpose of going cm
strike."23 This provision has been interpreted to include as an employee
unfair labor practice intermittent work stoppages for attendance of union
.meetings which are called for the purpose of slowing down production*^*
30b U. S* 2m,
Colorado* Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Utah- Vermont, Washing
ton, and Wisconsin#
23 L. 1939* chapter 57* section 111.06 (h).
^ M M of America jr. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board. Wis. Sup.
Ct,* 1947* 12 labor Cases 63,843*

those states that do not have labor relations acts have pro
hibited the sit-down strike as unlawful, illegal and subject to injunc
tive relief# Washington declares such a strike to be. a felony and
excepts it from the state’s -anti-injunction act*^ It is clear, that •
even in those states that have not condemned the sit-down strike by
-statute it would be enjoined* la view of this fact, few sit-down
©trikes have occurred, in .recent years*
\ .

Other regulation of ©trike activity
In addition to- the main categories of strike regulation which
have been discussed above, a number of states have enacted miscellaneous
laws-which are of less importance* Six states,^ for example, have
prohibited strikes by public employees, the Missouri statute readst
Any employee of the United -States, or of this state...who shall
call, support, encourage or participate in any strike against his
employer shall be considered engaged in an act of grave and
immediate danger to the community and ©hall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor.#^
This type of ©trike prohibition is* of course, in line with the policy of
the Federal Government with regard to public employees* Such employees,
however* have been granted the right to organise and bargain collectively*
Texas,

Horth Dakota and Missouri have outlawed sympathy strikes*

Epical of these statutes is that of Horth Dakota which declares- sympathy
strikes to be %gainst the public policy and against the peace and dignity
25 hem* Rev* Stat**,section 2^63-4♦
^ Michigan* Missouri* Hew York, Ohio* Pennsylvania and Texas*
\

27 L. 1947, S , B. 79, section 7.

(Repealed, July, 1949)*

of the (state)**.and shall be subject to restraint by the district
courts...as well as suits for damages therein."28 In Arizona, moreover,
it is illegal to force an employee to strike against M o will,27 and in

Massachusetts it is an employee unfair labor practice'to strike where the
objective thereof is to force any person to eoinmitt an unfair labor
practice*
In one state, Oklahoma, the law relating to striking, ^if given a
literal interpretation, apparently outlaws nearly every type of strike*
The provision reads*
It shall be a misdemeanor to prevent by force, threats, or
intimidation, any person from enploying another, or to compel such
employment, or to ecsspel a person to alter his mode of carrying'
on business, or to limit or increase the number of his...(employees)
or their rate of wages or time of service*-*®
Since almost any strike contains the element of force or coercion, the
■. *fc

law could possibly be construed m prohibiting even the so-called economic
strikes for- better wages and conditions of employment. If interpreted in
this manner, the constitutionality of the provision is extremely doubtful.
II* STRIKE REOIMTIOH W PUBLIO 0TB1TSES
To this point the discussion of state regulation of the right to
strike has been confined, though not absolutely,^ to such regulation
■
,nTiirn,'-,:ntri)iilim,WTjmTOinarTin,.'t'j.ii.;ii:iir'irtiinro‘[;ti'ri:',riTi(t'..

1* 194?, chapter 242, section 13* (Approved by referendum,
July 29, 1940*)
1* 1947, ’chapter 01, section 5&-1304*
3®

cM&h<mia Stats*, Title 21, chapter'.30, section 030*

31 Many regulations may apply to both private and public industry.

no
m

it applies to employees of private business and industry,-' Since a

somewhat different approach to the problem of strike .regulation has
been taken in the public utility field, it is desirable to make a
separate study of the pertinent legislation#
3M

regulation o f strikes Jg| nubile utilities
In

the course of a strike in. a private industry, two groups are

primarily affected, the employers and the employees* Only in an indirect
way is 'the general public inconvenienced# Such is not the case, however,
when a work stoppage occurs in. a public utility industry,.for not only
are the employers and employee© affected through loss of profits and
wages, but also a burden is placed directly on the citizens who depend
upon the utility for essential service#
The

public has recognized -the desirability of continuous operation

of public utilities for many years, since these industries are by nature
monopolistic and effective substitute© f o r their service are not readily
available# Thus the court© as well as the independent regulatory com
missions have -often insisted on continuous operation of a utility, even
to the extent of denying abandonment petitions where a fair return, on
investment could not be made*^2 It has been firmly established that the
interest of the public in m ch an enterprise must be considered in any
decision affecting the operation of the utility, and that management
prerogative, which is dominant in private enterprise, must not go un
restrained where the general welfare of the community is at ©take*
3%

Transit Commission jr* United States* 284 U* S» 360, (1932) *

In spite of the traditional attitude of the public with regard
to the continuous operation of essential utilities, the states took
little action, prior, to the 194? legislative sessions, to eliminate
disruption of utility service as a result of strikes*' Kansas,^ North
Dakota,*^ and Colorado*^ had experimented for many years with public
utility strike regulation, with varying degrees of success* It was only
after the wave of public utility work stoppages that swept the country
in the wake of the coal strike in 1944 that a large number of states
recognized, the significance of the problem* At the present time twelve
states^ have legislation that limits or prohibits the strike in a public
utility industry*
The need for strike regulation In public utilities introduces a
problem which is not easily met* By such regulation, it,is claimed, the
normal processes of free collective bargaining are subverted* With the
strike weapon removed by legislation, organized labor Is placed in a
disadvantageous position* As one student of the problem has'stated,
however,
In theory collective bargaining is the best .and most desirable
method of adjusting differences- between employer and employees»
In practice, it has not met with the degree of success necessary

33 19^5

G©n* stats*, Article 6, chapter 44*

3k

lev* Code, 1943, section 3?~01®4*

33

Colo* Stats* Anno*, chapter 9?, section 32, (Supp* 194?}*

3& Florida, Indiana, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Wisconsin, Missouri, Massachusetts, Virginia, Minnesota, Colorado*
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to insure the public against strikes and. the interruption of vital
utility services*^?
It Is therefore necessary to experiment with other means to insure
continuous operation of essential industries; twelve states are at
present engaged in this experimentation process.
the OQQllng~off period requirement
Four of the states, Virginia,^ Massachusetts,39 Hew
and

Michigan,

J e r s e y ,

40

41 require that prior to the inception of a strike in a

public utility, a certain number of day© must elapse. In Michigan, not
less than thirty days must pass between the serving of a notice of an
impending ©trike-and the actual walkout* The Virginia provision state©
that at least five weeks must intervene between serving of strike notice
and the date of the strike*
As was pointed out in the discussion of cooling*~off period© in
private industry strikes, there is some doubt concerning the value of
such regulation* It is .claimed that the cooling-off period ^merely
intensifies the determination to ©trike on the part of the workers con^
cemei,”^

Another argument against this procedural requirement is that

the parties to the dispute in a public utility Industry usually negotiate
t■iinraTTfniijf'rin,i)i;^"yioyd, ^Utility Strikes and the Public Interest,11 48
Wis. law Eev* 597, at 600, (1948).
3®

I** 1947, chapter 9, section 4.

39 l . 1947, chapter 596.
4® L. 1946, chapter 38.
4^* Acts 1949, No* 230, section 423.9*
42 12 law and Contemporary Problem© 355, 362, (1947)*

for a considerable length of time even without a compulsory period
required by law* Only in the event of a breakdown in negotiations does
the strike actually begin* One value, however, in the cooling-off
period is that it prevents "wildcat* and "outlaw* strikes by dissatisfied
minorities. But as far as promoting labor-management peace:.in the public
utility field is concerned its value is subject to question. Notwith
standing, where the policy of the state is designed to provide continuous
operation of essential industries, traditional prerogatives of labor must
suffer. Jn Virginia, for example, a threatened transit strike was everted
by a combination of the cooling-off requirement and the seizure provisions
of the law. In the final analysis, it is for the state to decide whether
the desirability of continuous operation outweighs the undesirability of
restrictions which are placed upon the "rights” of labor*
Compulsory arbitration in. public utilities
Another method with which the states are experimenting at the
present time is strike regulation by means of compulsory arbitration and
mediation. Florida,43 Ind±am,44 Mebraska#45 Pennsylvania,46

Wiscon

s i n ^ outlaw strikes in public utilities and provide for compulsory
43’L. 1947, chapter 23911,-section 1-19*
44 l . 1947, chapter 341, section 1-18.
43 Eev. Stats., (Supp* 1947), chapter 48, 801-23*
44 stats. Anno., Title 43*
47 U 1947, chapter 414, section 111.50.

.114

arbitration. Another group of states,

Michigan,

48 Massachusetts, 49

Virginia^ 0 and North Dakota^ provide for the mediation of dispute©
on a compulsory basis, limitations on the power to strike during
mediation, and for the seizure of industries if mediation fails*
The history of compulsory arbitration in two of the states that
have given it a sufficient test indicates that It Is not likely to prove
to be the. complete answer to the problem, of public utility ©trikes*
Kansas attempted to put such a plan into operation Just after the first
World War, by establishing the Kansas Industrial Court in 1920.^ This
court was charged with the responsibility of arbitrating disputes in
Industrie© "affected with the public interest*" In holding certain
portions of the Kansas Act unconstitutional in the Wolff Packing Co. case,33
the Supreme Court indicated the area in which the states could Impose
coB?>ulsory arbitration without violating the Fourteenth Amendment* These
three types of enterprise are (I) public utilities; (2) exceptional
occupations traditionally clothed wdth the public interest; and (3 )
industries not considered public at first but rendered so by changing
conditions* The meat packing industry, the Court held, did not come
under any one of the three classifleatlons, .and thus a significant portion
Acte 1949# Ho. 230, section *33.9.
**9 Anno. Laws, (Supp. 1947) chapter ISO B, section 1-7.
Va. Code, section 1887 (Supp. 1948).
51 Rev. Code, section 37-0106 (1943).
52 Gen. Stats., section 44-601 (SQpp. 1936).
53 262 B. S. 522,

of the Act was declared unconstitutional*
Prior to the Kansas experiment in 1916, the State of Colorado
had instituted a forn of compulsoiyr investigation of disputes in
industries affected with the public interest,, particularly in coal
mining* The Industrial Commission was charged with the investigation
of utility disputes and the making of an award, which was not binding.
Strikes which occurred 'during the period- of investigation were illegal
and subject to severe sanctions of the courts* Marne and Caddis, in a
study entitled "Eleven Tears of Compulsory Investigation of Industrial
Disputes in Colorado, "34 point out that the plan was not successful in
stopping strikes in important disputes, largely because of deficiencies
in administrative technique. Because of its early failures the plan has
been abandoned in recent years*, In spite of the apparent failures in
these two states, compulsory arbitration has become an important method
which the states are now employing to eliminate strike© in public utilities*
Typical of the compulsory arbitration features of state laws is
that of the Indiana statute*33 It encourages employees and employers to
first exhaust every available means to settle a dispute by collective
bargaining* If collective bargaining breaks down the Governor then
appoints a conciliator who shall attespt to bring the disputant parties
together in a compromise* If this effort is unsuccessful within thirty
days, a Board of Arbitration is appointed and it must hand down an award
54 35 Journal Pol. Been. 657, (1927)
55 Acts 1947, chapter 341.
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within sixty days* The award 1© subject to judicial review, but
reversible only under certain circumstances,; if a circuit court reverses
the judgement, further conciliation and arbitration must be eagaXoyed.
The Florida law, in addition to these provisions, makes the award bind-*
ing on both parties for a period of one year, unless altered by mutual
consent*^
The compulsory arbitration features of state laws which have been
passed since 194? have been subject to frequent criticism by organised
labor* A number of reasons are given in support of the contention that
compulsory arbitration is unworkable

First, it is claimed that

genuine collective bargaining is subverted* It cannot be denied that
cocgpulaory arbitration replaces genuine collective bargaining, but this
is true only after all available attempts to settle the dispute have
failed in private bargaining conferences* Host of the states have specifi
cally provided that arbitration machinery shall only operate where no
other hope for settlement exists* Consequently, this argument does not
hold up under close scrutiny of the laws* It has further been claimed
that compulsory bargaining will increase rather than diminish disputes
in public utilities because of the -difficulty of working under an agree- _
merit which either one party or the other disputes. Very few cases, how
ever have arisen under the compulsory arbitration features of state laws,
^ 1* 1947, chapter 23911, section 1-19•
57

A complete analysis of such criticism is found in 97 Univ. of
Pa. Law Rev* 410, 415, February, 1949*
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certainly not enough to formulate any valid conclusions. Hie initial
test of the Wisconsin law was highly successful, both employer and
esployees claiming victory as a result of the arbitration award.^
Since the arbitration boards are supposed to be impartial, it would
seem inconsistent with the laws if one party was deliberately harmed
at the ei^ense of the other#
It has been further argued that the failure of the Kansas and
Colorado compulsory arbitration experiments forecast the doom of present
day legislation* It has been shown, however, that the Kansas law was
only invalid as it attempted to regulate private businesses, and the
Colorado failure was a result of administrative inefficiency. These
early tests of compulsory arbitration furnish insufficient evidence
of the workability or unworkability of the present statutes# All of
these arguments, on the other hand, indicate that compulsory arbitral
tion should not be depended upon by the states as the sole answer to
public utility strikes#
Seizure Power in public utility strikes»
An

even more drastic measure than compulsory arbitration are the

seizure provisions found in tie public utility strike laws of Virginia,
Massachusetts, Kansas and North Dakota# The North Dakota law provides
that in the event of a strike in a public utility or coal mine, the
Governor of the State is empowered to seize and operate the facility*
Virginia and Massachusetts have adopted this policy since the end of the

5® See IS Wig*

2§S‘ » 6o8» (1948).
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Virginia provides t o r extensive mediation and arbitration in. the

event of a public utility labor dispute* M this process faH%. a
strike'or lockout may be- called for not less than five weeks in-the
future* Upon the receipt of the strike notice the Governor must investi
gate to determine whether the strike or lockout will result in interruption of essential services constituting a serious menace to the public
health* safety or welfare* and if he so concludes he may proclaim that
at the time of such interruption he will take possession of the utility*
its plant and equipment* for use and operation -of the tomaonwealth•^
During the period of government operation* no changes may be made in
working conditions or wages since it is intended that such matters shall-,
be left to collective bargaining* Hie Governor of Virginia may operate
the utility m long as he deems necessary and may return the facility
whenever he is Satisfied that normal, operations will be resumed*^® The
New Jersey law is similar to the Virginia statute* and both make it
unlawful to strike during the period of government operation*
Hie seizure power of the state governments is not subject to
question in the public utility field* Admittedly,- it is a drastic
measure; its use* therefore* should only come after all methods of strike
prevention have failed* The utilisation of the seizure power indis
criminately by the four states having such laws could have repercussions
which might be less desirable than lack of continuous operation of
^ 1 * 194?* chapter 9* section 5*
60 Ibid.. section 13*

.

utilities* •&, the final- analysis, all ooop^stan by the states

should be directed toward facilitating free collective bargaining and
voluntary settlement of disputes,-rather-than toward a subversion of
these processes* State control of the right to strike in public utility
industries Is necessary to the welfare of the ccmssamity, but it must be
exercised'with discretion*

The ri^at to strike has been limited as m economic pressure
device both in private industry and in the public utility field. Be#
©trictione which have 'been placed on the right to strike in areas of
private enterprise have not been so severs as those which the states
have felt necessary to prevent interruptions of service in esaeniiaX
.industries* Purely economic strikes, such as those for higher wages
and shorter hours, have been .relatively unaffected by state regulation,
but many states have instituted procedural requirements, such as strike
votes, strike notices, end cooling-off periods in. order to cut to a
minimum work stoppages* Hie sit-down strike is prohibited on a wide
scale, and the jurisdictional, strike has been, either prohibited or
regulated, in-a mvaber of states*
la the public utility field, there has been a trend in the post
war years toward coflopuleion -in one form or another to prevent strikes
from occurring* Compulsory investigation* arbitration, mediation,
cooling-off periods are all being tested in the state laboratories at
the present time# Even m m drastic 1mm have been written* allowing

12 0

some states to seise utilities'in which a dispute threatens to become
a strike# Many of these laws have been in operation less‘than, two years$
consequently* there is too. little evidence upon which to base judgement
of their merits*: Although public utility strike provisions have been
attacked on constitutional, grounds* as well as on the ground that they
are unworkable* such, judgement seems premature* the problem of continuity
of operation in public utilities mist be solved* and many of the states
are now attempting to discover workable solutions# It is quite possible
that some features of the present laws will prove unsatisfactory and
others will be modified in light of legislative experience, but the fact
that they are being given a fair trial may provide the foundation upon
■which these and other states will discover the solution to public utility
strikes*
In. conclusion,.' Justice Brandeis* statement in connection with his
dissent In the Duplex -case is worthy of note* He said;
'Because 1 have come to- the conclusion that both the common .law
of a state aid a statute of the United States, declares the right ..
of industrial combatants to push their struggle to the limits of
the justification of self-interest, I do not wish to be understood
as attaching any constitutional or moral sanction to that right*
All rights are derived from the p u r p o s e s of the society in which
they exist| above all rights rises duty to the community* The
conditions developed in industry may be such that those engaged in,
it cannot continue their struggle without danger to the community#

^ Duplex Printing Preps Co. v* Peering* 254 U* S* 306, 311, (1926)*
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The regulation of unfair labor practices as such began in 193f
with the passage of the Wagner Act by Congress* This important labor
legislation specifically defined certain practices which m $layers were
forbidden to- perform in the course of their relatione with organtod
employees* The Intent of Congress at that time mm to encourage the
organisation of employees, and to aid them In achieving collective
bargaining power which was equal to that enjoyed by employers* the
Wagner Act sawsmted only employer unfair labor practice©! employees
wars left .relatively free to- exercise economic coercion in industrial
relations* The first state labor relations acts, passed fey ^©eensJa,
Hew fork, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Utah in 193?, were models
of the Wagner let, and included provisions dealing with employer unfair
labor practices*: 3h 1939, however, Michigan and Minnesota enacted, labor
relations law© which were considerably loss restrictive on the rights of
employers, and which defined employee unfair Saber practices It* addition
to those which were forbidden to employers* this trend'.has continued to
the present time* Of the eleven States^ which now have labor relations
Saw© which list unfair labor practices* only Cormecticut, hew fork* and
Bhode Island fail to define er^ployee unfair labor practices* It is
.1u.nir.i Itti (O'•lu.-.riiwiwurpi^mirtrn 'Urijm-.rirutt r r T ' r n i i iniiiir

A Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, Mew fork, Bhode Island, Wisconsin and Utah* the Delaware
labor Halation© Act, which m s s&all&r to tfe.faft#Martley Act, m s
repealed by the 1949 session of the legislation*-

worthy of note that while the states followed the Wagner Act in the
matter of proscribing m p l& y ^ r unfair practices* they led .in the trend
toward restricting ea^loyee unfair practices*

It was not m h t t the

passage of the faft^lartle^ Act In 1947 that the. national, government
.specifically defined certain practices which
by

mm

unfair when performed

labor*
the purpose of this chapter is to- survey the

mm

ig&or&aixb

labor practices which the twelve states that here emcted this type of
legislation h a w prohibited in the course of regulating industrial

relations*
4**

j » t r u i s r i u y t t ioRouit r i s&v*

.Bvery state labor relations act now in 'operation contains piwt*
alone describing m & l& y & r unfair labor practices*: ..lb general* these
provisions am Introduced by the statement that *5& shall be m unfair
labor practice for an ea^loyer* individually or In concert with others”^
to engage in any of the practices which the -act prohibits* fhe t$m
enployer $# interpreted to wan anyone acting in the interests of an
eaployer* this position In that which m s taken by the Supreme Court in
connection with e^loyera In Interstate-

fhus m m^lmymw may

be guilty of perforating m unfair labor practice even though he Is-.
unaware of the fact* If It is done 'by a subordinate acting for the essplcyer
^ Utah Code lnno** 1943* chapter 55* section
3 S». £4 Hcina S o. *». NUtB. 311 » * S . 51h, (1 9 4 1 ).
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delegated authority.

Interference with the

of employees

ten states^ make it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
interfere with the guaranteed rights of employees granted by the Act.
these rights invariably include the freedom to organise, to bargain
collectively, and to engage in concerted activities which are legal in
themselves. Interference has been interpreted by seme state courts to
include an employers offer to grant wage increases If employees resign
from the union*-* and threats of discharge for union membership and
activity.^ Other courts have held* on the other hand* that the mere
granting of a wage increase during a union* s organisation campaign does
not constitute an employer unfair labor practice*? nor the discussion
of the union by an employer where there is no threat of reprisal for
joining or promise of benefit for not joining#9

The question as to whether an employer may transfer his business
to a different locality in order to thwart unionisation without committing an unfair labor practice has been determined in the negative by the
^ Colorado, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Utah, Wisconsin, Connec
ticut, New fork, Rhode Island, Michigan, and Kansas*
5

£a» M g v.

6 Pa. J M X‘

Bust*a Bairy. 13 labor Cases 64,003*(1946).
bellow Cab and Bug Co.. 10 labor Cases63,085, (1946).

^ Building Service Employees v. Uewhouse Realty Co.. and Utah LRB.
9? Utah 562, 95 Pae, 2nd. 507, tl»9T*
8 Pa, M B v.Beck, 7 labor Cases 61,863, (1943).
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Pennsylvania courts.^ It was held that this action, or the threat of
such action, constitutes an unfair interference with the rights of
ss^loyees*
The inportance of making employer interference with the rights
of employees an Illegal practice lies in the fact that the whole
philosophy of collective bargaining is grounded upon the freedom of
workers to organize and to choose their own representatives. These
rights have become widely accepted by all but those who are extremely
anti-labor* It would be fruitless, however,- to give labor these rights
by legislative enactment and fail to provide a semblance of protection
from employer interference and coercion* The making of such interference
an unfair practice is one of the means by which the states have attempted
to protect labor in the exercise of its granted powers to organize and
bargain collectively through the representatives of its choice*
Domination of labor organizations
In the early years of the labor movement in America* one method
which employers found to be a reasonably effective weapon against the
rising power of the national unions was the company union* These
unions were formed with the assistance of the employer and were confined
to the ei)f>l0y©r,s business* Although employees were often represented
by chosen workers in the company, the employer usually dominated the
affairs of the organization* thus making them relatively ineffective*
The independent national unions fought the company union tooth and claw
M

601 (19447.

IS Patterson, d.b.a. Tufoe,Pity Taxi and Transfer Co.. 350 Pa.
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for many years, and these efforts ultimately led to the passage of
legislation first on the national and then on the state level of
government,. At the present time, ten states^® make it an unfair labor
practice to either initiate, dominate or interfere with the formation
of any labor organisation#' The Wisconsin provision is typicals
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer♦.*to
initiate, create, dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organisation or contribute financial
support to it, provided that an employer shall not be prohibited
from#•♦permitting employee organisational activities on company
premises on the use of company facilities where such activities
or use create no additional e^qpense to the company*XX
in connection with this unfair labor practice the state courts
have held that the initiation and formation of an employee’s association
by supervisory employees, and the immediate recognition of this associa
tion by the employer as the representative of workers in the plant at a
time when an affiliated union was attempting to organize the plant was
ample evidence of an illegal interference*-^ In another case it was
held that an sublayer who allowed an employee association^ (dominated by
a personal friend' of the employer) to use company premises for meetings
at a time when an affiliated union was attesting to organize was ample
evidence of interference and dcsainaiion.^
X® Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Utah,
Wisconsin, Minnesota, Mew York, Rhode Island, Michigan, and Kansas#
XX i# 1939, chapter 57, section 111*06 (l)(b).
Stork Restaurants I m * v# Boland, 282 M* Y* 256, 26 N« E* 2nd'
247, (194077^
Mgw loi^ fflgEj v* Interboroui^ Mews, go,,■1 labor Gases '10,302, '
(1939)4
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Discouraging or encouraging union membership
Another .form of sqployer interferences which the lavs'of ten
states*^ proscribe a© an unfair labor practice is the discouraging or
encouraging of membership in a labor organization. In these laws there
is typically a provision which allows the en^loyer to enter into a
union security agreement subject to certain limitations. For example*
the Colorado statute declares it to be an employer unfair labor practice:
To encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization,
employee agency, committee, association or representation plan by
discrimination in regard to hiring, tenure or other terms or
conditions of employment, provided, that an employer shall not be
prohibited from entering into an all-union agreement.*.with M e
employees* •*where three-quarters or more of his employees shall
have voted affirmatively by secret ballot in favor of such all
union agreement*»*.X5
It was pointed out in chapter three that the Colorado requirement of
an affirmative vote of three-fourths of the employees prior to the
execution of an all-union agreement is considerably more stringent than
that found in the majority of state labor relations acts.

Wisconsin?^

requires a two-thirds vote, but the remaining states merely prescribe
a simple majority.

\
An interesting case developed in Wisconsin with regard to this

employer unfair labor practice, An employer entered into a collective
agreement with a union whereby employees were required to either join
the union and pay its admission fee and dues, or to obtain a work permit
X& Colorado, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Utah, Wisconsin,
Minnesota, Connecticut, Mew York, Bhode Island, and Michigan,
X5 L. 1943, chapter 131, section 6 (l) (c),
16 L. 1939, chapter 57# section 111.06 <c)j as amended by chapter

624, L. 1945.
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from the union which cost on© and. one-half times as much as the dues
alone. This was not an all-union agreement since the employees did
not have to join the union as a condition of future employment* The
state courts held that this was an unfair labor practice on the part
of the employer since the contract interfered with the employees*
right not to join or assist a labor organisation*^
With regard to discriminatory discharge for union activity*
the Pennsylvania courts have held that the burden of proof of such
discharge rests upon the employee

The employee must show con

clusively that he was fired for union activity and not for inefficiency
or insubordination* One court has held that the mere fact that th©
employee had a clear record over a period of seven years is not suf
ficient proof that his discharge was discriminatory**^ It is apparent*
therefore* that it is extremely difficult to prove to the satisfaction
of the courts that an employee*© discharge was made for union activity*
On the other hand* it is relatively easy for the employer to avoid the
prohibition of discrimination in favor of* or against union members.
The inclusion of discrimination as an unfair labor practice* however*
has undoubtedly had a deterring effect on the tendency of employers
to keep unionism in check by discrimination*
■wmnx-mrnmrT^-^rmrm-*.

t w w

International Union* Unitetf Automobile* Aircraft and Agricul
tural Implement Workers of America v* Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board. 245 Wis, 417, 15 S7 W, 2nd 873,' " ( & & ) ',
^ Pa. LKB v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.. 7 Labor Cases 61,755
(1943).
W American Foundry and Machine Co. v. Utah LRB, 106 Utah 394,141
pae. 2nd, ^ , " 1 1 9 ^ 7 . --------- - ~
------
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*te|ueaX to bargain collectively
One of the most important unfair labor practices which seven
of the 'states2® have included in their labor relations acts is the
refusal of employers to bargain with the representatives chosen by the
employees* the rights of enployees, which include the right to
o rg a n iz e

and select representatives for bargaining purposes* would be

of little consequence if it were possible for the employer to refuse
to meet with the agents of the employees to bargain collectively over
terns and conditions of employment. The making of such a refusal an *
unfair labor practice obligates the employer to participate in the
collective bargaining process* and to recognizee the representatives as
the agents of his employees* These representatives must be the certi
fied bargaining agents of his employees* and a refusal to bargain with
a minority representative does not constitute an unfair labor practice*2^
The Pennsylvania courts have held that an employer who made an
oral agreement following a collective bargaining conference* but who
refused to sign a written agreement was not guilty of an unfair labor
practice,22 Under the Taft-Hartley Act* however* a written agreement
must be executed at the request of either the employer or the agents of
his employees* Another Pennsylvania court declared that an employer
i

20 Colorado* Massachusetts* Pennsylvania* Wisconsin* Connecticut*
Hew York and Rhode Island,
M |S Sekles» d,&*a. Hill Top Bus lines.* 13 labor Cases
<3*988* Kt94?IT .

22

M S v* Gamine* ? labor Cases 61*615* (1943)*
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who persistently failed to arrive at an agreement was guilty of an
unfair practice*^ A Rhode Island court, however, held that the State
labor- Relations Board was in error when it declared an employer to be
guilty of an unfair practice when he refused to bargain with a union
after repeated negotiations, and after the union1s contract had esjpired,2^
It is interesting to note that the state laws do not require the employer
to bargain f,in good faith** a© does the amended M&tional labor Relations
Act* this requirement, however, is usually inferred by the courts*
State courts have held that the duty to bargain does not mean that the
employer must accede to all conditions demanded by a u n i o n B u t a
*

mere willingness to bargain is not sufficient% bargaining in good faith
entails compromise and cooperation in attempting to arrive at an agreement*26
u Dilatory tactics constitute an unfair labor practice and signify
bad faith.27
Discrimination for filing charges
In order to insure employees against retaliatory discrimination
by employers in the event that they are called upon to file charges or
32 Pa, 1RB v, Oestreicher, 10 labor Cases 6J,0B2, (1945)*
^ McGee v* local Mo* 662, Brotherhood of Painters* Decorator©
and Paper hangers. 36 Atl* 2 ^ 302^1^^17^
25 S* 1 » SLRB v, Loehmann Coro.. 56 W* It. S. 2 nd 4 8 5 , (1945).

26 I* X* SUP I* Montgomery Ward and Co., 38 N. X. S. 2nd 85$,
(1942).
27 Collier Service Coro, v . Boland. 4 N* Y. S. 2nd 480, (1938).
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testify under the laws, eleven statehave made such action on
employer unfair labor practice. Protection is thereby afforded employ
ees who have been discriminated against, but who, in the absence of
protection, would be reluctant to make a complaint for fear of discharge
or demotion*
Other unfair labor practices
the preceding labor practices are prohibited in the majority
of states having such laws* Other employer labor practices have been
listed by various states, and while they are of less significance and
fewer states have incorporated them into legislation, they nevertheless
indicate the scope of regulation which has been placed upon employer
prerogatives. These unfair labor practices include the refusal to
accept a final order by the board or commission after judicial review, 39
the use of the check-off system of union dues payment, unless individu
ally ordered to do so by employees,20 the commission of any crime or
misdemeanor in the course of a labor dispute,^!

the recognition of

a minority union as the agent of the employees for collective bargain
ing purposes*23
30 Colorado, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Utah, Wisconsin, ^
Minnesota, Connecticut, hew fork, Rhode Island, Michigan and Kansas*
3^ Colorado and Wisconsin*
30 Colorado, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin*
32* Colorado and Wisconsin*
33 Utah- and Wisconsin*

m

Of more importance is the prohibition of blacklists in six
states* Colorado* Wisconsin* Minnesota* Connecticut, New York and
Rhode Island. These same states declare the use of spies to be an
unfair labor practice,
All of the unfair labor practices which have been discussed
thus fab have pertained solely to employers* They are designed to
restrict the economic power of the employer in the industrial conflict,
and to protect the rights which these states have accorded to labor#
Beginning in 1939, a number of states amended their Acts and other
states passed legislation which also imposed restrictions on employee
prerogative in dealing with employers. The tremeridous growth in the
sice of labor unions, fostered by protective legislation in the Hew
Deal era, soon necessitated legislative action by the states to bring
into equilibrium the balance of power between unions and management.
The states felt that protective enactments had enabled organised labor
to achieve enough strength that if it were allowed to thrive unchecked,
the employer would soon become the underdog in the industrial conflict.
II. EMPLOYEE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
In nine of the states^ that have labor relations acts, employee
unfair

labor practices are defined* Both individual employees and

employees acting in conceit- through a labor organisation are prohibited
from engaging in these practices. Michigan and Kansas do not use the
33 Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Pennsyl
vania, Utah, Michigan, Wisconsin*
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term unfair labor practices, but they describe such practices as unlaw
ful* Since little practical difference exists between the two terms
the laws of these two states have been included in this section*
Coercion of employees
Colorado, Utah, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Delaware
make it an unfair labor practice for employees individually or in cons
c e rt

to coerce or intimidate an employee for the purpose of interfering

with the rights of other employees which are guaranteed by law* This
provision is a corollary of the provisions in state laws which prevent
employers from engaging in this practice* These four states apparently
see a need for employee protection not only from the employer, but also
from the coercive tactics of fellow employees.
One of the outstanding court decisions pertaining to this unfair
labor practice was handed down by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the case
of International Union* DAW of America* AH** local 2^2 v. Wisconsin
Ensplovment Halations Board»34 Here it was held that employees have a
legal right to continue their work despite work stoppage© by the union#
Injury to the property and person of employees who refuse to join a
work stoppage constitutes coercion of employees in the exercise of their
legal rights and is therefore an unfair labor practice* The same court
v upheld an unfair practice charge against a union where its members had
participated in acts which included the assault of non-union members,*^
34 12 labor Cases 63,843, Wisconsin Sup. Ct., (1947).
35 Christofel v, Wisconsin Employment Relatione Board. 243 Wis.
332* 10 H. W. 2nd 197, (1943;.

m

Coercion of an employer
In two states*^ the legislature has made it an unfair labor
practice for an employee or labor organization to coerce or intimidate
an employer in order to prevent him from exercising his guaranteed
rights under the labor delations Act# These employer rights closely
resemble the rights of employees* Employers are guaranteed free choice
of representatives, the right to bargain collectively and the right to
refuse demands of employees providing that they are bargaining in good
faith*
Five states, Colorado, Massachusetts, Utah, Delaware and Wiscon
sin make it an unfair labor practice for an employee, acting individually
or in concert" with others, to use coercion or intimidation to induce
an employer to interfere with the rights of his eaployees, or to commit
an unfair labor practice* It has been held that a union which coerced
the employer into signing an agreement which provided that all non
union members were required to obtain work permits from the union, and
to pay a fee for the permit, was guilty of an unfair labor practice*
The employer, the court reasoned, was committing an unfair labor practice*
by interfering with the right of employees to refrain from joining or
assisting a labor organisation, and the union was equally responsible
because it had forced the employer to sign the agreement*^
3o Colorado and Pennsylvania.
United Auto, Aircraft- and Agricultural irsgslement Workers of
America v* Wisconsin
SSatlons Boards 245 Wis* 417# 14 N* W*
2nd & ? 2 r
^
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Unfair strikes. picketing and boycotting
A number of state labor relations acts make certain phases of
economic activity by employees and unions unfair labor practices* It
m s noted in the preceding chapter that seven states^ make it an unfair
practice for employees to engage in any concomitant of a strike unless
a majority of the employees in a plant or business establishment have
voted to call the strike* Colorado, Utah, Wisconsin and Delaware also
outlaw as an unfair practice mass picketing, coercion, violence or
threats to prevent the pursuit of any lawful work or employment. Eight
states^ characterise the sit down strike as an unfair employee labor
practice, and Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Kansas similarly proscribe
any jurisdictional strike*
The secondary boycott has similarly been proscribed in eigirt
states.^*0 The courts in,Kansas^* and Pennsylvania,^ hox^ever, have
declared these provisions to be unconstitutional* The Kansas courts
have so held since 1945, and on March 21, 1949, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held this unfair labor practice to be invalid. The courts of both
states linked- the secondary boycott with constitutionally protected
3®

Colorado, Utah, Wisconsin, Delaware, Minnesota, Kansas and

Michigan*
39 -Colorado, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Utah, Wisconsin, Dela
ware, Minnesota and Kansas*

^ Colorado, Pennsylvania, Utah, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Dela
ware, Minnesota^and Kansas*
-^ Stapleton v* Mitchell, op. cit*, (1945)*
^
v. Chester and Delaware Counties Bartenders. 361 Pa. 246,
64 A* 2nd 834,(1949)*

freedom of speech, declaring that the legislature could not make this
type of union activity an ‘
unfair en^leyee labor practice*
Picketing of -a workerfa home is .an-unfair labor practice In
Colorado, Wisconsin and Utah, and in three states^ It £0 also unfair
to picket the domicile of an employer. Stranger picketing la an
unfair practice in Pennsylvania and Minnesota, hut the decision handed
down in the Chester; & Delaware Counties Bartenders case invalidated the
Pennsylvania provision, the Minnesota statute is also- xweonstitutionaX
in light of the Supreme Court decision in AFL y. Swing.

fteMfcteffi s£ &

aigsgasS

Colorado, Wisconsin, Betorare and Minnesota laws declare the
violation of aecollective bargaining agreement to be an employee unfair
labor practice, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has upheld a Wisconsin
iikployment Bel&blons Board order restraining a union from violation of
an agreement in which all disputes were to be submitted to arbitration,
the union engaged in a strike without submitting its grievances to a
board of arbitration, contrary to- the provisions of the collective
bargaining contract which It had with the employer.^*

m

sfite i§fesssbmMsmi
Other types of employee sxtd union activity have been declared

unfair labor practices by the states. For example, three states^ make
Wisconsin and Kansas.
Public Service Employees* Union v. Wisconsin Employment .Helations
Board. 2 4 6 l l S r ^ ^
***------^ ---- ** *—
^ Colorado, Delaware and Wisconsin.

m

it-,an unfair practice to fail, to servo notice of .intent to strikej two
States^ discourage featherbedding practices of onions ty -malcing such
activities unfair* and three states^ have declared the eossrdsslon of
any ©rime or mledemeaiior during the'course-of a labor’dispute to’-he- an
unfair labor practice*

•*

- ■
;
■

Other proscribed practices Include the refusal to -bargain collec**
tlvely with an employer* found .in the Massachusetts Act* and the refusal
to accept a final order* of the labor relations board after review by the
courts*^

■

Summary of

,m d

employee unfair labor practices

It.--is apparent tm m the prodding discussion of unfair labor
practices of both employers and employees that the provisions of state
laws ■constitute a ©IgdLfleant phase of industrial relatione 'reflation#
With regard to employer unfair practices it is evident that the states
have closely adhered to the provision© of the JS&iiohal labor Helations .
Act- prior-:to its amendment In 1947^ the imofe .important practices which
are proscribed include interference with the guaranteed rights of
ea^loyees, interference in the affairs of labor organisations^, the mm
of blacklists and spies* discrlialnation against union mmskem or .in
their favor in employment and discharge* the refusal to bargain with
the representative© or organised .employees* end the discharge of or
4^''
47

ado ^and Delaware*

Colorado* Delaware, and, Wisconsin* ^

^ Colorado, Delaware and Wisconsin*

discrimination against any employee who files charges or testifies
against an employer*
Employee unfair labor practices may be divided into three general
groups* the first group includes unfair practice© which coerce of
intimidate an employee In the exercise of his guaranteed rights tinder
the Act# Included in the second grotp are those practices which inters
fere with the rights of,employers* The third group of unfair employee
labor practices embraces a wide segaent of union coercive activities*
including limitations or the right to strike, and the use of boycotting
and picketing#
The significance of state labor relations acts which define
unfair labor practices lies in their influence upon national legislation,
as well as in their more immediate influence on industrial relations
4

within the states*. The trend toward placing;controls on employee
practices, which m s initiated in the states a® early as 1939, has only
recently been adopted on the national level of government* It is
apparent that acme states, Colorado for example, have gone to an extreme
In prohibiting almost every conceivable practice of labor organisations
In the industrial conflict* On the other hand, Hew fork* Rhode Island
and Connecticut have done nothing to limit employee practices while
vigorously controlling eagaloyer prerogatives# It is submitted that
neither extreme provides a workable solution to the problem of achieve
ing Industrial peace* Only through modification of existing laws and
endeavours to achieve balance in the bargaining power of employers and
employees can the probl<5m be effectively met* The balancing of bargaining

pm®#' is$3& not In t t M if pmmmk -a ll
-bo % long ©top
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CMMtm EIGHT
STATE REGULATION OF THE INTERNAL
AFFAIRS OF UNIONS

The preceding chapters indicate the significant scope of state
industrial relations regulation*. It is readily apparent that the
greater part of such legislation Is designed to restrict the activities
of organized labor* and a much smaller share is devoted to the regular
tion of the employer* The legislation thus far discussed is well
established in American law* In this chapter* however* a relatively
novel phase of regulation is discussed* that which includes the regu~
lation of the internal affairs of labor organisations*
I*

REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

Che of the most important aspects of state regulation of internal
union affairs is that which deals with the registration of labor organ!-*
zations, their principal officers* and members which are engaged in
organizing employees* At the present time* ten states^ have statutes
that require such registration*
The Alabama

Typical of these registration requirements is that which is found
in the Alabama lav*
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Every labor organization in the state must file

.

■* Alabama* Delaware* Florida* Kansas* Maine* Michigan* North
Dakota* Texas, Utah and Massachusetts*

^ Code of 1940* title 26* section 3&2m*

with the Alabama Peparfcment of labor a report giving the name of the
organisation and its pricipal location and offices, and the names and
addresses of its officers and business agents* together with the
salaries paid to each.. Soon after this law was passed it was challenged
by the Alabama State Federation of Labor on the grounds that it prohibit-*
v

ed freedom of speech and assembly, and denied union officials equal
protection of the laws. The Alabama Supreme Court, however, upheld the
provision as a valid exercise of state police power which did not limit
the unions functions in the state
fh®

Florida statute
Although the Alabama courts have upheld registration require

ments, some doubt as to their constitutionality was raised in 1945 when
the Supreme Court considered the Florida ubion registration law. This
statute was similar to the Alabama provision in that it required the
registration of all union officers and business agents, together with a
report showing the location of principal offices in the state,A In
.Hill v. Florida ax rel. Watson*^ the United States Supreme Court declared
the statute invalid to the extent that It may not be applied to enjoin
a union from acting as a collective bargaining agent for employees if the
union has failed to cosily with the law* The Court reasoned that such a
3 Alabama State Federation of iabps* v. McAdory* 246 Ala. 1, 18 So.
2nd 810 (1944)*
* Fla, Stats. 1941, (1945 Supp,), section 461.06.
5 325

H. s, 536, 65 Sup. Ct. 1373, (1945).
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situation would be inconsistent with the federally guaranteed right to
bargain collectively as provided for in the national labor Helations
Act* The Court did not, however, declare the, registration requirement
illegal oer set rather it merely declared that the penalties for failure
t

to com ply with the law could not be invoked against non-complying
organisations* An opinion of the Florida Attorney General issued a
year following the Hill decision bears this out*- In December, 1946,
he stated that all unions must comply with the registration requirements
of the law,^ but it is evident that the teeth have been removed from the
statute*

1

Xn spite of the Hill case, a number of states have passed regis
tration legislation since the opinion was rendered* Massachusetts,?
for example, requires the registration of all the officers of every
labor organisation and provides that failure to comply is punishable
by a fine of fity to five hundred dollars* It is doubtful that such
a statute would be declared unconstitutional since the penalties would
not necessarily preclude an organization from acting as a collective
bargaining agent. On the other hand it might be shown that excessive
fines for non-compliance prevented m organization from re p re s e n tin g
employees, but no such case has yet been considered* The present
legality of state registration requirements, therefore, is not subject
to question, but it is apparent that penalties which undermine the

? L* 1946, chapter 61$, sections 1, 5, 6*
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function of labor organisations as collective bargaining agents '.for
employees may not be levied when a union fails to comply with the law*
II. HEFORTS mn FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
The regulation of the' internal affairs of unions- in nine states^has included the requirement that labor organisations most file financial
statements and reports with an appropriate agency* Similar provisions
in the laws of Colorado^ and Texas10 have been declared unconstitutional
by the state courts# and the New Hampshire provision enacted in 194?
has been repealed by the 1949 session of the legislature*
The Massachusetts provision
A typical state law requiring the submitting of financial state-**
ments is that of MassachusettsIn this state any labor organisation
which has more than fifty members must submit a report to the Commissioner
of Labor and Industries showing the unionfs total receipts for the year*
the sources of these receipts# and its disbursements* Failure to comply
with this law makes the organisation liable to a fine ranging from fifty
<

to five hundred dollars. A previous Massachusetts law with similar
requirements was upheld by the state courts as a proper regulation of
t
mmrftmrmm:-wrx^mmwrKxrmm..^mim

Delaware# Kansas, Massachusetts, Florida, Minnesota, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Wisconsin and Alabama*
9 m . v. Reilly. 1X3 Colo. 90, 155P. 2nd 145, (1944),
10 M k 2- Man«- 9 Habor Cases 62,593, 188 S. W, 2nd 276, (1945).
U

1949,

chapter 394, effective September 5, 1949,

m

union affairs in light of the power which labor organisations have
achieved and- the necessity of preventing this power from falling into •
irresponsible hands.^
Wisconsin and Minnesota provisions
Wisconsin*^ and Minnesota,^ while not requiring that financial
statements be filed with any state agency, provide that every union
member must be furnished with a copy of the labor union*s annual
financial statement* The requirement contains certain advantages over
the filing of statements with a government official required by most
of the states having such laws* In the first place, every union member
has an opportunity to scrutinise the financial condition of the organ!**
nation* Second, every member is made aware of the uses to which his
dues and assessments are put, thereby providing a sound basis for
criticism of certain disbursements if such be warranted* On the other
hand, certain disadvantages are apparent in the Wisconsin and Minnesota^
plan* The possibility of submitting fraudulent statements to members
by questionable organisations weakens the law where it is needed most*
>Also, it is extremely doubtful that many union members are sufficiently
interested in the financial affairs of their unions to devote much
attention to the statements which are furnished them* -Bines these
■Bows v* Secretary of Commonwealth* 320 Hass# 230, 69 N*. B*
2nd 113, •(SPSPT
..... T
^ Stats* 1943, chapter HI, section 111*0$. .
^ 1* 1943# -chapter 625$ section 4*
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provisions requiring the filing of reports with a state agency or
submission to the rank and file are primarily an attempt to prevent
unscrupulous practices by.a. small minority of labor organisations*
t

it would seem necessary and proper to require that both the state
and the members be .furnished copies of the financial statement'*
Professor KilXingsworth has taken a conflicting view, stating that
there ttis more logic in requiring financial reports to member© than
in requiring the filing of such reports with some: state agency*«••
He does not deny, however, that the possibility of falsification
exists if the either course were followed*
Availability of statements and reports to the public

Reports or statements required by state law are made available
for public inspection in Horida,*^ Massachusetts,^ North Dakota,^
and South Dakota#^ Delaware,^ on the other hand, declares that union
Statement© and reports may be examined byappropriate state agencies and
officials only*' In Alabama^" these documents areavailable ts> union
members for inspection, but the general public is not allowed to
scrutinise them*
^ Killingsworth, Charles C*, HRestrictive State labor Relations
Acts,11 4? Wisconsin law Review 54b, at 595* duly, 1947*
36 L, 1943,

chapter

21968,

1? L. 1947,

chapter

180,section18.

1, 1947, chapter
19 1, 1943,.

chipter

242,section3*
86.

20 1. 1947, H. B. 212, section 15,
21 Acts 1943, No. 298, section 7.

On© of the principal arguments expounded by organized labor
against the filing of reports and financial statements is that employers
could gain significant information concerning the strength of a union
for use in his negotiations at the bargaining table* Thus, if an employ
er is aware of the fact that a union is in financial straits he,could
reasonably refuse demands of the union* knowing that the organization
could not afford a strike* This argument, it is submitted, does not
weaken the need for such statements but is rather a criticism of the
practice of making those reports public* This criticism was probably
more valid fifteen years ago than it is today, however* Corporations
advanced essentially the same argument in the early years of security
regulation, but at the present time they are quite willing to make their
reports public for publicity purposes* It is not unreasonable to suppose
that the day will come when unions will also willingly publicize their
financial condition*
Books of Account
Closely related to state requirements of financial statements and
reports by labor organizations' are the stipulations found in the laws
of Delaware,

Florida,^ Massachusetts^ and Texas23 which require

labor organisations to keep books of account* The Texas provision states
^ L* 1947* chapter 196, section 24*
23 1945, Supp*, section 481.0?*
^ 1* 1947# chapter 180, section 18*
23 Tex* Rev* Civil Statutes, 5154a, section 9*

that all labor unions must ,keep accurate books of accounts itemizing
all receipts and esqpenditures and stating, the sources of these funds
and the puiposes of expenditures* Hie books are available to any
enforcement officer of the state and to Judicial bodies making inquiries
into the practices of unions* The latter provisions of the law were
attacked on the grounds that mandatory availability of these accounts
constituted unlawful search and seizure and involved compulsory self**
incrimination* But a court of Civil Appeals held that the provision
was a constitutional regulation of labor unions and industrial relations*
111* REGULATION OF EKES, DUES AND ASSESSMENTS
One form which the regulation of union internal affairs has taken
is the limitations which seven states2^ have placed upon the rights of
labor organizations to charge their members for services rendered*
Alabama

has prohibited unions from collecting or demanding money for a

permit to engage in lawful work which is not in the form of membership
t

dues in a labor organization* This law has been upheld as a constitutional
exercise of police power.2^ The Colorado provision that initiation fees
and dues must be “reasonable” was declared unconstitutional because it was
a part of an invalid law,30 but it would undoubtedly stand on its own
! 26 APL v> Mann, 188 S. W. 2d 276, (1945).
^ Alabama, Colorado.- (invalid), Delaware, Florida, Kansas,
Massachusetts and Texas '{invalid}*,.

2a 0ode of 1940, Title 26, section 390*
Ala* State Federation of Labor v* McAdory* op* cit,
^ jAffb V* Really* op* cit.*

merit#*

a labor organisation Im prchiMted from charging

In

more than fifteen dilate as an initiation fee*

■

Crape
M

..interesting 4®m%a%m&n% in the regulation of ,dues and assess-

menti charged fey unions m © the lf4f California Supreme Court decision

to pg^as 2. Miss&m EsgmMmM M is. isUsla*32 toe p lain tiff,
according to the f&dfe©* reseed, to tender an aesesemeniby M e union
for the purpose of opposing a proposed open shop amendment to the consti
tution Of California* Because of M s refusal* -BsMille was barred 'from :
membership in the union and thereby prevented from producing radio plays*
a job which he had held for eight year# and for which he was- paid mere;
than njyoeiy^ight thousand dollars a year#- IN&ttlle•coMsn^d that the
assessment m s made for a purpose with which he m s personally msyapathet£$* and that M s deprivation of union membership because/of failure to
pay it was In violation of the Fourteenth ^mendteent* fh© court refuted
M l of these arguments in. holding that the assessment ms.-made for a
legM purpose* and that reddles#, of the plaintiffs personal beliefs
M s oontinusd meshersMp in. the .union lias dependent upon M

b

paying:

'whatever assessments were- levied in the interests of the organisation.

a s Ssm.
Seertion seven of the Texas Union Control law33 strictly regulates

31 Florida Stats* 1 » (.(Supp. 1945) section «81,Q5.
•

-<K-

32 31 A. C. 137, 187 P. 2nd 769, (1917),*.
33 itev. C iv. S tats. 5154a, section 7 .

the.amount# which 'union© .may charge in connection M t h initlation fees*.
.dues* ■lints--end- assessments*

the courts of the* stats* however* have

hSid that this provision Is an unconstitutional,. Iit^osltion of burden, on.
labor organisations which I# not demanded by the public Interest and
which is not essential to the enforcement of other valid provisions of
the laif#^
It may be argued* in' contrast to the opinion of the I s m # courts*
that there is. a definite, need for reflation of union fees* dues and
assessment#*

there I# a particular need for such, regulation in ease#

idler® a closed or union shop contract would allow a few- .unscrupulous
unions- to charge exorbitant rate# for the privilege of union membership
whieh is required a# a condition of employment* .m

this sense the

union# have been granted monopoly power# similar to- that •of a public •
utility*

On the other hand* where m such contract exists# Or idler®

the state has proscribed such contracts* there is somewhat less justifi
cation for- regulation* although -the pubHo nature of labor union# place#
.them In a category In which regulation of due# and assessments reasonably
comes within the police power of the state*

In many case# where the

union, exert# no monopoly power In- the: labor market the .administrative
burden, of such regulation* "both for the state and the unions* Is unduly
large in comparison. 'with the advantage# which the regulation may provide*

149

.Although only mm state* C&Ioradqv has attested to regi&ate the
internal affaire of unions by requiring such organi^tions to incorporate,
and; although'the law has hew declared unconstitutional*',it is nsverths*
less,important to ecsasaine the-provisions of the statute and to consider
the -reasoning of the 'court -In.rendering the .law iiqaobert*. ■the signifl**
canee of the Colorado incorporation law lies in the fact that it involves
a radical c^perMent in union control* as wall as .in the fact that organ**
ised labor has traditionally shunned the corporate t o m of organisation.
■• . c.
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The Colorado law requires every collective bargaining unit local
of any labor organisation to incorporate under the corporation laws-of
the state#- An. exception, to the general law of Incorporation is made in
that labor organisations' are not required -to have capital, stock divided •
into shares# Additional requirements are- loosed,* however^ which include
the statement in the Articles' of Incorporation for each union that: each ■.
member shall have one vote* that annual .meetings will be held With officers elected at such .meeting* and that''by-laws will be adcpted at a
meeting-'of all mwbers*. *
After Mcoxporaiion* each bargaining unit is accorded all of ■the -,
-benefits -and -responsibilities provided .by thegeneral laws of incorpora**
tim within. 1he -state# tJnder the la% the union mgr sue and be. wed*
1# 1943*- chapter 131* sectiw

/

file fSnaneialand other reports with the IMusbriaX
-m& As subject to periodic audit#. of it# account#* H e penalties £m

failing to incorporate- under the- Act- consist of denial of recourse to
the: industrial Commission in m

of a# employer unfair' practice or

Other grA-eimnc#, end- fine# of three-4iundred dollar## laeh member of the
bargaining unit -which refuses to incorporate A# liable to a fine of
three^himdred dollar#, in'addition to the organi^tion*# ■penalty'#.
€on#titutionality ffjT the Colorado incorporation law
fkm

entire- section of the Colorado labor Eolations Act requiring

incorporation of union# was held unconstitutional by the State Supreme
Court^ in 1944* H e section us# challenged; on the ground that com**
puiaor^ incorporation of labor organisation© delate# the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution* Plaintiff union
contended'that it# light to freedom of speech,, pres# and assembly had
been violated, and., that the statute deprived it of civll^rAghts and
liberties without due process of law* the court upheld each of these
contentions, theireby .striking down the ineeipsmtlon features of the
Act* ihs sepu?ai3ili^r clause in the law -did net prerent 'the court im m .
invalidating other' feature# of Section twenty which included the require**
of reports said financial ■statements on m amual 'basis;*,.
Since other -states have not -attested to follow the escample of
Colorado in ecmipuXsOa^ incorporation of union#,, it M.-doubtful that
there will be- m y s l^ d iX o m t xmrvwmt in this direction' in the future*
Since 1944 there has ^b#en no state mw&v&mry imorpom&Mn law, and

SJOLeven during the height' of resbi&cbive labor ieglalatiou'is* 3.94? 'there
iser# m concerted attempts to pass!such legislation*At? I
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* iMi# the i^eeiStig methods of :reg^eting the interml affairs of
unions ■have had a significant role in the regulatory process* the states
have not-been' content to allow labor organisations a free rein in several.
Other ii^ortari aims 'that relate to the conduct of union brines©*

for example* fourteen states?^■now provide that a union may sue or
he sued in its common name# kathode of service vary among the states
that have such provisions* In florlda*^- service may be had,upon any
officer-or husinessr:agCnt of the union*. 3ft

it 1# only- •

required that a copy of the Ammons be left at the office where union
business is transacted* thm m m z m U p law provides that service may
he'had upon the Secretary of State* who is deemed to he the agent of
all unions within the state#

fhere is also a divergence among the state .provisions as to the
liability of union, officers or members in- Case of successful action
Alabama* Colorado (invalid)* Belaware* Florida* Kansas* Mains,
lassachusetts* Hlth&geta* Bebraska, Berth Bakota, Sheds -Island# South
p&lsota*,- Utah and Ifcuwcut*.
&*

1943# chapter 2196&, section H *

39 L» 1%?* L. B» 376* section 25-314*
46

U

1947* chapter 527*

agai&st

i M :

Ehodc Island*^ South

.Mmeccta#.^ ;ifoh¥&Qtea>jft*.
and X te & ffi m m m x ^ may be had only .*

against the common property of the association^ in Bel&w&ra*^ on the
*

.*■'•'

-

-7-

other hand* aaagrae»b*r who is. a party named, in the suit is beM liable
to m m m w of "his individual property#.
..rEb® swahility of unions as unincorporated association _la w d 1
established in.-the common h m me well as in the statuatory law of many
states* for

the ..drisona court# two held that ,rnm m

state statutes recognise the existence of labor unions# their right to
contract and to adept a label and seal* 'by indication it follows that
a labor union may e«e or be aued as a legal entity.49

fo u r states'*0 Shave re g u lated -th e in te rn a l a ffa ir s o f anions by

4 1 0 0 ^ 1940, title 7* section 143.
i . . 42 L. 1943* 3. B. 264, section 10.
. :

;■

■43 L. 1947*: ch ap ter. 527.

44 1 . 1947* 1 . 8 , 276j amending Kev;S ta te * 1943, sectio n 2 5 -31 3.
'45 1 , 1938, chapter 530, sections 1 -4 .
44 1. 1947, S. B. 225, section!1.
. 47 Code, 1943* necbiph 1 0 4 -3 -2 6 *'’ .
48

li-1947,' 8, B# ai,''section 8. ?*■

‘
^49 4 H V . !4fi»ridffla'Sssh and Door C o ., (A ria , 1947) 13 la b o r Oases
6 3 .9 9 1 .,C t. K ingsley y . Amalgamated Kept C n ttsrg , 323 301. 6pp* 353,55 .
N. £ . 2d 554.
...............................
90

Alabama, Colorado, Delaware and Texas.

prohibiting' ouch organiration# fram shaking contributions to political
parties* In Colorado the provision was invalidated because it was an
Integral part of an cnconetitutlonal section of;the labor ^Halations Act,^ .
and the Alabama provision m e declared unconstitutional because it violated
the provision la the state constitution 'limiting each act of the legiala**
ture to one subject*^2 In neither m m did the court indicate that the
provision was unconstitutional on its own merits# On the other hand* a
Massachusetts court declared that m initiative proposal .to prohibit
polictical contributions could not be submitted to the voters for approval#
The court held that such a provision wsuld limit without''Justification
?

■" tft

*

r

■
•r-V-.

freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and Would not only regulate union
activities but also would serve to destroy the ability of unions to engage
in legitimate activities*®'

'YY

' Y :.V.'

A Texas court M e taken an opposite viewpoint* The ban in that
state m union.political contributions was.held constitutional as a
reasonable regulation of union activity desired to prevent public offi*
Ciate tm m becoming unduly .subject to the influence' of .organised labor
The labor Managcaaent .Eolations* Act of' 194?^ considerably eo&ended the
:■
■ : i.■
’ ■::' .
,
■;■■■ '■•
; ••
I<.•
.c
<' ■
scope of prohibitions; of political contributions by macing them unlawful

■ M k Z * B e llly . m i c lt .

52 £&»
t

h a s s a U & g t Mtee 2* tMfez, «&• Mt.

•

IjfSp- 2* ^eerat^r f t CQiiMonwealth* op# cit#
Sl&*
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53 T itle 3 , section 304* 39 B* S. C. A. 151 e t seq.

An a Pras&dential or Cangrassionai election*

The two states m m having

valid provisions relating to political contributions include any contri
bution regardless .of the type of' election being held* .

*

Ee^ulation m
of
union
and
mmrn
mmmSmm elections w
SSSmm- officers
Five stater^ have loosed regulations on the election of union
officials*

These provisions include such limited regulation as that

found An the Kansas law which makes At an unfair 'labor practice to pra*
rant the election of union officers^ and m m
found in the M m

of

comprehensive legislation

and Minnesota.^

Colorado law# prior to

its invalidation in the asUSy case# required annual elections of union
officers by secret ballot* with any member in good standing eligible to
run for office*.
Certain classes of people have been prohibited from holding office

An

in a union by tbs % m m of Taras

61

and Belawara*

in Texas# no alien or

person convicted of a felony whose citizenship has not been restored may
be elected,
-2-- —

—w..X j-.fti

.la addition to these limitations# Delaware has provided that
i-— .

■Vrn *■

- » ..

.*t*

.

— -# ■
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Colorado (invalid}* i)elaware^ Crepealed)* Kansas, Minnesota and

fmm*
^

h* 1943# chapter 191# section

44-809(2).

^

1* 1943#' chapter 131# section

20* (invalid)

^

1* 1943# chapter 625*

^ Her* Civ* Stats* 5154a# section 4s*

61 1* 1947# H* B..212* section 21*
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nth ragsrd to -the regulation of union *^etton% mm atudent-. ■
has., stated' that these Estate regulations ■of elections appear to grow
out of a conviction that democratic procedures are particularly Important
. t o

union*i<**eo irportant that the state to' Justified

t

o

stogltog unions

out «nd topeatog Upon ih m requirements ‘
not applied to other private
organizations*

It to true that the states have been, particularly

interested to promoting democratic procedures to labor unions# and
preventing racketeering union officials i t m

gatotog a foothold to the

union movement# hut the contention that the unions haw been %togtod
cute for regulation ignores the existence of other state regutotton
designed to promote democratic practices to. other private organisations.*
A number of states have passed Fair Bi§&eptenb Practice Acts# for
m m p lQ p

which are- primarily designed to prevent und^nocratie -employe

ment practices by e^toyers* the incorporation laws of many states
provide for the .regulation of elections of cojporation directors and
set forth certain qualifications which officers of such organizations
must possess.*^® It to therefore- apparent that labor unions# while
subject to considerable regulation of election practices# are but one
type of private organisation that has been so- regulated* .

Although It to not within the scape of this study to examine the
Charles# op* d W # p* 397*
^

uto*

S e % for srampto# la* Cktn* Stats* ,1939# Tbl* 1# section 1S10*-

fair Ik^loyme&i Practice Acts- found to five stoles#^ it is desirable
to mention to c m m m t t m with the ragulstton. of, union affairs the fact

that these states prohibit mmsbemhUp diso^tetoatito* Under these 'tows#
a person cannot be denied membership to a labor organisation because of

race# religion# color or national origin* to every state having such a
tow but l&seonsto* preventative provisions haw toon enacted* ‘A c m m im
aion to empowered to hear grievances and issue cease and desist orders
to these states* to Wisconsin^ the ct«isslo& to merely ejspowered to

conduct an investigation of discrimination to labor untons and to publish
its findings.

. It to shown to this chapter that labor organizations are subject

to a significant amount of state regulation to the conduct of their
internal affairs* the neatest part of this legtolation to designed to
restrict the ims crapulous practices of a small minority of labor leaders#

who# under the guise of representing employees* era to reality preying
upon the rank and file*

Honest union leadera# perhaps uhforturately*

must also comply with the law*

.The regulation of union internal affairs’ha# .been criticised by
organised labor as an unwarranted toterferance with private, organisations*

■It to submitted* however*, that there to a definite need -for such raguto*
Cion. Most state and rational regulation of private businesses has been
***

Connecticut* Massachusetts# lew- Jersey# Mew fora and Wisconsin*

^

3tats* 1943# Raptor 1J1*31* sections 111*31 to 311*37*

necessary because of toe' injudicious and fraudulent, practices of/a -small
m ^ m n i of -the gren^* 'Security regulation to & prime exacjple to -theUnited .States# as to: toe business o t banking*

The tremendous growth of ,
.

labor organisations since 1935 places them to a category to.which r e g u 
lation of financial and menhershto practices to justifiable*- It has been
shown# however* that such arbitrary interference as. cm phXm rf tocorporatier* requirements cannot he recommended as furthering toe public interest
to any appreciable degree# and appear to constitute

iabor
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toe preceding chapters of the present study of state industrial
relations regulation, have dealt# in the main* with the. substantive assets
of pertinent state legislation*

lama dealing with the restriction of

prohibition of the basic weapons of organized, labor have .received, appro**
priate emphasis to keep tog with toe postwar trend, toward restrictive
labor legislation* In chapter serai* it was shown that employers have
also 'been subject to state regulation# several states having defined
certain practices which mragement could not towfully perform to dealing
with employees*
to this chapter a transition to made tm m substantive law to
administrative law* to general# the purpose of this part of the study
to to determine too to charged -with toe resporaibility of enforcing state
industrial relations legislation* what duties, and powers .are delegated to'
the responsible admtototrative agencies*, end toat procedures are- followed
to carrying out the will and intent -of the several legislatures*
*

It should be noted at the outset that tot great majority of states
'have left the responsibility for tto admtototration and enforceioent of
industrial relative legislation to toe hands of toe judicial, branch of
.government* them states have not .seen fit to'establish separate agencies
to deal with to© adtatototrablon of their laws* adhering to the philosophy
that toe established judiciary to best equipped to carry out the duties of

m

interpretation and enforcement* fbf defects of the »oourh technique1*
as it is utilised in the imjority of state# are generally recognized tf*
students of the problem* 4# one acute^observer has stated#: there ha# M m
.little enforcement of these- laws because of the lengthy litigation that

must follow and civil action or original prosecution for violation of the
state law*

W mm

iwm M m .little Incentive to secure damages In the

courts since much time and effort if- necessary to secure remedial relief#
V

*

'

*

.

:

.

It is not within the seeps of this chapter! however* to,discus# the reto*
tlire merits of the judiciary as opposed to the independent cemjmission as
the proper agency for law enforcement. But since ten. of the states
bom

set up administrative beard#' to expedite the enforcement Of Indus*’

tidal relations legislation! the ccphasi# I# placed upon the technique#
used by these state#!; rather than upon the familiar method# of judicial
enforcement. It I# true# of course* that even where administration is
carried out by board# and commission# remedial and punitive -orders are
subject to review hr the court#.*
■s*, hie m u m c's m of
M

the eight state# which dp not-

4«cx&s
utilise the. courttechniqueof

labor law enforcmnent^ the state labor- relations act ha# created a board
gats* I*, a*.* «A Decade of State labor

l^gi^tica*’115 Ihiiversity- j|J Sh%ago tor leview..282* (X#48).

'

2 Colorado* eonnacticut* Hassaehusetts, Sew fork* Feimasrlv^aia*
Shed# Island* fiaS,
and li*#tes#ta«
3- wichigan.and Minnesota* while providing for administrative
agencies .to Conduct election# and perform mediation and coiUJiMatlon
service#! do not enpower the## agencies to take action against unfair
labor practices*
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or commission to mrry out thepurposee of the legislation* four states*
Connecticut* Hew fork* Bhode Island- end Pennsylvania hare established
labor Belations Boards* fallowing the precedent set by the 'Wagner Act in
1935*- In Massachusetts* the administrative bodyis known m the labor
Kelations Commission* while the Utah and Colorado acts are-enforced by
the Industrial Commission* the .latter agencies having been in operation
✓

for, a number of years prior to the passage of-comprehensive labor legist
latlon in these states* .Wisconsin has established an Employment Belations
Board* and Michigan has given its administrative agency the title of
labor .Mediation Board* In the latter .state* the court technique- of
enforcement, is heavily relied upon, but the board has certain powers
which may properly be included in the discussion of the administrative
technique* Minnesota has a one man administrative' official known as the
labor Conciliator*
It is apparent that a considerable diversity of nomenclature
exists -among the states with respect to the agencies responsible for the
administration of industrial .relations legislation* for the purpose,of
this chapter the term ’’board* is used to denote these agencies* frrespee**
hive of individual variations among the states* except where a particular
state law is being discussed*
dOBg3Qsitlon of bjie administrative boards
With the exception of Minnesota* 'the state 'labor relations boards
invariably consist- of three -members appointed by the governor with the
advice and consent of state senate* general assembly or executive council*

Members of the board met have certain qualifications which are defined ,
in the various laws* ,epical requirements are- found- -in the Hew fork
statute*^,3§&ch ma&ber.must be a citizen of the United States, a resident
of |be,,state# and a qualified-'elector for a-period of mm year prior to
his appointment*' m,addition, |t is stipulated that the member met-not
hold any other position during the period of his service on the boardj
this provision has apparently been included to assure' greater Impartiality
among the appointees* tBhode Island, however, takes .a different approach
to the appointment of board members by stating that one member is to be
appointed from each of the three large groups involved in the industrial
conflict* labor, jmnagemeot and the public*^
■Salaries of board members:*: fhe salaries of board members vary
markedly from, state to state* While M m lbt k pays- each member ten thousand
£

dollars a year, Bhode Island pays its members only two thousand five
hundred dollars per year*^ Michigan and Connecticut ecs^ensate members^
of the labor relations board,on a dally basis* the latter providing payg
meiti- at the rate of twenty-fivir dollars..-for*eqch day worked, and the
former at the rate of twenty dollars per diem*^ 'Michigan,,however,
provides that in no .case shall a member be paid more than five thousand ■
A

-&*•1937* chapter 443* section 702* ' 1

; -5:X*. 1941,. chapter ■1066* section.3* .
^ I**" 1937, Chapter 443* section 703*
? 1* 1941, chapter 1066, section 3*
■-^ -Gen* Stats* (1945 Supp*) section 934h*
^ 1* 1939# section 423*5*

dollars In any one -year* faken m a whole, the states do not compensate the member# of
their labor relations boards in a manner commensurate with the responsib
ilities which accompany the appointment to such a position#' the salaries
of government officials aare generally subject to this, criticism* In the
case of board members it would be particularly desirable be have rela
tively large salaries provided, in view of the qualifications of members
necessary for the efficient and honestadministration of the laws*.' Bines
members, may not engage in any other occupation, it. I# doubtful that the
position would appear desirable to any but a few selfless public servants*
Appointment to the boards la likely to develop into a “political plum11
which the governor may use to reward the party faithful* Bvsn the
relatively Mgh. salary paid in Hew fork is .hardly sufficient 'in view of
the Industrial and legal background necessary,,to the. efficient perform■

<

!

■

■

■

■’

anee of the duties of the poaitlon* With the salaries of members, of the
national labor Belaiions Board fixed attwelve- thousand dollars- per year,
however, it is unlikely that the states will raise their salary scale in
the near future*
tenure £f office* Members of the state labor relations boards
enjoy a datively long tenure of office* Michigan provides that board
meBlber8 011811 80rw* *w

thpee #»*«* bufc to Massachusetts the

length of service is five years. In Hew fork,'Pemsylvania, Bhode Island,
Wisconsin and Connecticut, appointments are made for six yeans* this
long period of service is highly desirable, since it allows each member
to become proficient as an administrator of labor legislation, and also

because itprevents the office, to a certain extent, from becoming a
part of. the patronage system ;m prevalent in many states* Since state
governors.are usually' elected every two years, it is not possible for
the membership to change drastically merely because •of a change in the
political party in power*..
xi* k w w w
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of «otisihaiivi boahds

.in examination of the state labor .relations acts indicate that the
legislatures have delegated to administrative boards a significant amount,
of power and responsibility in connection with industrial relations* The
most important powers which the boards exercise include the investigation
of labor disputes, the certification of collective bargaining represents**
hives and.the holding of elections, 'together with the responsibility for
preventing unfair labor practices*

lew York, Pennsylvania, Ehode Island* Utah and Massachusetts have
granted rather extensive investigatory powers to their boards* The other
states having Ward administrated labor -relations acts -also provide for
investigation to a limited degree* In .general, the purpose of iavestiga**
tion is to enable the boards 'to- determine the fadts in a labor dispute or
to gather data concerning -the claims of unions who wish to act as collect
ive bargaining representatives of eaployeea in a particular- bargaining unit*
The Mew Toiic Xaw,^ provides an example of the broad investigaiofy
",W!LM"

443, section 708#

pom m ni

state-.boards which administer the .labor relatione acts* The

board is given the power to gain access to .records of any p e rs o n being
investigated,- Including the right to photograph or -oopy any. evidence .
which is:pertinent to.-the purpose of .-the investigation* Jhurmember of
the board may subpoena witnesses and require them to disclose any
information, or produce any documentary evidence which is appropriate
to- the investigation* The law,provides that refusal to obey a board
order to -appear,before It or to t^dthhold information makes any person
subject .to legal, action in the.state courts* .Ho'person ray-refuse to
testify on the grounds that his information is self.incriminatory£ but
the -law provides, that no.person may be prosecuted for anything which he
says or produces as evidence under compulsion* The board, 'in connection
Mtti any investigation may call upon any state agency to .furnish infer**
ft

nation or .records which are necessary to the proceeding*
P re v e n tio n

of unfair
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Perhaps the most- important- power which has been delegated to the.
state boards, which administer the labor relations -acts is that of prevent**
lug unfair-labor practice#*^ •The- procedure which .is-followed,in this,
connection'varies among-the states, but three'.general classifications-'are
apparent. In the first group of states^ the ■.procedure'--follows Is
closely related'to that-of the- national .labor Eolations Act, in, that the-,
boards'in' these states are' responsible for the investigation, prosecution

^ Massachusetts, M m York, §w m m tlhut, Utah .and Bhode Island*

and ■adjudication of charges of unfair labor practices*/ to these,.five
states the board itself may initiate proceedings.; against an ettplcyer or
employee to effectuate the policies of the state law#
In

Pennsylvania* Colorado and Wisconsin, 'however,, the state hoard

merely'acts as a court of .initial resort. In these states the burden of
proof of an,unfair practice is not upon the hoard and. its legal, staff
but upon the person or persons who make the charge* The main function
of the board under these 1awe is to--hold a hearing following a complaint
by an aggrieved person, and to issue an order after the hearing 'has been
terminated# Ho attempt is made to effect a voluntary settlement of a .
dispute, prior to the adjudication proceedings* It -is interesting to note
that in these three ,states the -parties to the ^dispute,may twithdraw charges
and- thereby end the hearingj if this- is done the board may not issue any
remedial order even though it is clear that the state law ‘
has been violated*
In Colorado, an alternative procedure may be followed which allows the
Industrial Ootmaissibn to issue cos^laints against persons guilty of
committing unfair labor practices, but the board, is not given the power
to prosecute in its own right*
The third group of states, which includes Michigan and Minnesota,
roly almost entirely upon the state courts to- prevent unfair labor prac
tices defined in the law* The Minnesota law, for example* provides that when any unfair labor .practice Mis threatened o r committed# a suit be
enjoin such practice m y be maintained in the district court'of any county
wherein-such practice has occurred or is threatened
’^ ^ WW^ 3 m n ^ s t a t s **„chapter Iff,, section 1TO.1&*

In Michigan* the

m

.labor Mediation Board has power to attempt' to settle dispates by media**
tion* but here again the- main reliance for prosecution is upon the state
courts*-

*'
•

imong the three,types of preventive procedures utilised by-the
states* it has been generally conceded by studentsof the problem that the
procedure followed in Hew Tork* Connecticut^ Hhode Island* Massachusetts
and Utah, which is patterned after the -national law# is the.most effective
method of preventing unfair labor practices*; In these states the law
cannot be. subverted merely- because' an employer or an employee does.'not
wish to engage in the procedure of initiating and proving the charge of.
an unfair labor- practice* .the. board is charged with carrying out the
purposes of the law by initiating coa^laints# prosecuting* and issuing .
remedial orders 'to- effectuate'state policies*-. On the other hand* in the
second group of states- which -utilise the ouasijudielel technique* the effectiveness of the law depends upon the aggressiveness of.ei^Xoyees-- and
employers in Initiating and prosecuting coiaplaints before the beard*. -St
.is possible* and highly probable that many charges of unfair practices .
never reach Hie adjudication stage due to- the time and effort necessary
to receive- remedial relief' in-these states*.-..flic-same' criticism*''as ,it
'

*

;

■

r

has been pointed out, applies to those states Which us
technique*1 of enforcement#
Certification
the admiuistrstive boards have also- been granted the power; to
r

conduct elections among employees for the purpose of determining "

appropriate collective bargaining units and for purposes.of certifying
representatives as the sole agents of enployees, The Wisconsin statute
is representative of one method in which the appropriate bargaining unit
is chosen by the employees* and is alto found in the Colorado statute*
The Wisconsin provision reads*
Whenever a question, arises concerning the determination of a
collective bargaining unit«»*it shall be determined by secret
ballot* and the Board* upon request* shall cause tbs- ballot to
be taken in such manner as to show separately the wishes of the
employees in any craft* division* department or plant as to the
deteminatlon of the collective bargaining unit. *
Although the appropriate collective bargaining unit is always
determined by an es^loyee election ih Wisconsin and Colorado* It may be
determined by the board .in lew York*;Connecticut* Bhode "Island* Massachu
setts, Pennsylvania and Utah* for magpie* the Bhode Island 'law states
that “the board shall decide in each case whether* in order to insure to
employees the fuH benefit of (their rights) **.the unit appropriate for
the purpose of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit* craft
unit* plant unit* or any other unit**1'provided that if a majority of the
employees wish a certain unit the board shall designate'that unit as the
m®

appropriate*^-5
In a case where a dispute arises between two labor organisations

over the question of: which is to represent the employees in a certain
bargaining unit the state boards are empowered to hold hearings and
elections among the employees to determine their wishes* If an election
14 U
^

1939, chapter 57, eection 11.05.

1 . 19W.# chapter 1066, section 6 ( 2 ) .

MB

is held* the representative chosen by the majority of employees is. the r‘
unit is certified by the beard as the sole collective bargaining agent
of the employees* This certification is usually binding for at least
one year* although a linger period may be provided for to' a collective
bargaining contract* Colorado and Wisconsin have provided that in any
election to determine collective bargatoiiig representatives* the ballot
.must be so made up tha£ an eaployee may vote against anyrepresent&tive
-whatsoever if- he wished to do so*
m & si
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although the state boards have been given a great deal of power
over'industrial relations* it is m% an absolute ‘power*- 'toe boards merely
act as courts of first resort* and any person has the right to petition
the state courts for a review of any order of the-agency* Orders of the
boards consist largely of remedial rather than"punitive actions* Thus
the cease and desist order*, the reinstatement order and the. certification
/

order have'been the.main remedies granted* The right to judicial review
is expressly stated -to many of the state labor relations, acts*, and where
it does not appear to the text it may be /readily found to. the law which
has. been, formulated to America since the rise of independent regulatory
commissions,
toe state courts have taken jurisdiction over the orders of labor
relations boards but they have generally upheld the finding of the agency
where substantiated by evidence* fhto principle has developed throughout
the entire American court system*, -and even the. Supreme Court of the United.

U f

States refuses to reviewevidence presented by enforcement officials
where;there are no apparent errors# ■Orders of state boards have most',
often been set aside because they- -violate some constitutional principle
or because they have .exceeded the boundries of delegated legislativepower#
In many cases .the.;board itself must resort to the state judiciary
for-the enforcement of .its carders* .Xf voluntary compliance is not
achieved, the board must petition the courts of the state for appropriate
enforcement, and must submit all evidence in the ease, together with its
findings, to judicial review*- 'the person charged with non-compliance is.
ordered to- appear before the court and is allowed to present additional
evidence to show that the order was in error* Usually* the lower court#s
order or judgement becomes final, but in certain, cases- the process of
:
*
review extends to the United States Supreme Court* judicial .review,
while providing necessary safeguards against the arbitrary action of
administrative agencies, is not .resorted to- in. the vast majority of cases*
For the most part the labor relations boards have settled controversies
4

- .

without extensive- litigation in -the courts, which, in the final.analysis,
is indicative of their success in the administration of state- legislation*
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Ihe preceding chapters of the present study have been concerned,
in the main, with the role of state governments in the regulation of
labor relations# Xh keeping with a leather marked legislative trendy
emphasis has been placed upon the regulation of organised labor and its
use

of the more important economic capons at Its command# It is apparent
t

that the tremendous growth of labor unions since 1935 has resulted in sn^
almost universal feeling in the state legislative chambers that this
expansion of union power must not go unchecked# thus* the era of
restrictive employer regulation and union encouragement has partially
given way to widespread concern with the potentialities of unrestrained
labor union prerogatives* and this concern has been translated into
thoroughgoing regulation in many states#
i# m m m
In order to integrate the various sections of this study It is
appropriate that a brief summary be presented at this point# for the
most part* this analysis will be objective in nature* leaving to a
subsequent section the task of formulating conclusions#
im W M M m o l
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One of the important problems of labor relations regulation
Is that which dials with the division of regulatory powers between the

state and federal governments* Although this problem has by no means
been conclusively resolved* certain trends are evident# -.for example*
it Is clear that'the states may regulate union security -agreements
provided that the regulation is not less restrictive than the federal
law* It is ifi5>ortant to note that this state regulation covers industries
operating In interstate as well as intrast&te commerce, Hie states'may •
also limit the. right- to strike, provided that such limitations are not
Inconsistent with controlling Supreme Court decisions* Section thirteen
of the Ta£t~Hartley Act makes this point clear*
Certain limitations have also been placed upon the Jurisdiction of
the state in regulating industrial ablations* -Since- the Bethlehem case
in 1947* the federal .government has held exclusive power to certify" bargain-*
ing representatives in interstate commerce# the states are also denied
Jurisdiction to prevent unfair labor practices in the four main areas of

Interstate commerce* mining* manufacturing* transportation and earamenlea-*
tlon, But the National .labor Belations Board has beenempowered to- cede
jurisdiction to state agencies in other industries where- cOBoparable state
and federal laws exist* even though these industries operate in interstate
comme.rce* --■
■ 'In-actual practice*, the refusal to- take Jurisdiction over small
industries by the- MSB 'in.'.recent-months points to the ©mansion of the
state police power within the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment*

the

outcome of the controversy between the KLRB* which does not wish to assert

Jurisdiction over essentially local industries* and its General Counsel,

who firmly believes that Congress has g iv e n the Board a mandat© to process
all .oases within 'the botMdsries of its' possible Jurisdiction, will hairs
considerable bearing upon toe expansion or contraction of the state'police
power.

'The .regulation or prohibition of union security agreements has
claimed a significant ©hare ofXegisl&tive attention, particularly since
194?* to twelve of the states, regulation has taken the form of pro-*
cedural requirements idiich must, be met prior to the execution of such
an agreement, The most important requirement I© that a majority of
affected, employees must vote for such an agreement to a secret ballot*
Colorado provides that three-fom'tb© of the employee© to a bargaining
unit must approve any union security clause, and Wisconsin law stipulate©
that a two*»thirds affirmative vote must be cast for the agreement,
In addition to. those state© that merely regulate- union security,,
thirteen states have, by legislative enactment or constitutional amende
menb, entirely prohibited the making of any closed shop, union shop, or
maintenanceHsf^membership agreement# These proscriptions have recently'
been upheld by the United States Supreme. Court a©-a valid exercise of
the state police power*
Regulation off picketing
In spite of the'decision to Thornhill y* Alabama# to. which the
Supreme Court extended constitutionally protected freedom of speech to
peaceful pickettog, the state© have, enacted a significant amount of
regulation restricting this to m . of union activity* Wot all of the state
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activity to "this field to constitutional to light of controlling deci©tons, of the Court* ■ Nebraska, for example, prohibits even peaceful
picketing if the law to accorded a literal, interrelation, South Dakota,
Missouri,^ Delaware*^ North Dakota, Virginia, Pennsylvaniir5 and Minnesota
have declared stranger picketing to be illegal, an assumption clearly to
conflict with the Supreme Court decision to Apt y* Swing, South Dakota
and Texas have laws'which ‘
limit picketing to situations' to. which a labor
dispute exist# between m employer and hit employees* .The Court has held
such'laws to be unconstitutional to gajseagr and gftgfegg- grtoem^ X* M i *
Certain regulation# of picketing, however, are clearly constitu
tional* Violent picketing'has been, prohibited to fifteen states, and
would undoubtedly be enjoined by the courts to many others* It was noted
to chapter •four that the. toornhill doctrine does, not extend bo picketing
attended with violence, coercion or intimidation, toe Headowmoor Dairies
decision clearly points this out*
Eleven states prohibit mas# picketing*, toe constitutionality of
this phase of picketing regulation ha# not been questioned since, the
Iri-Gity case to 1921, and ha# 'been, recently, affirmed to Carpenters and
M m m M m

2 * m s * m sm$«

Here Justice Robert® declared the states

could legally limit the participants to picketing to wreasonable,.numbers***
Picketing to achieve an. illegal ■end is prohibited to Massachusetts
■•£^

2 fiepealed, 1949,
3 Invalidated recently by the courts of Pennsylvania.

and. Oregon! Texas ha# outlawed picketing to which fact# are misrepresented
by the- participants!; ftorldar.and- Kansas- have limited picketing' to the
place -of business where the.dispute exists! -and ten -states outlaw the
picketing of a workers home.
ft is -thus apparent that the states have deemed -picketing a
significant source of tobor*mamgement conflict and have "adopted extensive
.regulation;:.of this device* Thirty-six of the forty-eight states have
imposed some, manner of regulation on the vright to picket*
Regulation of the 'boycott
In chapter, five it was shown that twenty states' have prohibited
the use of the secondary boycott* to two of these states, Alabama and
California, the law has been held unconstitutional as an invalid .exercise '
of the state police power violating- the .'Fourteenth Amendment,

to two

other states, Missouri and Delaware, the prohibition of the secondary
boycott was repealed to 1949*^
to eight of the states having labor relations acts, the secondary
boycott is characterised as an unfair labor practice,

'to

tour states it

to -declared to- be a conspiracy to restraint of trade. Georgia, Iowa, .
i

f

Idaho, Missouri tod-Texas have merely declared the boycott to be unlawful
without giving specific .pounds for its illegality.
to. some states, Alabama for example, the courts have attempted to
extend the immunity of free speech be boycotting to much the same manner
that peaceful''picketing has been protected from legislative prohibition*.
& Both the Missouri, Bradford Act and. the'Dataware labor Halations
Act were repealed to the 1949 session of the legislature*

that# this movement will gain headway in other states is. subject to
considerable doubt, not only because of essential dissimilaritiea
between picketing and boycotting in their effects, but also because
of the enactment of federal' legislation making the boycott illegal, in.
interstate commerce. IMS union device is made an unfair employee
labor practice in section eight of the faft-Hartley Act and also by'
, section 303 of the labor Management Halations Act#
L M ^ a t ion of the X M & M

strike

i

-fhe basic economic weapon of organized labor has traditionally
„been the strike# Although It has been clear since the Wolff Packing Co#
case that the states cannot prohibit strikes in private industry alto
gether* thi# fact has not prevented- a significant degree of' regulation
by the states* In private industries {as distinguished from’public
utilities}- the right to strike has -been limited by the imposition of
procedural' requirements such* as the strike election provision found in
thirteen states, and the ‘‘cooling off1* period requirement la: eight- •
states*
Strikes in violation ,of collective bargaining* agreements are proscribed in a number of states*. The jurisdictional strike has- been
banned or strictly regulated in eleven states* - In* some of these rather
elaborate machinery for the settlement of jurisdictional .disputes has
been set up. ftm sit-down strike* which has always been condemned by
the courts* is- proscribed in fourteen, states by legislative enactment. ■Michigan* Missouri* Mew fork*. Ohio, Pennsylvania and ferns outlaw -

Strikes by public employees* a policy which is in 11m with that of the
federal, government.
. The attention of the 1917 legislative sessions was directed to
the prevention of strikes in public utilities*

M

order to promote .

continuous operation of these essential industries a number of states
enacted legislation requiring cooling off periods* c<m$>ulsory arbitra
tion and mediation of disputes, and providing for broad seizure powers
in case of a breakdown In. negotiations which would be or is followed by
a strike,

Regulation o f u n fair labor practices
Following the passage- of the tfegner Act in 1935, a number of states
enacted similar laws to govern the conduct of Industrial relations in.
intrastate commerce.

In these early “little Wagner Acts*1 employers were

forbidden to engage In certain activities which the states characterized
as unfair labor practices*

Beginning in if39,'labor relations' laws were

passed which included not only employer unfair labor1practices but -also
unfair -practices which were forbidden to eisployees,^

At the- present

time the laws, of Connecticut* Mow folk and Bhode Island .proscribe employ
er unfair labor practices but do- -not include «oployee unfair- labor
practices*
the scope of employee unfair labor practices defined by the- various

$'‘
-'Prior to the 1949 legislative sessions* twelve states had passed
coaprehensive labor.relations laws similar to the National labor Belations
Act* The Delaware apt was repealed by H* B* Mo* 1* laws of 1949* effective
dune 29* 1949*

m
elates includes many acta by employees which are merely unlawful in
other states not hairing comprehensive legislation*

these include the

use of the secondary boycott, the sit-down strilce, and in several
states- 'the calling of'-a stri&e where less than.- amajorityof the affected
employees have voted for' such action*

On the other -hand, most of the

state- labor-relations- acts'include practices which are not specifically
outlawed .in, other states, having fragKientary reflation#

For eseasple,

many of the states mah© the coercion of an employee or: an employer to *
prevent his exercise of certain guaranteed rights an unfair employee
labor practice*

Befusal to bargain collectively with an employer, or

the violation of -a 'valid 'collective 'bargaining agreement has also been
included in the labor relations acts as an unfair labor -practice,

it

may be noted that these practices are- closely related to those enumerated
in the f&ft^Hariley law*

Since the state acts-were passed prior to the

1947 national law, it is evident that Congress was influenced by the
states to a considerable degree*
Unfair ©fspXeyer 'labor practices' as' defined in the..state acts
closely follow the terminology and philosophy of the Warier Act*

Hie

more important practices which employers are prohibited from, performing
includes

(l) Interference with the rights of employeest© organise andt

(a)

bargain collectively*

the domination of labor organisations through

financial or other means* (3) discouraging or encouraging union member*
ship I £4) discriminating against employees for .filing charges or testify*
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.duly certified representatives of M s ©nployeesj and {*>}'the use of
spies or blacklists*
Bsigolabloo gjg union.
A

relatively' new phase of industrial relations regulation by 'the

states has taken the fbrm of eontrol over the internal, affairs of unions*
Hie .growth and achievement of economic power p i 'the labor union in the
past fifteen years has resulted In a felt need for the regulation of
internal union practices, just as the growth of the coloration as a
powerful economic and social institution in America has called forth a
significant amodht of regulation of its Internal affairs in the past*
It the ■present time, ten states require the registration of union
officers and business agents' with m appropriate government agency* 2h
Hill v* Horida ex rejL* Watson* the United States Supreme Court invalidated
such statutes insofar as they were applied to prevent union officers and
agents from acting as collective bargaining, agents* the status of these
laws is therefore in doubt* apparently non-c<m^liance with the law cannot
result In penalties m severe that they interfere with the-collective
bargaining power of the organisation*
Hine states -have regulated union internal affairs by.requiring
these organisations to Hie periodic reports and financial statements
with the state* Procedure with regard- to the availability of these
reports varies* in some states they are held bo be confidential and
subject to the scrutiny of state official© only,, while in.other ©bate©
the .public has access to them* A i m states require that reports’be
submitted to union members*

if ;Cnipn dues* fees and assessments have come within the control
of seven states* In general* this regulation la designed to prevent
racketeering practices by a email minority of union leaders and to pro**
beet the “worker whose job is often dependent upon union membership*
Although only on© state* Colorado* has enacted a law requiring
the ecvapulsory incorporation of labor unions* and although the % m ban
beep held unconstitutional by the state courts^ this method of regulating
the internal affairs of unions deserves mention* It constitutes a radical
experiment in the control of union affairs which hardly seems justifiable*
It has been shown that effective regulation of union activity and organisa
tion in the public interest is not dependent upon the forced adoption of
any particular i^pe of union structure* While it is difficult to concur
with the Colorado Supreme Court*s holding that compulsory incorporation
Interferes with civil liberties* the benefits of such regulation are
Clearly outweighed by the necessity of preserving freedom of organisation
and association*
Other methods of regulating union affairs include the prohibition
of political contributions in four states* the regulation of union
elections In five stages and the regulation of membership practices of
unions in those states which have enacted Fair Employment Practice Acts*

the administration of state industrial relations legislation is*
for the most part* left to the judicial branch #£ goverment* £n ten
States* however* administrative agencies have been set up to carry out

the:purposes'of. the,state legislation* In tm of these states# Michigan
'and Minnesota* the -administrative agency does net have1tire power to
enforce the law when .ft is violaied| in these states the tteourt technique0
in relied upon, and the chief faction of the agency- is to mediate -and
conciliate labor disputes*
. In.theeight states which haw given wide discretionary power over '
labor relations to a board or commission two general types of ada&nistra**
tloa are evident* In Massachusetts* Mew lork^ Connecticut, Utah and
Bhode Island the board is empowered to initiate ansi prosecute unfair
labor practices in its own right without the necessity of a formal cosh*
plaint having been filed by an aggrieved person* M Pennsylvania,
Colorado and Wisconsin# however# the state board or eomisslon merely
acta as a court of'first resort after a 'cosplaimt has been'' filedi the
agency in these states may not take the initiative in prosecuting unfair
practices#
Together with the prevention of unfair labor practices, an inportant
function of adatef^tr&tive.agencies is the certification #f collective
bargaining representatives' and the IV?lding of representation elections#
In Colorado and Wiscomin# collective bargaining representatives end
units arealways chosen by an election'‘held by the board or COTaission,
but In other states the board may decide what unit will best serve the
'Interests of employees#
Even in the eight states which rely upon the adaiinistrative rather
than the court technique of .labor relations law enforcement, (the technique
which leaves the enforcement of the legislation to the judiciary} the law

mi

preserves -the right of the courts to review orders and Judgements of •
the state agency* This, of course, provides protection'for individuals
from the arbitrary decisions of administrative officials*
xs*

a « iiis x M s

The preceding study of state .regulation of industrial relations
has revised in broad outline the general characteristics of state regu-*
■Xatory legislation ‘
in this field# little, attempt has been made to •
evaluate' the desirability of this body of'legislation in its entirety*
although criticism-or-defense of specific laws has not been lacking#
it- this point it is. appropriate to formulate conclusions based upon the
data which has been presented in' the preceding, chapters*
•4a examination of the present body of state legislation dealing
with industrial relations, reveals a preponderance of restrictive- regular
tien of .labor organisations* and a somewhat less aggregate, concern for
the actions of employers In the 'Industrial conflict# This fact indicates
a rather sharp departure-from the era of practically unlimited encourage**
meat of labor and its activitiessduring the early 1930*0# The condition
of Industrial relations at that time* however* -ms vastly different from
the present situation# - labor organisations were -weak .generally*: and the
,,
‘
’f
bargaining power of labor m s inferior to that of management# whence*,
both the state and national legislatures felt the necessity of restrict*
ing the employer*a ^rights* in the' industrial conflict* .as well' as the
need for strong'unions to meet the collective bargainliigopower of the 1
employer on equal terms# The lam- passed In this period reflected this

pMXoeophy, •«*$

they «ert

suecessfhl- in

achieving ihair -objectSires* ■la 193$, only throe and one-half million
at the present t im warn eighteen,taHlion persons

-.workers
belong to the anions*

The era of practically unlimited government encouragement of labor
organisations ended In 1939 on the state level of goverj»nt# and la 194?
on the federal level. The latter year olimxed the period of restrictive
labor legislation, with the passage-of the f&fWBartley-let as wel1"as
a. .great-deal of restrictive state legislation* In 1949,. there was some
indication that the movement had subsided, as pressure -'grew for the
repeal of the fa£t*»Hartley Act and as the repeal of restrictive XegisXa**
tion in Delaware and Missouri was effected*
The motives behind the restrictive labor legislation of the states
may be summarised' as-the desire to equalise the bargaining power of labor
and management*^ which many legislatures deemed to have swung too far in
favor of the unions, and the desire of the states to protect the individual
working man from the collective action of M s fellows* M order to
achieve these objectives the states have prohibited or strictly regulated
union security agreements, end have' regulated the use'of the basic weapons
i

**

of organized labor, including strikes, picketing and boycotting* Also,
*

in order to protect the’individual wbrker and the public, many states'
have passed legislation- which regulates the internal affairs of unions*
.the desirability of this body of legislation, particularly from the'
'■,i

-

6 Jg. Cohan* Sanford* State labor legislation. 1937~19i»7. Ohio
State University, 1943, p* 99*
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'fhe right of the states to regttiate or prohibit the closed shop,
the union ©hop and mlnbeneiiee^^

agreements is not subject

to question* the baited States Stpiw Court clarified this point In a
number of- recent decisions discussed in chapter three# fiats* whatever
conclusions may be dram with respect to union security relation
turn upon the desirability of such regulation rather than its legality#
The desirability or undesirability of union security regulation
must rest upon two considerations$ namely the right of iadividuals to
obtain work without encumbrance, and the necessity of maintaining the
bargaining power of organised labor# It is submitted that the closed
shop* while isaterially strengthening the bargaining power of labor*
Interfere© unduly with the rights of Individual., worker© to obtain
^jloyment* the monopolistic position of the union under a dosed shcp
agreement* particularly where a dosed, union has been instituted* enables
It to ©aeereis# power over the m m m io deailty of imkers to a degree
which is not hamodons with the public interest# The objections to
the dosed shop are partially removed* however* men the union mop is
considered* Under this type iif union security agreeaent the individual
worker is given, a chance to approve or disapprove its- e m m t& m * with
the laajosity .ruling in a secret ballot taken among es^loyees affected*
-fhe union shop .removes many of the undesirable featuyes of the closed shop
and at the same time it enables the union to

a strong bargaining

•position*. Even, if the union ©hop- is given public' approval, m it hasbeen under the provisions of the £afb#Hartley Act* ■m rtm m additional

safeguard© must be given the Individual; worker* In general* these
should include rather strict state regulation of union fees* dues- and
assessments, together with considerable government control of the
membership policies of organised labor*
It may he concluded that the union chop is more in Hue with the
public interest than is the closed shop* It is true, nevertheless* that
thirteen state© have 'adopted a public policy which outlaws all forms of
union security* In the final analysis* the desirability of these laws
smsb be tested by experience in the various states, and any arbitrary
condemnation of such legislation is not justified at the present time.
Regulation of picketing
, State proscription, of mas© picketing* picketing involving violence
and intimidation, and secondary picketing.!© desirable from the stand-*
point of the public .interest* It would be difficult to present a con
vincing defense'Of any of these foms of ,tn*ion activity* 'Peaceful
picketing, on the other hand should be protected by'the' state© m a
legitimate, weapon of organised labor*'.A curious situation has- developed
with, regard to the law of picketing* -however, in that a number'of states
have attempted 'to outlaw even peaceful, picketing in spite of'the fact
that the Supreme Court ha© ©truck down such statute© a© a violation of
conetitutionally protected freedom of speech*. the public welfare is-not
*best' sewed when auch^tates so limit iheuse of the

>of

labor
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that •its Imrg&ining power is drastically weakened. ■ .Apparently nothing
can be done to- rectify'this situation-until the state courts review .
cases arising out of violations of tjiese unconstitutional laws*
s i imsa&Uag.
State regulation of boycotting, which has been directed principally
toward limiting or prohibiting the secondary boycott seems desirable, on
the whole, frost the public standpoint* The element of coercion, which is
almost always present in a secondary boycott, involves the rights of
third parties which are interfered with even though they have no relation^
ship to the dispute*, 'The fact that the secondary boycott -lias been con
demned on a wide scale by the state governments as well'as'the federal.
*

’■

government is indicative of the-public attitude- toward this activity*
It may be- argued that labor should have the right to enlist the assist*
ance of third parties to further its interests in a dispute with an
employer* This assumption is valid insofar m the enlistment of aid "
is carried on in a .peaceful manner and the element of coercion and iniimi*
dation is absent* the publication of unfair lists would not violate
this principle* On the other hand, most secondary boycotts .Involve the
refusal to work with non-union .made materials or the bringing of pressure
to bear upon third, parties to refuse to handle the products of an employer*
To be effective these activities must foe coercive* since this is true,
the interests of the public are vitally affected* Hence, the state govern
ments have strongly condemned the secondary boycott as -an. illegal, use'
of collective union power*

"•/■■■V
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aims- s&fHsg.
State regulation of the right. ..to- strike .in private.industries
has generally taken the fom of prohlbiting oertain types of strikes.
Jurisdictional and. sit-down strikes have been widely p m M h iM M by the
states* 'and..such"action ‘
cannot he criticised from the standpoint of
the public interest*- With regard to the former type* however* it is
doubtful that legislative prohibition can do much to- remove the cause
of such strikes* fhe Michigan provision© with regard to jurisdictional
strikes constitute a.more enlightened viewpoint* in that state juris**
diction&l disputes must be submitted to iruediation* If mediation fails
the dispute is.settled by secret ballot among the affected employees*
*A recent development .in strike regulation which Is desirable.
requires, a majority vote among employees prior to the calling of a
strike#, this not only protects the'public from ^outlaw11 and ^wildcat1*
strikes* but also enables the union in the-same maimer from the actions
of a minority of Its‘members* the .individual worker-la also given acltemej^coice approval or disapproval of ©trike action* a. procedure
which gives him a greater share of influence in shaping the policies-of
the union*
State laws: which regulate the right to ©trike In essential public "
utilities must be defended on the ground, of-public interest in continuous
operation of these industries* It Is true* of course* thaithe process
of free collective bargaining has been ^Interfered with and organised
labor I© deprived of rights which are- considered to be -fundamental in

2M

as an Inevitable and desirable outcome of the growingpower of labor#
ihihlie control of'the:msml^rirtitp policies -of.labor

is

.also justified in light, of the quasi**public nature of the labor union*

As it has been indicated throughout this study* present state
regulation of industrial relations deals largely with the activities
and affairs of labor* the Importance of this legislation tea resulted
in. a lack of emphasis upon the somewhat older and more established regula
tion of employer prerogative* in. the industrial conflicts* The states*
however*, have .not left the employer free to deal with enployees without
restriction* The state anti-injunction laws- have* in most instances*
successfully prevented .the use- of the injunction in legitimate labor
disputes* and thus have 'limited the power of the employer to prevent the
mm

of the legal weapons of labor* KLaeklists and labor'spies have been

condemned In many states* as has the use of the yellow dog contract*
the state labor relations laws constitute the most extensive
regulation of the employer*; In the states in which suchlawe have- been
enacted*- the employer may not Interfere with or -aid a labor union* lie
may not discharge an employee for union membership nor for filing charges
under the provisions of the act* In short* the employer is prevented
from controlling or Interfering with the established and guaranteed rights
of his employees# from the standpoint of the public* this regulation is
highly desirable*- It- net only increases the bargaining power of labor*
but also -enables the worker to raise .his Standard of living* Encouragement

m

of this type of legislation In. other states would tend to offset what**
ever reduced labor bargaining power will reeolt from the' restriction©
Which .have recently been placed upon -the activities of onions* A
balance of bargaining power has been generally accepted as desirablef
but this, balance Cannot be attained in those states which do not prevent
the employer from interfering with the recognised rights of onions.
S m .tMSSialfea a£ J M state
m

chapter two it was indicated that a need for clarification of

the -division of power over- industrial relations between the state and
federal government exists* Present federal law with regard to this
problem is ambiguous* As a result* the courts have been forced to place
boundaries upon the limits of state and federal Jurisdiction based upon
inadequate legislative guide posts* Bven the .national'labor delations
Board is-uncertain as to the extent of its jurisdiction and the amount
of power within Its legal'jurisdiction which it may delegate to the '’
states.
It in submitted that :ihe states should be allowed to exercise'
power over industrial relations- where the dispute- in. -question does ‘not
materially affect interstate commerce and where the controversy is
primarily local In scope* 'If the present federal system of'government is
to survive* the states .must be- -granted'-wider powers than'they have been
allowed in the past* A trend is apparent, however, which would allow
the states wider latitude in matters of’industrial relations'"than they
have possessed since the passage of the 'Magner Act* fh© Supreme Court Is

wo
&%m r

more reluctant to .strike down state legislation which does not

conflict radically-with -the federal law and which is not an arbitrary
denial of; constitutionaX protections*.
The states 'have the potential ability, to foster industrial peacej
this power should be' given encouragement t r m Congress as well as from
the Supreme Court* In a. sense# the states provide a valuable service in
1

that they serve m the proving grounds for widely diversified industrial
relations legislation* U pm these experiments in social control the
federal government may base its actions* This fact# of course, embodies '
one of the strongest arguments against condemning any state action no
matter how restrictive of the rights of employees or employers it may be*
It is perhaps better that a law be proved inadequate and.--unjust through
trial on the state level of, government# than, that such esperb&entation
be conducted oil the federal level where the. effects of regulation involve
a 'much .greater sequent of industry and organized .labor*'- .
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